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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This article provides the most comprehensive discussion to date of
whether so-called automated, autonomous, self-driving, or driverless
vehicles can be lawfully sold and used on public roads in the United
States. The short answer is that the computer direction of a motor
vehicle’s steering, braking, and accelerating without real-time human
input is probably legal. The long answer, which follows, provides a
foundation for tailoring regulations and understanding liability issues
related to these vehicles.
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The article’s largely descriptive analysis, which begins with the prin-
ciple that everything is permitted unless prohibited, covers three key
legal regimes: the 1949 Geneva Convention on Road Traffic, regula-
tions enacted by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA), and the vehicle codes of all fifty U.S. states.
The Geneva Convention, to which the United States is a party,
probably does not prohibit automated driving. The treaty promotes
road safety by establishing uniform rules, one of which requires every
vehicle or combination thereof to have a driver who is “at all times . . .
able to control” it. However, this requirement is likely satisfied if a
human is able to intervene in the automated vehicle’s operation.
NHTSA’s regulations, which include the Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standards to which new vehicles must be certified, do not gen-
erally prohibit or uniquely burden automated vehicles, with the possi-
ble exception of one rule regarding emergency flashers.
State vehicle codes probably do not prohibit—but may compli-
cate—automated driving. These codes assume the presence of li-
censed human drivers who are able to exercise human judgment, and
particular rules may functionally require that presence. New York
somewhat uniquely directs a driver to keep one hand on the wheel at
all times. In addition, far more common rules mandating reasonable,
prudent, practicable, and safe driving have uncertain application to
automated vehicles and their users. Following-distance requirements
may also restrict the lawful operation of tightly spaced vehicle pla-
toons. Many of these issues arise even in the several states that ex-
pressly regulate automated vehicles.
The primary purpose of this article is to assess the current legal sta-
tus of automated vehicles. However, the article includes draft lan-
guage for U.S. states that wish to clarify this status. It also
recommends five near-term measures that may help increase legal cer-
tainty without producing premature regulation. First, regulators and
standards organizations should develop common vocabularies and
definitions that are useful in the legal, technical, and public realms.
Second, the United States should closely monitor efforts to amend or
interpret the 1969 Vienna Convention, which contains language simi-
lar to the Geneva Convention but does not bind the United States.
Third, NHTSA should indicate the likely scope and schedule of poten-
tial regulatory action. Fourth, U.S. states should analyze how their ve-
hicle codes would or should apply to automated vehicles, including
those that have an identifiable human operator and those that do not.
Finally, additional research on laws applicable to trucks, buses, taxis,
low-speed vehicles, and other specialty vehicles may be useful. This is
in addition to ongoing research into the other legal aspects of vehicle
automation.
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II. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that someone invents a time machine. Does she break the
law by using that machine to travel to the past? Whether the new
technology is time machines or automated vehicles, the answer is not
an automatic yes or no. Instead, that answer requires thoughtful con-
sideration of existing law—and begins with the common law’s pre-
sumption of legality. “There is no principle more essential to liberty,
or more deeply imbued in our law, than that what is not prohibited, is
permitted.”1 This fundamental principle finds its strongest application
in criminal law: Courts strictly construe criminal statutes in part be-
cause there can be “no crime without law”: nullum crimen sine lege.2
This principle is also recognized in other jurisdictions3—although per-
haps less so in Germany.4
1. United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1081 (9th Cir. 2006). But see infra note
8.
2. See id. (citing Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 348–49, 69 S.Ct. 106, 93
L.Ed. 52 (1948)); see also, e.g., United States v. Davis, 576 F.2d 1065, 1069 (3d Cir.
1978) (“Although proper judicial interpretation of any federal statute is always impor-
tant, proper judicial interpretation of a criminal statute is critical. The maxim nullum
crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege [no crime without law, no punishment without
law] reminds us that the courts may not punish conduct as criminal unless that con-
duct has transgressed the clear, plain, or fair meaning of the defined offense.”); see
Hirota v. Gen. of the Army Douglas MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 69 S. Ct. 1238, 93 L.
Ed. 1902 (1949) (Douglas, J., concurring); infra note 199.
3. See, e.g., Richard H. Steinberg, Who Is Sovereign?, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 329,
345 n.13 (2004) (“[I]t is well established that state behavior that is not prohibited is
permitted under international law.”) (citing Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8, 1996)); Sir John Laws, Beyond Rights, 23 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 265, 273 (2003) (“The first—I have a right to do something if I have no
obligation not to do it—reflects the general principle of the common law, that for the
individual citizen, everything that is not forbidden is allowed.”); Donna E. Arzt, So-
viet Anti-Semitism: Legal Responses in an Age of Glasnost, 4 TEMP. INT’L & COMP.
L.J. 163, 166 (1990) (“There is only one basic principle; information that discloses
state secrets or is capable of damaging the country’s interests is prohibited. There is
also only one formula for everything else: Anything that is not prohibited is permit-
ted.”) (quoting former media censor); Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La.
724, 734 (La. 1915) (“[A] general principle” in French property law is that “whatever
is not prohibited is permitted.”) (quoting Toullier); Stephen J. Werber, Cloning: A
Jewish Law Perspective with A Comparative Study of Other Abrahamic Traditions, 30
SETON HALL L. REV. 1114, 1135 (2000) (“[A] basic precept of Jewish law is that that
which is not prohibited is permitted.”).
4. See Otis R. Damslet, Same-Sex Marriage, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 555,
566 n.46 (1993) (quoting On the Record, TIME, Mar. 18, 1985, at 73 (“In Germany,
under the law everything is prohibited except that which is permitted. In France,
under the law everything is permitted except that which is prohibited. In the Soviet
Union, everything is prohibited, including that which is permitted. And in Italy, under
the law everything is permitted, especially that which is prohibited.”); Don Wallace,
Jr., Address to the 33rd Annual Meeting of the Section of Antitrust Law of the America
Bar Association, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 571, 571 (1985) (“There was a column written—
and he actually did this—in the Washington Post by Lloyd Cutler while he was coun-
sel to President Carter. He was trying to distinguish between the Anglo American,
German, and French approach to the law. He said of the common law approach, that
anything was allowed unless it were prohibited by law; the German approach was that
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Until legislators, regulators, or judges definitively clarify the legal
status of automated vehicles, any answer is necessarily a guess. But
some guesses are more helpful than others, and unsupported asser-
tions of illegality are particularly unhelpful.5 These assertions substi-
tute assumption for analysis and a presumption of illegality for the
presumption of legality. Reaching a useful conclusion about the legal
status of automated vehicles instead requires identification and inter-
pretation of all laws that might conceivably prohibit (or be construed
to prohibit) their manufacture, sale, or use. This article attempts such
an analysis, so while it begins with the presumption of legality, it seeks
to prove a hypothesis of legality by disproving illegality.
Illegality in this sense refers to the proscription of conduct rather
than to the mere assignment of legal responsibility for the costs of that
conduct. This article does not consider how the rules of tort could or
should apply to automated vehicles—that is, the extent to which tort
liability might shift upstream to companies that design, manufacture,
sell, operate, or provide data or other services to an automated vehi-
cle.6 Nonetheless, the legality of automated vehicles is foundational to
everything is prohibited unless permitted by law; and the French approach is that
everything is prohibited but anything can be arranged.”)); Richard A. Epstein, The
Permit Power Meets the Constitution, 81 IOWA L. REV. 407, 407–08 (1995) (“An old
observation of the German system of freedom is that all which is not permitted is
prohibited (which is at least better than what I take sometimes to be the modern
American position that all which is not prohibited is required).”). But see Grundge-
setz [German Basic Law] art. 2 para. 1 (“Jeder hat das Recht auf die freie Entfaltung
seiner Persönlichkeit, soweit er nicht die Rechte anderer verletzt und nicht gegen die
verfassungsmäbige Ordnung oder das Sittengesetz verstöbt.”) [“Every person shall
have the right to free development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the
rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral law.”]; see also,
e.g., Elfes Urteil, BVERFGE 6, 32, 1 BvR 253/56 (Bundesverfassungsgericht [Federal
Constitutional Court] Jan. 16, 1957) (broadly construing article 2, concluding that the
right to travel abroad flows from it, and preventing Wilhelm Elfes from exercising
that right); Reiten im Walde, BVERFGE 80, 137, 1 BvR 921/85 (Bundesverfassung-
sgericht June 6, 1989) (endorsing the broad construction of article 2 and concluding
that specific restrictions on riding horses in the woods are consistent with that
construction).
5. See, e.g., Tyler Cowen, Can I See Your License, Registration and C.P.U., N.Y.
TIMES, May 28, 2011 (“The driverless car is illegal in all 50 states.”); Florida House of
Representatives, Final Bill Analysis, CS/HB 1207, Summary Analysis, available at
www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?FileName=h1207z1.
THSS.DOCX&DocumentType=Analysis&BillNumber=1207&Session=2012, at 2
(“The only jurisdiction in the world where it is legal to operate autonomous vehicles
on public roads is in the state of Nevada, where a law authorizing them passed in June
2011.”); Autonomous car, WIKIPEDIA, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autonomous_car (Oct. 1,
2012) (“One of the most significant obstacles to the proliferation of autonomous cars
is the fact that they are illegal on most public roads.”).
6. See generally, e.g., STEPHEN N. ROBERTS, ALISON S. HIGHTOWER, MICHAEL
G. THORNTON, LINDA N. CUNNINGHAM, AND RICHARD G. TERRY, ADVANCED VEHI-
CLE CONTROL SYSTEMS: POTENTIAL TORT LIABILITY FOR DEVELOPERS  (1993);
NIDHI KALRA, JAMES ANDERSON, MARTIN WACHS , LIABILITY AND REGULATION OF
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TECHNOLOGIES 6–8 (2009) (California PATH Research Re-
port, UCB-ITS-PRR-2009-28), available at www.path.berkeley.edu/PATH/Publica-
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these matters, because violation of certain laws under certain condi-
tions can be used to establish negligence or defect7 and, to a lesser
extent, compliance with certain laws might limit liability.8 Contract
law, to which similar considerations may apply, is also outside this ar-
ticle’s scope.
The identification of relevant law is a rather large undertaking. Do-
mestic law includes, at a minimum, the U.S. constitution; federal stat-
utes and certain treaties; regulations and practices of federal
administrative agencies; constitutions of states, Native American
tribes, and territories; statutes of these and other jurisdictions; regula-
tions and practices of administrative agencies within these jurisdic-
tions; and ordinances and other enactments of municipalities and
other local authorities; as well as common law (i.e., case law) adopted
and adapted by courts within all these jurisdictions.9 International law
tions/PDF/PRR/2009/PRR-2009-28.pdf.; Bryant Walker Smith, Proximity-Driven
Liability, 102 Georgetown L.J. (forthcoming 2014), available at ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2336234; Bryant Walker Smith, Uncertain Liability, cyberlaw.stanford.edu/
blog/2013/05/uncertain-liability (listing additional resources).
7. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. Code § 669; CAL. CIV. PRAC. TORTS § 25:26. Notably,
“[t]his presumption may be rebutted by proof that . . . [t]he person violating the stat-
ute, ordinance, or regulation did what might reasonably be expected of a person of
ordinary prudence, acting under similar circumstances, who desired to comply with
the law.” CAL. EVID. Code § 669(b).
8. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (holding as a
matter of implied preemption that a federal motor vehicle safety standard that re-
quired airbags in only some new vehicles meant that the lack of an airbag could not
constitute a defect for the purpose of state product liability law). In general, however,
“it does not follow that merely because one has complied with the terms of a statute
or ordinance that one is absolved from negligence.” CALIFORNIA CIVIL PRACTICE:
TORTS § 25:26; see also Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1170
(D.N.J. 1984), rev’d, 789 F.2d 181 (3d. Cir. 1986) (“The arguments presented by the
defendants in this case symbolize a common misperception of the function of govern-
ment regulation and the imposition of standards of conduct which result. It would be
inappropriate to conclude that what is not prohibited is permitted or that a minimum
standard fixes the maximum as well. It is impossible for the government to codify
every act which should not be done or the standards by which every act should be
performed. Thus, government has frequently established standards in those areas in
which a particular industry has failed to establish its own. But injuries to persons,
property and the environment were wrong even before government declared that
they were wrong. Now that government has acted in many areas and decreed safety
and quality standards, it would be unfortunate if those directed to do no less, assume
that they need do no more. In almost every instance, government standards are meant
to fix a level of performance below which one should not fall. However, legal mini-
mums were never intended to supplant moral maximums. Nor were they intended to
eliminate pride in quality and craftsmanship or self-imposed standards of health and
safety.”).
9. Cf., e.g., BAILEY KUKLIN AND JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE
LAW: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL PRIMER (1994). Even private
standards can arguably behave like law. Cf. Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization As Dele-
gation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003).
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is a separate system derived from (again at a minimum) treaties, cus-
tom, and general principles.10
This paper identifies three key legal regimes: the 1949 Geneva Con-
vention on Road Traffic, regulations enacted by the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, and the vehicle codes of U.S. states (in
tandem with model language supplied by the Uniform Vehicle
Code11). It considers how these regimes might apply to both the sale
of automated passenger cars and the operation of such vehicles on
public roads in the United States. Its scope includes vehicle pla-
toons,12 which are discussed in an appendix,13 but excludes trucks,
buses, and taxicabs as well as all vehicles not operated on public
roads.
Interpreting these laws is, in many ways, more challenging than
merely identifying them. In domestic law, a statute is generally inter-
preted to carry out the will of the legislature that enacted it:
In all cases the object is to see what is the intention expressed by the
words used. But, from the imperfection of language, it is impossible
to know what that intention is without inquiring further, and seeing
what the circumstances were with reference to which the words
were used, and what was the object, appearing from those circum-
stances, which the person using them had in view; for the meaning
of the word varies according to the circumstances with respect to
which they were used.14
10. The Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38., June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1055 (1945).
11. UNIF. VEH. CODE (2000) (Millennium Edition). The Uniform Vehicle Code
has shaped or reflected the motor vehicle codes of many states since it was first pub-
lished in 1924. See infra Part VI. The most recent version was released in 2000 by the
National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances (NCUTLO), a private
nonprofit organization that “suspended operations about five years ago due to lack of
funding.” Email from NCUTLO’s former executive director (Mar. 20, 2012) (on file
with author).
12. A platoon is a convoy of tightly spaced and closely coordinated vehicles that
operates with at least some automation. See Tom Robinson & Eric Chan, Operating
Platoons on Public Motorways: An Introduction to the SARTRE Platooning Pro-
gramme, www.sartre-project.eu/en/publications/Documents/SARTRE_Overview_Fi-
nal_Paper_ITS_World_Congress_2010.pdf, at 2. Notable research includes the Safe
Road Trains for the Environment (SARTRE) project, see About the SARTRE pro-
ject, SARTE, www.sartre-project.eu/en/about/Sidor/default.aspx, and the earlier Na-
tional Automated Highways System Consortium, see Fact Sheet, Vehicle Platooning
and Automated Highways, CAL. PATH, www.path.berkeley.edu/path/Publications/
Media/FactSheet/VPlatooning.pdf (last visited Dec. 29, 2013).
13. See infra Part VIII.
14. River Wear Comm’rs v. Adamson, 2 AC 743 (1877) (Lord Blackburn); see
generally Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Standards of Judgment: Intent of
the Legislature, in 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45:5 (7th ed. 2007)
(“The question of meaning lies deeper than the law. It involves questions of judgment
too subtle for articulation and issues of the transference of knowledge as yet not fully
understood by lawyers, scientists or psychologists inter alia.”).
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Courts avail themselves of numerous interpretive theories, tech-
niques, and canons to arrive at results that are not necessarily obvious
from the words of the statute itself.15 For example, California’s vehicle
code provides that “[n]o person shall drive a vehicle upon a highway
at” an unreasonably high speed16 and expressly states that a bicycle is
not a “vehicle.”17 Nonetheless, a California court held that a bicyclist
could be convicted of speeding.18 This is because the code also pro-
vides that “[e]very person riding a bicycle upon a highway has all the
rights and is subject to all the provisions applicable to the driver of a
vehicle [under the rules of the road] . . . except those provisions which
by their very nature can have no application.”19 The court concluded
that “the clear legislative intent . . . was to make bicycles subject to the
same rules of the road as motor vehicles” and that “[t]o rule otherwise
would inevitably frustrate the manifest purposes of the legislation as a
whole and lead to absurd results.”20
In international law, “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”21
That context includes, inter alia, the treaty’s “text, including its pream-
ble and annexes.”22 Together with that context, “[t]here shall be taken
into account,” inter alia, “any subsequent practice in the application
of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding
its interpretation.” In general, “[w]hen a treaty has been authenticated
in two or more languages, the text is equally authoritative in each lan-
guage.”23 Furthermore, “supplementary means of interpretation, in-
15. Despite a “trend” toward interpreting public-safety legislation liberally to ad-
vance its basic purpose of preventing physical harm, “courts have not developed a
uniform attitude or policy in its construction. In many cases, courts have expressed, or
have seemed to follow, a strict interpretation.” Norman J. Singer and J.D. Shambie
Singer, Statutes Enacted for the Public Safety, in 3A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION § 73:4 (7th ed. 2007).
16. CAL. VEH. CODE § 22350 (West 2000).
17. Id. § 670.
18. People v. Fong, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 907, 908 (App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1993).
19. CAL. VEH. CODE § 21200.
20. Fong, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 908; see also McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25
(1931) (Holmes, J.) (strictly interpreting a criminal statute to hold that an airplane is
not a vehicle under the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act); Men Busted for Riding
Horse Drunk, ABCNEWS (Jan. 12, 2011), abcnews.go.com/US/video/men-busted-for-
riding-horse-drunk-12598140 (discussing whether a Texas statute criminalizing the in-
toxicated operation of a motor vehicle includes riding a horse).
21. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679. The United States, like all states, is bound by customary
international law—norms that are established through state belief and practice rather
than through treaties. Some of these norms with respect to treaties have been codified
in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). Although the United
States is not a party to the VCLT and this treaty does not apply retroactively to the
Geneva Convention, those portions of the VCLT that codify customary law are useful
as an expression of that binding law.
22. Id. art. 31.
23. Id. art. 33.
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cluding the preparatory work of the treaty,” may be used to “confirm”
a meaning “or to determine the meaning when the interpretation”
would otherwise be “ambiguous or obscure” or produce “a result
which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”24 For example, the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights relied on history and context to inter-
pret the term “alcoholics” as encompassing persons who might not be
addicted to alcohol but “whose conduct and behavior under the influ-
ence of alcohol pose a threat to public order or themselves.”25 Since
definitions matter, this article turns to them now.
III. AUTOMATED DRIVING REQUIRES NO REAL-TIME
HUMAN INPUT
For the purpose of this article, automated driving and automated
operation each mean computer direction of a vehicle’s steering, brak-
ing, and accelerating without real-time human input. An automated
vehicle is a motor vehicle capable of automated driving.26 As the re-
maining sections of this article conclude, existing law does not cate-
gorically prohibit the sale or automated operation of such vehicles.
That conclusion is only one part of the article’s analysis. That is be-
cause the lack of real-time human input does not necessarily negate a
human role in the vehicle’s operation. Only in the narrowest transitive
sense does driving refer exclusively to the direct physical manipulation
of a motor vehicle’s steering wheel, throttle, brake, clutch, and related
mechanisms; one hopes that routine statements like “we drove to the
beach” do not imply that these responsibilities are being shared at any
given moment.
24. Id. art. 32.
25. Judgment of 4 April 2000, European Court of Human Rights App. no. 26629/
95, cited in RICHARD K. GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 39 (2008); see also,
e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 86 (July 8,
1996).
26. This broad definition includes any vehicle that is autonomous under Nevada,
Florida, or California law, see infra Part VI.D, or that is partially, highly, or fully
automated under the German classification, see infra note 34. Real-time input could
be provided by nonhuman systems external to the vehicle. In this way, the definition
includes some connected vehicles, see Steven E. Shladover, Cooperative (Rather than
Autonomous) Vehicle-Highway Automation Systems, IEEE INTELLIGENT TRANSP.
SYS. MAG. (Spring 2009), ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=51176
54&tag=1, and conventional vehicles that are operated by a physically distinct robot,
cf. U.S. Def. Advanced Res. Projects Agency (DARPA), Broad Agency Announce-
ment, DARPA Robotics Challenge, TACTICAL TECH. OFF. (TTO), DARPA-BAA-12-
39 (April 10, 2012), www.fbo.gov/spg/ODA/DARPA/CMO/DARPA-BAA-12-39/
listing.html (“For Event 1 (drive a utility vehicle to the site) the robot must demon-
strate mounted mobility by ingress to the vehicle, driving it on a road, and egress from
the vehicle. The robot must also demonstrate manipulation by operating the controls,
including steering, throttle, brakes, and ignition.”); DARPA Seeks Robot Enthusiasts
(and You) to Face off for $2M Prize!, DARPA (Apr. 10, 2012), www.darpa.mil/News
Events/Releases/2012/04/10.aspx. This paper does not examine laws specific to trucks,
buses, and taxicabs.
420 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1
A more useful conception of driving recognizes all of its constituent
elements. Primary tasks involve the selection of destinations and their
order (trip), roads to those destinations (route), lanes as well as the
turns and merges onto them (path), and speed and spacing within
those lanes (position).27 Secondary tasks involve the adjustment of
safety features such as windshield wipers, lights, and turn signals.28
Tertiary tasks involve the adjustment of comfort features such as the
radio or air conditioning.29 Vehicle propulsion—whether combustion
or current—arguably adds a fourth set of driving tasks. Each of these
tasks requires the perception of information, a decision based on that
information, and the execution of that decision.30
In this way, a human-machine system may actually “drive” an auto-
mated vehicle: Some of the constituent tasks may be performed by a
human, others by a machine, and still others by a combination—either
sequential or simultaneous—of humans and machines.31 This per-
formance may occur in advance or in real time, remotely or in the
vehicle, and independent of or in cooperation with other actors.32 And
it may vary depending on the particular domain of operation.33
Properly conceptualizing this system has been a key first step in a
number of efforts, including those by the German Federal Highway
Research Agency,34 the U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin-
27. See Wuhong Wang, Fuguo Hou, Huachun Tan, & Heiner Bubb, A Framework
for Function Allocations in Intelligent Driver Interface Design for Comfort and Safety,
3 INT’L J. COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SYS., 531, 535–36 (2010); Dagmar Kern &
Albrecht Schmidt, Design Space for Driver-based Automotive User Interfaces, Pro-
ceedings of the First International Conference on Automotive User Interfaces and
Interactive Vehicular Applications (2009); Thomas A. Ranney, Models of Driving Be-
havior: A Review of Their Evolution, 26 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 733,
741–43 (1994); PRAVIN VARAIYA & STEVEN E. SHLADOVER, SKETCH OF AN IVHS
SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE (1990, rev. 1991) (discussing route, path, and maneuver);
Kalra, supra note 6, at 6–8 (2009) (discussing sensing, planning and acting).
28. See supra note 27.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Consider, for example, antilock brakes, electronic stability control, and con-
ventional as well as adaptive cruise control.
32. Cf. Shladover, supra note 26 (discussing cooperative systems).
33. Domain in this sense includes traffic complexity (ranging from facilities used
only by vehicles of a certain type to urban streets used by a variety of motor vehicle,
bicycle, and pedestrian traffic), environmental conditions (ranging from dry to snowy
and from dark to sunny), and vehicle speed (ranging from the very low speeds charac-
teristic of parking maneuvers to the high speeds characteristic of freeways).
34. Tom M. Gasser (Projektgruppenleitung), Clemens Arzt, Mihiar Ayoubi, Arne
Bartels, Lutz Bürkle, Jana Eier, Frank Flemisch, Dirk Häcker, Tobias Hesse, Werner
Huber, Christine Lotz, Markus Maurer, Simone Ruth-Schumacher, Jürgen Schwarz,
und Wolfgang Vogt, Rechstfolgen zunehmender Fahrzeugautomatisierung, Gemein-
samer Schlussbericht der Projektgruppe, Berichte der Bundesanstalt für
Strabenwesen (BASt), Fahrzeugtechnik Heft F 83, at 9 (2012). This report on the
“legal consequences of increasing vehicle automation” is impressive. To order it as a
German-language hardcopy on BASt’s website, see Rechtsfolgen zunehmender
2014] AUTOMATED VEHICLES ARE PROBABLY LEGAL 421
istration,35 and the influential standards organization formerly known
as the Society of Automotive Engineers.36 Some, including these
three, have defined multiple levels of automation.37 Some have recog-
nized multiple dimensions.38 Some have attempted to draw a single
bright line between conventional and automated vehicles.39 Others
have yet to determine their approach.40 And at least one rejects
Fahrzeugautomatisierung, www.bast.de/nn_42254/DE/Publikationen/Berichte/unter-
reihe-f/2013-2012/f83.html.
35. National Highway Traffic Administration, Preliminary Statement of Policy
Concerning Automated Vehicles, www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/Press+Releases/
U.S.+Department+of+Transportation+Releases+Policy+on+Automated+Vehicle+
Development (last visited on April 7, 2014).
36. SAE International, Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to On-Road
Motor Vehicle Automated Driving Systems, Document J3016, available at stan-
dards.sae.org/j3016_201401, discussed at Bryant Walker Smith, SAE Levels of Auto-
mation, cyberlaw.stanford.edu/loda (last visited April 7, 2014). I serve on the
committee that drafted these definitions. See SAE International On-Road Autono-
mous Vehicle Standards Committee, SAE INT’L, www.sae.org/works/committee
Home.do?comtID=TEVAVS (last visited Jan. 5, 2014). NHTSA has incorporated past
SAE standards. See, e.g., infra note 274 and text accompanying.
37. See supra notes 34-36; see also The Future of Driving, Deliverable D61.1, Final
Report, HAVEIT 28, haveit-eu.org/LH2Uploads/ItemsContent/24/HAVEit_212154_
D61.1_Final_Report_Published.pdf (describing automation as a spectrum ranging
from complete human control to complete computer control); THOMAS B. SHERIDAN,
TELEROBOTICS, AUTOMATION, AND HUMAN SUPERVISORY CONTROL 260 (1992) (de-
fining multiple levels).
38. The BASt report identifies maximum operating speed as a second dimension,
which divides into low speeds (parking and shunting), medium speeds (traffic jams
and city driving), and high speeds (motorways). Gasser, supra note 34, at 9. The
leader of the project group subsequently suggested a potential third dimension,
namely the length of time that a particular function is used. See Tom M. Gasser &
Daniel Westhoff, BASt-study: Definitions of Automation and Legal Issues in Ger-
many, 2012 Road Vehicle Automation Workshop, Transportation Research Board, at
6 (July 25, 2012), onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/conferences/2012/Automation/
presentations/Gasser.pdf. Steven E. Shladover offers a useful taxonomy of driving en-
vironments. Steven E. Shladover, Automated Vehicles: Terminology and Taxonomy,
2012 Road Vehicle Automation Workshop, Transportation Research Board (July 25,
2012), onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/conferences/2012/Automation/presentations/
Shladover1.pdf. And a federal working group sponsored by the National Institute for
Standards and Technology (NIST) describes “contextual autonomy” in three dimen-
sions: the complexity of the mission assigned to the system, the complexity of the
environment in which that system performs its mission, and the degree to which that
performance is performed without human involvement. Hui-Min Huang, Autonomy
Levels for Unmanned Systems (ALFUS) Framework: Safety and Application Issues,
NAT. INST. STANDARDS & TECH., www.nist.gov/customcf/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=823619
(last visited Dec. 29, 2013).
39. See generally infra Part VI.D (describing autonomous driving laws in Nevada,
Florida, and California).
40. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO), for example, has
published standards for adaptive cruise control (ACC), traffic impediment warning
systems, and functional safety and is now developing a lanekeeping standard, but it
has not placed these systems within a larger taxonomy of automation. See ISO
15622:2010, Intelligent Transport Systems – Adaptive Cruise Control Systems—Per-
formance Requirements and Test Procedures, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION,
www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=50024
(last visited Jan. 4, 2014); ISO/TS 15624:2001, Transport Information and Control Sys-
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the enterprise altogether.41 Even the terminology used is conten-
tious.42
Regardless of how it is described, the idea of a human-machine sys-
tem is critical to the article’s full analysis. This analysis assumes that
such a system is technically capable of driving in a manner that would
tems—Traffic Impediment Warning Systems (TIWS)—System Requirements, INT’L
ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_tc/catalogue_
detail.htm?csnumber=27833 (last visited Jan. 4, 2013); ISO 26262:2011, Road Vehi-
cles—Functional Safety, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, www.iso.org/iso/cata-
logue_detail?csnumber=43464 (last visited Jan. 4, 2014) (nine parts total); ISO/CD
11270, Intelligent Transport Systems—Lane keeping Assist Systems (LKAS), INT’L
ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_tc/catalogue_
detail.htm?csnumber=50347 (last visited Jan. 4, 2014).
41. See Def. Sci. Board, The Role of Autonomy in DoD Systems, FED’N AM.
SCIENTISTS 23–24 (July 2012), www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/autonomy.pdf (“The
pervasive effort to define autonomy and to create vehicle autonomy roadmaps is
counterproductive. . . . The attempt to define autonomy has resulted in a waste of
both time and money spent debating and reconciling different terms and may be con-
tributing to fears of unbounded autonomy. . . . A negative consequence of the com-
mitment to levels of autonomy is that it deflects focus from the fact that all
autonomous systems are joint human-machine cognitive systems, thus resulting in
brittle designs.”).
42. Although both “automation” and “autonomy” are frequently used to mean
computer control, these words have subtly different meanings. Compare Automation,
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2013) (“The action or process of introducing auto-
matic equipment or devices into a manufacturing or other process or facility; (also)
the fact of making something (as a system, device, etc.) automatic.”) (selected defini-
tion) with Autonomy, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2013) (“With reference to a
thing: the fact or quality of being unrelated to anything else, self-containedness; inde-
pendence from external influence or control, self-sufficiency.”) (selected definition).
Automation describes the replacement of human labor through technology; “auto-
mated driving” is therefore driving performed by a computer. In contrast, autonomy
describes a system’s independence from external control; “autonomous driving” is
therefore driving performed by itself. Without careful identification of the system and
its boundaries, this term is unclear. Steven E. Shladover argues that the use of the
term “autonomous” in this sense is incorrect rather than merely unclear. See
Shladover (2009), supra note 26. The level of autonomy (or, conversely, cooperation)
refers to the degree to which driver-vehicle pairs are isolated from each other. Id.
Under this conception, today’s vehicles are largely autonomous. Id. In contrast, vehi-
cles that are tightly coordinated with each other (through vehicle-to-vehicle commu-
nication known as “V2V”) and with infrastructure (through vehicle-to-infrastructure
communication known as “V2I”) would be both automated and cooperative but not
autonomous. Id. Yet another conception of these terms treats “autonomous driving”
as “[t]he extreme end result of automated driving.” Margriet van Schijndel-de Nooij
et al., Definition of Necessary Vehicle and Infrastructure Systems for Automated Driv-
ing, at 12 (SMART 2010/0064, Study Report v 1.2 for European Commission) (2011),
ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/esafety/doc/studies/automated/reportfinal.
pdf, at 12. Under this conception, automated driving overlaps with cooperative driv-
ing, which includes both “automotive and road traffic systems.” Id. at 11. Statutes in
Nevada, Florida, and California reference “autonomous vehicles,” see infra Part
VI.D, as do many media articles, see Autonomous Driving v. Self-driving v. Driver-
less, GOOGLE TRENDS, www.google.com/insights/search/#q=autonomous%20driving
%2Cself-driving%2Cdriverless&gprop=news (last visited Dec. 29, 2013). Ultimately,
the technical, legal, and popular usages of these terms may or may not coalesce.
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be considered reasonable today.43 To this end, the particular division
of tasks between human and machine is a technical question: A
human must perform those tasks that the machine cannot. But it is
also a legal question: A human may be required to perform certain
tasks regardless of what the machine can do or is doing. These two
questions are distinct.44
This article asks whether the division of tasks that is legally required
deviates from the division of tasks that is technically required. In
other words, does existing law impose obligations on the human user
of an automated vehicle that are not technically necessary? For exam-
ple, an automated vehicle may be technically able to operate without
a human present, but that operation might only be legal if a licensed
human driver is in the driver’s seat.45
Four levels of human participation in driving help simplify this anal-
ysis. In the first, no human is available to provide real-time input to
the automated vehicle—perhaps because she is asleep or at home. In
the second, a human is physically present and able to provide such
input whenever she desires. In the third, that human is monitoring the
vehicle and is available to provide such input at some point after the
vehicle requests it. And in the fourth, that human is monitoring the
vehicle’s environment and is available to provide real-time input im-
mediately, regardless of whether the vehicle requests it. These levels
can variously describe what a human is actually doing, what she is
technically required to be doing, and what she is legally required (or
legally presumed) to be doing.
As a general matter, the automation, delegation, or division of work
previously performed by a single person is hardly new to law. The
most instructive model for automation may actually be corporatiza-
tion—that is, how law has addressed notions of specialization, control,
and responsibility among multiple human and nonhuman actors in
complex systems.46 Particularly relevant examples may include corpo-
rate personhood, the identity of an investor under patent law, and,
43. This assumption is critical to the conclusions that follow. The conclusion that
“automated vehicles are legal” is limited in the same way that the assertion about the
legality of any product (including motor vehicles) is limited: They must all meet cer-
tain standards, which in the case of motor vehicles includes some level of safe per-
formance. See infra Parts V, VI.C.
44. Similarly, technical control, technical responsibility, legal control, and legal re-
sponsibility are probably not coextensive concepts. In the legal context, this raises
questions regarding vicarious and other forms of strict liability, culpability (mens rea),
and conduct by actors subject to the law (actus reus).
45. See infra Part VI.B.2.
46. Automation could also increase standardization and aggregation. See, e.g., Lisa
Shay, Woodrow Hartzog, John Nelson, Dominic Larkin, & Gregory Conti, Con-
fronting Automated Law Enforcement, WE ROBOT 19 (Apr. 2, 2012), ro-
bots.law.miami.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Shay-EtAl-
ConfrontingAutomatedLawEnf.pdf; infra Part IV.D.
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potentially, regulation of high-speed electronic trading.47 This article
begins its legal analysis with a treaty directed at an earlier instance of
automation, namely the automobile.
IV. THE CONVENTION ON ROAD TRAFFIC DOES NOT
CATEGORICALLY PROHIBIT AUTOMATED DRIVING
The 1949 Geneva Convention on Road Traffic, to which the United
States is a party, promotes road safety by establishing uniform rules.
These rules include article 8, which requires every vehicle or combina-
tion thereof to have a driver who is “at all times . . . able to control”
it.48 The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Traffic, to which the
United States is not a party, contains similar language that might be
clarified by amendment.49 Article 8 of the Geneva Convention is
probably satisfied if a human is able to intervene in operation of the
vehicle and possibly satisfied if that vehicle operates within the
bounds of human judgment.50 However, because the Convention is
binding internationally and may be binding domestically, clarification
of these issues is desirable.51
A. The Geneva Convention’s History Informs Article 8’s
Driver Rule
The Convention on Road Traffic signed at Geneva in 1949,52 best
known in connection with one type of international driving permit,53
was intended to “promot[e] the development and safety of interna-
tional road traffic by establishing certain uniform rules.”54 The
“[r]ules of the road” contained in chapter II of the treaty are directed
at domestic as well as international traffic; they constitute “minimum
regulations which would be observed by vehicles traveling inside the
47. The legal response to these developments has not been entirely satisfactory.
See, e.g., Ralph D. Clifford, Intellectual Property in the Era of the Creative Computer
Program: Will the True Creator Please Stand Up?, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1675, 1696–97
(1997) (noting an implicit requirement in patent law that the inventor be human);
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (overturning
campaign spending restrictions on corporations and unions as a violation of the first
amendment’s protection of free speech).
48. See infra Part IV.A.
49. See infra Part IV.B.
50. See infra Parts IV.C.–IV.D.
51. See infra Part IV.E.
52. Convention on Road Traffic, Geneva, Sept. 19, 1949, 3 U.S.T. 3008, 125
U.N.T.S. 3, available at treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsV.aspx?&src=TREATY&
mtdsg_no=XI~B~1&chapter=11&Temp=mtdsg5&lang=en [hereinafter Geneva
Convention].
53. See id. art. 24 (“Each Contracting State shall allow any driver admitted to its
territory who fulfils [certain] conditions . . . and who holds a valid driving permit
issued to him . . . to drive [certain motor vehicles] on its roads without further exami-
nation. . . . A Contracting State may however require that any driver admitted to its
territory shall carry an international driving permit conforming to the model . . . .”).
54. Id. at pmbl.
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borders of their country of origin so that foreign motorists would
know roughly what standard of behavior to expect.”55 Most of these
rules are directed at “the driver.”56 The provisions of particular inter-
est are contained in article 8, which reads as follows:
1. Every vehicle or combination of vehicles proceeding as a unit shall
have a driver.
2. Draught, pack or saddle animals shall have a driver, and cattle
shall be accompanied, except in special areas which shall be marked
at the points of entry.
3. Convoys of vehicles and animals shall have the number of drivers
prescribed by domestic regulations.
4. Convoys shall, if necessary, be divided into sections of moderate
length, and be sufficiently spaced out for the convenience of traffic.
This provision does not apply to regions where migration of nomads
occurs.
5. Drivers shall at all times be able to control their vehicles or guide
their animals. When approaching other road users, they shall take
such precautions as may be required for the safety of the latter.57
Article 4 defines driver as “any person who drives a vehicle, including
cycles, or guides draught, pack or saddle animals or herds or flocks on
a road, or who is in actual physical control of the same.”58 Motor vehi-
cle is also defined; vehicle is not.59
55. United Nations Economic and Social Council, United Nations Conference on
Road and Motor Transport, Committee II on Technical Conditions to be Fulfilled by
Vehicles, Summary Record of the Seventeenth Meeting, Held at the Palais des Nations,
Geneva, on Tuesday, 6 September 1949 at 9:45 AM, E/CONF.8/C.II/SR.17/Rev. 1 (18
Nov. 1949) at 7. This paper usually references the revised version (“Rev.”) of the
Geneva conference’s summary records when the pertinent pages of that version are
available and legible.
56. See Geneva Convention, supra note 52, arts. 7 (“Every driver, pedestrian or
other road user shall conduct himself in such a way as not to endanger or obstruct
traffic; he shall avoid all behaviour that might cause damage to persons, or public or
private property.”), 8 (“5. Drivers shall at all times be able to control their vehicles or
guide their animals. When approaching other road users, they shall take such precau-
tions as may be required for the safety of the latter.”), 9 (“As a general rule and
whenever the provisions of Article 7 so require, every driver shall: (a) on two-lane
carriageways intended for two-way traffic, keep his vehicle in the lane appropriate to
the direction in which he is travelling; (b) on carriageways with more than two lanes,
keep his vehicle in the lane nearest to the edge of the carriageway appropriate to the
direction in which he is travelling.”), 10 (“The driver of a vehicle shall at all times
have its speed under control and shall drive in a reasonable and prudent manner. He
shall slow down or stop whenever circumstances so require, and particularly when
visibility is not good.”), 12 (“1. Every driver approaching a fork, crossroads, road
junction or level-crossing shall take special precautions to avoid accidents. . . .”), 13
(“Drivers shall not leave vehicles or animals until they have taken all necessary pre-
cautions to avoid an accident.”). In addition to these obligations, a driver arguably has
rights as well. See art. 24 (“Each Contracting State shall allow any driver admitted to
its territory [who has met certain conditions] . . . to drive on its roads without further
examination [certain] motor vehicles. . . .”).
57. Geneva Convention, supra note 52, art. 8 (emphasis added).
58. Id. art. 4.
59. Id. art. 4.
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The origin of these provisions is illuminating. The 1949 treaty was
drafted under the auspices of the Economic and Social Council of the
United Nations to “terminate and replace, in relations between the
Contracting States, the International Convention relative to Motor
Traffic and the International Convention relative to Road Traffic
signed at Paris on 24 April 1926, and the Convention of Inter-Ameri-
can Automotive Traffic opened for signature at Washington on 15 De-
cember 1943.”60 The 1926 Motor Traffic Convention, for its part,
modified the Convention with Respect to the International Circula-
tion of Motor Vehicles signed at Paris in 1909.61 (Of these earlier trea-
ties, the Inter-American Convention62 is the only one to which the
United States is a party.63) The negotiators at Geneva proceeded from
a draft treaty that had been prepared within the Economic Commis-
sion for Europe.64 The ECE drafters “kept constantly in mind and
60. Geneva Convention, supra note 52, art. 30; see International Convention relat-
ing to Road Traffic, Paris, Apr. 24, 1926, 1929 L.N.T.S. 82, No. 2220 [hereinafter 1926
Road Traffic Convention]; International Convention relative to Motor Traffic, Paris,
Apr. 24, 1926, 1930 L.N.T.S. 123, No. 2505 [hereinafter 1926 Motor Traffic Conven-
tion]; Convention on the Regulation of Inter-American Automotive Traffic, Washing-
ton, Dec. 15, 1943, available at www.oas.org/dil/treaties_C-11_Convention_on_the_
Regulation_of_Inter-American_Auto-Motive_Traffic.PDF [hereinafter 1943 Conven-
tion]. Only the French texts of the two 1926 treaties are authoritative. See 1926 Road
Traffic Convention at 1; 1926 Motor Traffic Convention, at 1. It is conceivable that
they still govern relations between certain states.
61. 1926 Motor Traffic Convention, supra note 60, at pmbl.; see Convention with
Respect to the International Circulation of Motor Vehicles, signed at Paris, Oct. 11,
1909, 4 AM. J. INTL. L. 316, 316–28 (1910), available at www.jstor.org/stable/2212082
[hereinafter 1909 Convention]. This paper uses the term “treaty” to refer to each
negotiated document, but other uses are possible. See Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, supra note 21, art. 2(2).
62. This treaty continues to govern relations between the United States and nine
states (Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pan-
ama, and Uruguay) that have not ratified the Geneva Convention. Organization of
American States, Signatories and Ratifications, Convention on the Regulation of Inter-
American Auto-Motive Traffic, available at www.oas.org/dil/treaties_C-11_Conven-
tion_on_the_Regulation_of_Inter-American_Auto-Motive_Traffic_sign.htm.
63. As the lead U.S. representative to the Geneva conference explained, “The
United States had been represented at the 1926 Conference merely by a delegation of
six observers. It had therefore been unable to accede to or ratify the Conventions
which that Conference had drawn up. . . . [H]is country now realised the importance
and necessity of a world-wide convention in the field of road transport.” United Na-
tions Economic and Social Council, United Nations Conference on Road and Motor
Transport, Summary Record of the Second Meeting, Held at the Palais des Nations,
Geneva, on Wednesday, 24 August 1949 at 10 a.m., E/CONF.8/SR.2/Rev.1, at 10 (14
Nov. 1949). Indeed, U.S. motorists in 1949 “operate[d] a total of more than 35 million
private automobiles,” H.H. Kelly, United Nations Conference on Road and Motor
Transport, A Report on the Preparation, Formulation, and Signature of a World Con-
vention on Road Traffic, U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, Vol. XXI, No. 545. 875a
(Dec. 12, 1949), which accounted for “more than 70 percent of all the motor vehicles
in the world,” id. “The largest volume of travel has been into Canada, Mexico, and
Cuba, but . . . about 3,000 United States cars [were] taken to Europe for touring
purposes” in 1949 alone. Id.
64. Specifically, the Sub-Committee on Road Transport of the Inland Transport
Committee of the Economic Commission for Europe. Actually, both this draft and
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were guided by the ideas contained in” the 1943 Convention65 but
were clearly influenced by the Paris treaties as well.66
Without recorded discussion, the Geneva committee responsible for
what would become article 8 adopted the ECE draft’s requirements
that “[e]very vehicle or combination of vehicles proceeding as a unit
. . . have a driver” and that “[d]rivers . . . at all times be able . . . to
control their vehicles or guide their animals.”67 These draft provisions
come from two articles in the 1926 Road Traffic Convention (which
are themselves based on a French draft prepared for the conference
that produced both 1926 treaties).68 Article 2 provides in part that
the 1943 Convention were designated as working papers for the conference, see
United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report of the second session of the
Transport and Communications Commission, Resolutions of 28 August 1948, E/1053
(28 August 1948), in Resolutions adopted by the Economic and Social Council during
its seventh session from 19 July to 29 August 1948, E/1065/Corr.1 (11 March 1953),
but the ECE document clearly served as the draft treaty.
65. Economic Commission for Europe, Inland Transport Committee, Sub-Com-
mittee on Road Transport, Draft Provisions for Insertion in a Convention on Road
and Motor Transport, Explanatory Memorandum submitted by the Sub-Committee on
Road Transport, E/ECE/86 as corrected by E/ECE/86. Corr. 1, para. 3 [hereinafter
ECE Memo], in UK Ministry of Transport, Draft Provisions for Insertion in a Conven-
tion on Road and Motor Transport and Explanatory Memorandum, London (1949)
[hereinafter UK Ministry of Transport].
66. “Mr. PERLOWSKY (AIT/FIA) drew attention to the fact that the Draft Con-
vention was based on the International Convention relative to Road Traffic and the
International Convention relative to Motor Traffic, both signed in 1926, as well as on
the Convention concerning the Unification of Road Signals, signed in 1931, the two
latter of which contained provisions relating to national traffic.” United Nations Eco-
nomic and Social Council, United Nations Conference on Road and Motor Transport,
Committee I on Legal and General Matters and Documents, Summary Record of the
First Meeting, Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Wednesday, 24 August 1949
at 3 p.m., E/CONF.8/C.1/SR.1, at 9 (24 Aug. 1949).
67. United Nations Economic and Social Council, United Nations Conference on
Road and Motor Transport, Committee III on Road Traffic, Summary Record of the
Second Meeting, Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Thursday, 25 August 1949
at 10 a.m., E/CONF.8/C.III/SR.2/Rev.1 (21 November 1949), at 4, 6. At some point,
the word “must” in clause one was changed to “shall” and the phrase “able and in a
position to control” in clause five was changed to “able to control.” How and when
these changes occurred, however, is unclear.
68. The French draft prepared for the 1926 Paris conference provided as follows
(in a section entitled “Conduite des Véhicules, Bêtes de Charge ou de Trait et
Animaux”):
Art. 2. Tout véhicule doit avoir un conducteur; toutefois, un convoi de
véhicules à traction animale peut ne comporter qu’un conducteur par trois
véhicules à condition que les attelages du deuxième et du troisième soient
attachés à l’arrière du véhicule qui les précède immédiatement.
Les bêtes de trait ou de charge et les bestiaux en circulation sur la route
doivent être accompagnés.
Art. 3. Les conducteurs doivent être constamment en état et en position
de diriger leur véhicule ou de guider leurs attelages, bêtes de trait, de charge
ou bestiaux . . . .
République Française, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Conférence Internatio-
nale relative à la Circulation Automobile et Routière, 1926 Paris, Imprimerie Nation-
ale 1927, 197693.
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“[e]very vehicle proceeding singly must have a driver,” and article 3
provides in part that “[d]rivers shall at all times be able and in a posi-
tion to control their vehicle or guide their teams or draught, pack or
saddle animals.” Significantly, these express requirements are absent
from the three treaties that address only motor vehicles.69
This history suggests that article 8 was addressed to unsupervised
animals (including animal-powered vehicles) rather than to un-
supervised automobiles. As a practical matter, cows, sheep, mules,
and horses (with or without carts in tow) might be perfectly capable of
reaching their destination without human control.70 Cars were not.
Even the visionary behind the General Motors Futurama at the 1939-
40 World’s Exhibition stopped short of predicting a truly driverless
car:
[T]hese cars of 1960 and the highways on which they drive will have
in them devices which will correct the faults of human beings as
drivers. They will prevent the driver from committing errors. They
will prevent his turning out into traffic except when he should. They
will aid him in passing through intersections without slowing down
or causing anyone else to do so and without endangering himself or
others.71
In 1949 (as in 1926), deliberately requiring a motor vehicle to have a
driver would have seemed as important as deliberately requiring that
vehicle to maintain contact with the ground. Indeed, all of these rules
“were of such a general nature and were so widely accepted that it was
not considered any difficulty would result in having them applicable to
all traffic.”72
69. See, e.g., 1926 Motor Traffic Convention, supra note 58, art. 3 (“The controls
and steering apparatus must be so placed that the driver can manage them with cer-
tainty and at the same time have a clear view of the road.”), art. 6 (“The driver of a
motor vehicle must possess qualifications which provide a reasonable guarantee of
public safety . . . .”).
70. Notably, cattle need only be “accompanied,” and the division of convoys is not
required “in regions where migration of nomads occurs.” Geneva Convention, supra
note 52, art. 8. As a representative from Iran explained, “it was customary for a very
few men to drive hundreds or thousands of cattle. . ..” E/CONF.8/C.III/SR.2/Rev.1,
supra note 67, at 4.
71. NORMAL BEL GEDDES, MAGIC MOTORWAYS 56 (1940). Later in the book, the
author narrates how “the truckman and his relief driver climb aboard” their truck
before undertaking a highly automated trip from Washington, D.C. to San Francisco
that lasts merely 24 hours (and 15 pages). Id. at 152 (emphasis added).
72. Kelly, supra note 63, at 879 (“[T]hese brief rules are only a selection of the
basic requirements found in the elaborate traffic laws and regulations of many coun-
tries, all of which have certain fundamentals in common.”); United Nations Economic
and Social Council, United Nations Conference on Road and Motor Transport, Com-
mittee I on Legal and General Matters and Documents, Summary Record of the First
Meeting, Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Wednesday, 24 August at 3 p.m.,
E/CONF.8/C.I/SR.1 (Aug. 24, 1949), at 10 (“Mr. RUMPLER (France) said that in
drafting Chapter II the preparatory committees had consistently kept in mind the
difficulties of federal states, and had consequently included therein only such rules as
were uniformly and unanimously applied in the majority of countries.”); UK Ministry
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Obviousness may also explain why the Geneva negotiators spent
little time discussing the definition of driver in article 4. The 1909 and
1926 treaties do not expressly define this (or any other) term. In the
1943 Inter-American Convention, “operator” means “any person who
drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a high-
way.”73 This phrase probably came from the Uniform Vehicle Code
developed in the United States earlier in the century.74 The ECE draft
drew on this language to define “driver” as “any person who drives a
vehicle, including cycles, or guides draught, pack or saddle animals or
herds or flocks on the road, or who is in actual physical control of the
same.”75 After negotiators “observed that no Committee had consid-
ered” this definition, the French representative on the committee that
was subsequently assigned this task pointed out “that to define driver
. . . as a person who drove, was not to define the word at all.”76 Her
fellow representatives helpfully responded by adopting the draft lan-
guage and “leaving to the Special Group the question of the modifica-
tion of the wording of the French text to meet the objection raised by
the French representative.”77 Accordingly, the English definition re-
mains somewhat circular, while in the equally authoritative French
text “conducteur” means “toutes personnes qui assument la direction
de véhicules . . . ou qui en ont la maı̂trise effective.”78
B. The Vienna Convention May Also Inform Interpretation of
This Rule
Of the 95 states that are currently parties to the Geneva Conven-
tion,79 40 are also parties to the Convention on Road Traffic signed at
Vienna in 1968.80 The United States is neither a party nor a signatory
of Transport, supra note 65, intro., para. 5 (“Most of the rules embodied in Chapter II
conform with those in the Highway Code. There would be little change in the habits
of British road users if this part of the Draft were accepted.”).
73. 1943 Convention, supra note 60, art. 2.
74. See UNIFORM VEH. CODE, Act V, Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on High-
ways § 10(c) (1939) (“Driver.—Every person who drives or is in actual physical con-
trol of a vehicle.”); see also UNIFORM VEH. CODE, Act II, Uniform Motor-Vehicle
Operators’ and Chauffeurs’ License Act § 1(f) (1926) (“‘Operator.’ Every person,
other than a chauffeur, who is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a
highway.”); infra note 304.
75. ECE Memo, supra note 65, Draft Provisions to be Inserted in a Convention on
Road and Motor Transport, art. 4, para. 1.
76. United Nations Economic and Social Council, United Nations Conference on
Road and Motor Transport, Committee III on Road Traffic, Summary Record of the
Seventeenth Meeting, Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, 6 September
1949 at 3 p.m., E/CONF.8/C.III/SR.17/Rev.1, at 2 (Nov. 21, 1949).
77. Id.
78. Geneva Convention, supra note 52, art. 4 (emphasis added).
79. Id. (Accessions and Ratifications available at treaties.un.org/pages/View
DetailsV.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XI~B~1&chapter=11&Temp=mtdsg5&
lang=en).
80. Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire
(Ivory Coast), Cuba, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark,
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to and hence has no obligations under this 1968 treaty. Nonetheless,
this Vienna Convention may be useful to the extent that it reveals the
practice of the Geneva Convention parties with respect to that
treaty.81 In this regard, it is important to note that the United States
remains a member of the United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe (UNECE), under the auspices of which at least the Vienna
Convention continues to be discussed and amended.82
In comparison to the Geneva Convention, the Vienna Convention
imposes somewhat more extensive obligations on the driver of a vehi-
cle. Article 8 reads as follows:
1. Every moving vehicle or combination of vehicles shall have a
driver.
2. It is recommended that domestic legislation should provide that
pack, draught or saddle animals, and, except in such special areas as
may be marked at the entry, cattle, singly or in herds, or flocks, shall
have a driver.
3. Every driver shall possess the necessary physical and mental abil-
ity and be in a fit physical and mental condition to drive.
4. Every driver of a power-driven vehicle shall possess the knowl-
edge and skill necessary for driving the vehicle; however, this re-
quirement shall not be a bar to driving practice by learner-drivers in
conformity with domestic legislation.
5. Every driver shall at all times be able to control his vehicle or to
guide his animals.83
Finland, France, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Kyrgyzstan, Luxembourg,
Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Po-
land, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia,
South Africa, Sweden, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Zimbabwe. Compare id.
with Convention on Road Traffic, Vienna, Nov. 8, 1968, 1042 U.N.T.S. 17 (with subse-
quent amendments) [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (Accessions and Ratifications
available at treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsV.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=
XI~B~1&chapter=11&Temp=mtdsg5&lang=en).
81. Also of note are, inter alia, (1) the European Agreement Supplementing the
1949 Convention on Road Traffic and the 1949 Protocol On Road Signs And Signals,
signed at Geneva on 16 September 1950 and (2) the European Agreement Supple-
menting the Convention on Road Traffic opened for signature at Vienna on Novem-
ber 8, 1968. Article 8 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation addresses
pilots instead of drivers: “No aircraft capable of being flown without a pilot shall be
flown without a pilot over the territory of a contracting State without special authori-
zation by that State and in accordance with the terms of such authorization. Each
contracting State undertakes to insure that the flight of such aircraft without a pilot in
regions open to civil aircraft shall be so controlled as to obviate danger to civil air-
craft.” Convention on International Civil Aviation, Chicago, Dec. 1, 1944, art. 8.
82. For background on the UNECE’s work on road safety, see Kevin M. McDon-
ald, Shifting Out of Neutral: A New Approach to Global Road Safety, 38 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 743 (2005). The Inland Transport Committee recently recognized a
relationship between the two treaties in a different context. See Economic Commis-
sion for Europe, Inland Transport Committee, Working Party on Road Transport,
Annotated provisional agenda for the 106th session, July 25, 2011, ECE/Trans/SC.1/
395, at I(4)(f), available at www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/doc/2011/sc1/ECE-
TRANS-SC1-395e.pdf.
83. Vienna Convention, supra note 80, art. 8.
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A sixth paragraph on distracted driving was added to this article in
2006:
A driver of a vehicle shall at all times minimize any activity other
than driving. Domestic legislation should lay down rules on the use
of phones by drivers of vehicles. In any case, legislation shall pro-
hibit the use by a driver of a motor vehicle or moped of a hand-held
phone while the vehicle is in motion.84
In addition, article 13 provides in part that “[e]very driver of a vehicle
shall in all circumstances have his vehicle under control so as to be
able to exercise due and proper care and to be at all times in a posi-
tion to perform all manoeuvres required of him.”85
Article 1 defines driver as “any person who drives a motor vehicle
or other vehicle (including a cycle), or who guides cattle, singly or in
herds, or flocks, or draught, pack or saddle animals on a road.”86 This
definition omits the American-inspired reference to “actual physical
control” found in the Geneva Convention.87 As with the Geneva Con-
vention, motor vehicle is also defined; vehicle is not.88
Through the UNECE, parties to the Vienna Convention have been
debating its application to driver assistance systems for at least a dec-
ade.89 The “German position” in 2002 was that only systems that can
be overridden by the driver at any time are permitted under that
treaty.90 According to a report prepared for the German project group
described above,91 this view of the Vienna Convention would only
permit a driver assistance system that is continuously monitored by a
driver who is aware of the current traffic situation at all times and who
has the actual ability to override that system.92
84. Id.
85. Id. art. 13. In contrast, the equivalent article in the Geneva Convention pro-
vides that “The driver of a vehicle shall at all times have its speed under control and
shall drive in a reasonable and prudent manner. He shall slow down or stop whenever
circumstances so require, and particularly when visibility is not good.” Geneva Con-
vention, supra note 52, art. 10.
86. Vienna Convention, supra note 80, art. 1.
87. See supra note 74.
88. Vienna Convention, supra note 80, art. 1.
89. See Arzt et al., Rechtliche Bewertung: Ordnungsrecht und Zulassungsrecht, in
Gasser, supra note 34, at 54–55 (citing Economic Commission for Europe, TRANS/
WP.1/2001/15, TRANSP/WP.1/2001/37, TRANSP/WP.1/2002/9).
90. Id. at 54 (“[H]insichtlich des Systems [Intelligent Speed Adaption] wird aus
deutscher Sicht eine Vereinbarkeit mit dem [Vienna Convention] nur für die Sys-
temvarianten anerkannt, die jederzeit vom Fahrzeugführer übersteuert werden
können.”).
91. See Gasser, supra note 34. The final report simply referenced the Vienna Con-
vention in support of its broader conclusion that German law, in the abstract and in
its application, requires a (human) driver to attentively monitor traffic and the road-
way. Id. at 13.
92. Arzt et al., supra note 89, at 54–55. There is some internal tension in the Ger-
man position. On one hand, it holds that the Convention requires total human con-
trol; on the other hand, it assumes that a driver will abdicate that control when
operating a vehicle that does not need her. See Gasser, supra note 34, at 14 (noting
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Under a contrary view, the Vienna Convention does not necessarily
prohibit every system that a driver cannot override.93 This is because,
first, the Vienna Convention’s “rules of the road” are “merely obliga-
tions of conduct for the driver that are not applicable to” the actual
design of a motor vehicle and, second, the authentic treaty language
(including “control” in the English and “contrôler/maı̂triser” in the
French)94 is more broadly suggestive of monitoring and supervision
than the common German translation (“Beherrschen”).95 Switzerland
and the Netherlands have argued that even a system that determines
the vehicle’s speed and position would not contravene the treaty, be-
cause the driver would still maintain full control of the vehicle itself.96
The Vienna Convention might be amended again to provide clarity
regarding driver assistance systems. For example, a 2011 proposal by
an informal expert group would have defined “[d]riving assistance sys-
tem” as “a built-in system intended to help the driver in performing
his driving task and which [has] an influence on the way the vehicle is
driven, especially aimed at the prevention of road accidents” and
specified that such systems “shall not be considered contrary to” arti-
cles 8 and 13 as long as they “are overridable at any time or can be
switched off,” only optimize a function performed by the driver, oper-
ate only in case of emergency, or intervene in a way that is “identical
with a usual property of a motor vehicle (e.g. speed limiting
device).”97
that any system can be configured in a way that technically enables a driver to per-
form her driving duties).
93. The status of antitheft, alcolock, and other driving authorization systems is
potentially disputed. See Torsten Janzyk, Verband der Automobilindustrie [German
Association of the Automobile Industry], WP.1 Round Table meeting on March 19,
2012, at 7 (excluding these from the proposed definition of “driving assistance
system”).
94. Whereas the Geneva Convention is authentic in English and French, see Ge-
neva Convention, supra note 52, signature (“in the English and French languages,
both texts authentic”), the Vienna Convention is authentic in Chinese, English,
French, Russian, and Spanish, see Vienna Convention, supra note 80, art. 56. The
Vienna Convention’s Russian text, incidentally, requires every vehicle to have a
driver who is always able to drive it. Id. art. 8.
95. See Arzt et al., supra note 89, at 55. The German term “Kontrolle” would seem
to capture these meanings. Id.
96. Id. (citing Economic Commission for Europe, TRANS/WP.1/2001/37,
TRANS/WP.1/2002/9). These positions predated paragraph 6 of article 8. Id. Sweden
and the Netherlands are also parties to the Geneva Convention. See supra note 80.
97. Economic Commission for Europe, Inland Transport Committee, Working
Party on Road Safety, Sixty-first session, March 21–23, 2011, Geneva, Informal Docu-
ment 1, available at www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/doc/2011/wp1/Informal_
document_01e.pdf. Notably, Germany has taken the position that “driver” necessarily
“means a natural person, not a system.” Note by the secretariat, Consistency between
the Convention on Road Traffic, 1968, and the vehicle technical regulations, ECE/
Trans/WP.1/2009/2/Rev.1, available at www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/doc/2010/
wp1/ECE-TRANS-WP.1-2009-2-Rev.1.pdf (setting forth an earlier proposal as well as
Germany’s response).
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Although this proposal was apparently “delete[d],” it has remained
the subject of discussion into 2012.98 Others have followed.99 It is im-
portant to note that a state that is party to both the Geneva and Vi-
enna Conventions would not directly alter its obligations under the
former treaty by accepting an amendment of the latter.
C. The Term “Driver” Is Probably Flexible
The identity of an automated vehicle’s driver is probably a more
important question under U.S. state law than under the Geneva Con-
vention. This is a curious assertion, since of these regimes only the
Geneva Convention expressly requires vehicles to have drivers. But as
the later discussion of domestic law demonstrates,100 the devil is in the
details, and when it came to the rules of the road, the Geneva negotia-
tors deliberately avoided both devils and details.101 By codifying basic
expectations rather than precise mechanics, they achieved a consensus
that has avoided amendment for more than sixty years.
This focus on fundamentals is consistent with a broad and flexible
understanding of the term “driver” as defined in article 4 and used
throughout the treaty. Like many of the U.S. state definitions that
98. Economic Commission for Europe, Inland Transport Committee, Working
Party on Road Traffic Safety, Sixty-third session, March 19–22, 2012, Geneva, Infor-
mal document 7, March 16, 2012, available at www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/
doc/2012/wp1/63-Informal-document-7e.pdf [hereinafter Informal Document 7]; Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe, Inland Transport Committee, Working Party on Road
Traffic Safety, Sixty-fourth session, September 24–27, 2012, Geneva, Consistency be-
tween the Convention on Road Traffic (1968) and Vehicle Regulations, available at
www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/doc/2012/wp1/ECE-TRANS-WP1-2012-8e.pdf;
Working Party on Road Traffic Safety, Sixty-fourth session, September 24–27, 2012,
Geneva, Annotated provisional agenda for the sixty-fourth session, available at www.
unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/doc/2012/wp1/ECE-TRANS-WP1-136e.pdf. Of some
interest is Sweden’s suggestion that “this wording is aimed at making the car manufac-
turers not liable if a [driver assistance system] does not work as intended and thinks
that it’s not appropriate to regulate this issue in the Convention.” Informal document
7, supra note 98; cf. also Arzt et al., supra note 89, at 55 (noting that some states
believed that Germany’s concerns about the Vienna Convention go to liability rather
than legality). Shortly before this Article’s publication, the Working Party on Road
Traffic Safety agreed on proposed amendments to articles 8 and 39 of the Vienna
Convention. See Working Party on Road Traffic Safety, Sixty-eighth Session, March
24–26, 2014, Geneva, Report of the Sixty-eighth Session of the Working Party on
Road Traffic Safety, available at http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/doc/
2014/wp1/ECE-TRANS-WP1-145e.pdf.
99. Compare, e.g., Economic Commission for Europe, Inland Transport Commit-
tee, Working Party on Road Traffic Safety, Sixty-sixth session, September 23-26, Ge-
neva, Document 3, July 15, 2013, available at www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/
doc/2013/wp1/ECE-TRANS-WP1-2013-3e.pdf (submission of Belgium, France, Italy,
Sweden, and the United States of America) with Economic Commission for Europe,
Inland Transport Committee, Working Party on Road Traffic Safety, Sixty-sixth ses-
sion, March 19–22, 2012, Geneva, Sixty-sixth session, September 23-26, Geneva, Doc-
ument 4, July 15, 2013, available at www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/doc/2013/
wp1/ECE-TRANS-WP1-2013-4e.pdf (submission of Germany).
100. See infra Parts VI.B–C.
101. See supra note 72.
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probably share a common ancestor,102 article 4’s definition contem-
plates both “driv[ing]” and “actual physical control.”103 And it is
nonexclusive, referring to “any” person rather than to “the” person.104
An automated vehicle might therefore have multiple simultaneous
drivers, including a person who is physically or electronically posi-
tioned to provide real-time input to the vehicle, a person who turns on
or dispatches the vehicle, or a person who initiates or customizes that
automated operation.105
As a definitional matter, these persons might even be nonhuman.
International law recognizes corporate persons in the context of inves-
tor protection106 and human rights (including the 1950 European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms).107 In this way, the companies responsible for the design,
manufacture, or ongoing operation of an automated vehicle may con-
stitute drivers for the purpose of the Geneva Convention.108 In con-
trast, the treatment of a computer system as a driver seems much
more speculative in light of article 4’s reference to a “person,”109 and
indeed Germany has expressly rejected such an approach to the Vi-
enna Convention.110
The drafters of the Geneva Convention did presume that drivers
would be physically proximate to their vehicles or animals; the treaty
describes drivers intransitively “keep[ing]” or “mov[ing]” to the edge
of the carriageway,111 “turn[ing] into a road,”112 and “approaching
other road users,”113 and it requires every motor vehicle to “be so
constructed that the driver shall be able to see ahead, to the right and
to the left, clearly enough to enable him to drive safely,”114 with “at
least one mirror . . . so placed as to enable [him] to view from his seat
the road to the rear of the vehicle.”115 But these rules do not necessa-
102. See supra note 74; infra note 307.
103. Geneva Convention, supra note 52, art. 4.
104. Id.
105. Cf. infra Part VI.A.4.
106. See, e.g., MARIUS EMBERLAND, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF COMPANIES, EXPLOR-
ING THE STRUCTURE OF ECHR PROTECTION (2006).
107. See, e.g., id. at 4 n.20; European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms at art. 1(1), art. 34, cf. Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union, art. 42. Germany’s basic law also recognizes human
and corporate persons. See Grundgesetz, supra note 4, art. 19 para. 3.
108. Cf. infra Part VI.A.2.
109. Geneva Convention, supra note 52, art. 4.
110. See supra note 97.
111. Geneva Convention, supra note 52, arts. 11 para. 2, 4, 12.
112. Id. art. 12 para. 4.
113. Id. art. 8 para. 5.
114. Id. annex 6 part III(j)(ii).
115. Id. annex 6 part III(b); see also infra notes 420–421 (noting similar require-
ments under U.S. state law).
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rily define the whole set of drivers under the treaty—or even the
whole set of lawful drivers.116
Ultimately, the dual questions of who a driver is and what she must
do are intertwined with each other and woven into the larger fabric of
the Geneva Convention. The concept of control informs this task—
and is the focus of the section that follows.
D. Article 8 Can Faithfully Be Interpreted to Require Only
Indirect Control
The obligations imposed by the Geneva Convention are intended to
foster road safety in part by ensuring that vehicles can be con-
trolled.117 Control in this sense is a relative concept.118 This suggests
that article 8 is probably satisfied if a human is able to intervene in
operation of the vehicle119 and possibly satisfied if that vehicle oper-
ates within the bounds of human judgment.120 These interpretations
may not require a human to be physically present.121
1. The Purpose of Control Is to Facilitate Safety
With respect to article 8, the interpretive task is clear even if the
answer is not: In the light of the Geneva Convention’s “object and
purpose”122 of “promoting the development and safety of interna-
tional road traffic by establishing certain uniform rules,”123 what con-
textual “ordinary meaning”124 should be given to the requirement that
“[e]very vehicle or combination of vehicles proceeding as a unit shall
have a driver” who is “at all times . . . able to control” her vehicle or
combination of vehicles125—or, in the equally authoritative French,
“[t]out véhicule ou ensemble de véhicules couplés marchant isolément
doit avoir un conducteur,” qui “doive[ ] constamment avoir le con-
trôle de [sa] véhicule ou pouvoir guider [ses] animaux”?126
It is apparent that the Geneva Convention is to be interpreted in a
way that promotes rather than frustrates road safety. This conclusion
is manifest from the treaty’s preamble, from its preparatory work, and
from the context provided by the entirety of article 8’s fifth paragraph:
116. The treaty’s first substantive rule of the road provides that “[e]very driver,
pedestrian or other road user shall conduct himself in such a way as not to endanger
or obstruct traffic; he shall avoid all behaviour that might cause damage to persons, or
public or private property.” Id. art. 7.
117. See infra Part IV.D.1.
118. See infra Part IV.D.2.
119. See infra Part IV.D.3.
120. See infra Part IV.D.4.
121. See infra Parts IV.D.3–IV.D.4.
122. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, art. 31.
123. Geneva Convention, supra note 52, pmbl.
124. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, art. 31.
125. Geneva Convention, supra note 52, art. 8.
126. This suggests that “be[ing] able to control” is the same as “hav[ing] control.”
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“Drivers shall at all times be able to control their vehicles or guide
their animals. When approaching other road users, they shall take
such precautions as may be required for the safety of the latter.”127 If
automated vehicles ultimately deliver a safety breakthrough, an inter-
pretation of article 8 that prohibits their use would produce “a result
which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”128 Indeed, such technol-
ogies may well constitute “precautions . . . required for the safety of”
other road users.129
As its fifth paragraph makes clear, article 8 promotes safety through
control. To control is “[t]o exercise restraint or direction upon the free
action of; to hold sway over, exercise power or authority over; to dom-
inate, command.”130 As one U.S. court has noted, “[t]he essence of
‘control’ is nothing less than the power to determine the scope, range,
or effect of a given activity.”131
With respect to road traffic in general and animals in particular,132
control would seem to serve two purposes. First, it facilitates compli-
ance with the written rules of the road: Unlike a horse, a human can
be expected to keep a vehicle on the proper side of the road (and to
know whether that side is the left or the right).133 Second, it facilitates
reasonable judgment in situations not expressly contemplated by
those rules: Unlike a horse, a human can be expected to always “slow
down or stop whenever circumstances so require, and particularly
when visibility is not good.”134
Control in this sense is a function rather than a device or mecha-
nism.135 Article 4 defines a driver as “any person who drives a vehicle,
including cycles, or guides draught, pack or saddle animals or herds or
flocks on a road, or who is in actual physical control of the same.”136
This language implies, first, that there is a difference between “con-
trol” and “actual physical control” and, second, that a person can be a
driver without having “actual physical control” of her vehicle.137 In-
127. Geneva Convention, supra note 52, art. 8.
128. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, art. 32. One might
reasonably respond that the Convention can simply be amended. See infra Part
IV.E.2.
129. Geneva Convention, supra note 52, art. 8.
130. Control, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2013); cf. Controller, OXFORD EN-
GLISH DICTIONARY (2013) (discussing the fiscal, mechanical, and electronic meanings
of this term). Contemporaneous definitions were similar. See Ohio v. Wilgus, 31 Ohio
Op. 443 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1945) (citing three dictionaries and fourteen judicial
decisions).
131. Axcelis Techs. v. Applied Materials, Inc., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d 1039, No. CIV.A 01-
10029DPW, 2002 WL 31761283, at *6 (D. Mass. Dec. 10, 2002).
132. See supra Part IV.A.
133. See Geneva Convention, supra note 52, art. 9.
134. Id. art. 10.
135. In contrast, a vehicle must have a “strong steering apparatus” (or “appareil de
direction robuste”). Id. at annex 6, part III(a).
136. Id. art. 4.
137. Cf. infra Part VI.A.1.
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deed, “drive” means both “[t]o guide a vehicle or the animal that
draws it” and “to travel or be conveyed in a carriage under one’s own
direction or at one’s disposal.”138
The French text leads to a similar conclusion by a slightly different
route. Article 8 requires the driver to have “contrôle,” which suggests
supervision, monitoring, or mastery,139 rather than “direction,” which
instead implies “complete power.”140 In contrast, article 4 specifies
that “direction” and “maı̂trise effective” are each sufficient but not
necessary for a person to be a driver.141
State practice recognizes that control need not be direct or absolute.
In addition to horses, antilock brakes142 and electronic stability con-
trol143 each mediate between a driver and her vehicle. Both the
United States and the European Union (among others) require these
nonequestrian technologies on certain vehicles.144 In one sense, these
systems actually reduce a driver’s control over components of her ve-
hicle. In another sense, they increase her control over the path and
position of that vehicle. Control—like automation145—is a complex
spectrum.
138. Drive, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2013) (providing as examples of the
latter that “[t]he Queen drove yesterday afternoon” and “you had better take a cab
and drive to London Bridge”).
139. See Arzt et al., supra note 89, at 55.
140. International Law Commission, Articles on State Responsibility, art. 17, n.7
(2001).
141. Geneva Convention, supra note 52, art. 4.
142. “Four-wheel ABS senses if any of the four wheels is about to lock, and if so, it
quickly releases the brakes on that wheel and lets it start rolling again. Cycles of
releasing, holding and reapplying brakes are repeated many times per second.  As
long as the driver maintains firm pressure on the brake pedal, ABS will automatically
modulate the pressure at the wheels at a level close to the optimum braking force
short of lockup. ABS will enable the driver to steer while braking, prevent yawing due
to rear-wheel lockup, and on many surfaces reduce stopping distances relative to a
skidding vehicle.” CHARLES J. KAHANE AND JENNIFER N. DANG, THE LONG-TERM
EFFECTS OF ABS IN PASSENGER CARS AND LTVS 1 (Aug. 2009) (DOT HS 811 182),
available at www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811182.PDF.
143. “ESC systems have sensors that monitor the speed of each wheel, the steering
wheel angle, and the overall yaw rate and lateral acceleration of the vehicle. Data
from the sensors are used to compare a driver’s intended course with the vehicle’s
actual movement to detect when a driver is about to lose control of a vehicle and
automatically intervene in split seconds by applying the brakes to individual wheels
and possibly reducing engine torque to provide stability and help the driver stay on
course.” Jennifer N. Dang, Evaluation Note, Preliminary Results Analyzing the Effec-
tiveness of Electronic Stability Control (ESC) Systems, NAT’L HIGHWAY SAFETY AD-
MIN. (Sept. 2004) (DOT HS 809 790), www.nhtsa.gov/cars/rules/regrev/evaluate/
809790.html.
144. 49 C.F.R. §§ 571.121, 571.126; Regulation (EC) No 661/2009 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning type-approval requirements
for the general safety of motor vehicles, their trailers and systems, components and
separate technical units intended therefor, PARL. EUR. DOC. (EC 661) art. 12 (2009);
Brake Systems for Passenger Cars, Design Rule 31/02 (Austl.).
145. See supra notes 34–42.
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2. Control Is Generally Regarded as Relative
The requisite degree of control has arisen in other legal contexts.
The vehicle codes of U.S. states, which are discussed below, are partic-
ularly relevant.146 In the time between the 1926 and 1949 treaties,
Congress also passed two acts related to securities that referenced
“control” without defining it. Legislative history suggests that this
omission was deliberate:
[W]hen reference is made to “control,” the term is intended to in-
clude actual control as well as what has been called legally enforcea-
ble control. . .. It was thought undesirable to attempt to define the
term. It would be difficult if not impossible to enumerate or to an-
ticipate the many ways in which actual control may be exerted. A
few examples of the methods used are stock ownership, lease, con-
tract, and agency. It is well known that actual control sometimes
may be exerted through ownership of much less than a majority of
the stock of a corporation either by the ownership of such stock
alone or through such ownership in combination with other
factors.147
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) ultimately
defined “control” in a related context as “the possession, direct or in-
direct, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the manage-
ment and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of
voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.”148
In international law, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ITFY)’s Appeals
Chamber, the Iran-United States Claim Tribunal, and the European
Court of Human Rights have all addressed the “problem of the degree
of State control necessary for the purposes of attribution of conduct to
the State.”149 “With regard to individuals or groups not organised into
military structures,” courts generally “have not considered an overall
or general level of control to be sufficient, but have instead insisted
upon specific instructions or directives aimed at the commission of
146. See infra Parts VI.A.1, VI.B.2, VI.B.3 (discussing control).
147. HR Rep No. 1383, 73d Cong, 2d Sess. 26 (1934), quoted in EDWARD BRODSKY
AND M. PATRICIA ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS:
RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND LIABILITIES, 16:3; see also Laperriere v. Vesta Ins. Group, Inc.,
526 F.3d 715, 722–23 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“Congress recognized that it
would be difficult, if not impossible, to enumerate or anticipate the many ways in
which actual control may be exercised and expressly declined to define the term ‘con-
trol,’ leaving courts free to decide issues of control status on a case by case basis.”)
(quoted in BRODSKY & ADAMSKI, supra).
148. SEC Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 and SEC Rule 12b-2(f), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.12b–2(f), quoted in BRODSKY & ADAMSKI, supra note 147.
149. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 140, art.8 note (5) n.160; see gener-
ally id. art. 8 notes (3)–(5) and art. 17 notes (6)–(7); Antonio Cassese, The Nicaragua
and Tadic̀ Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment on Genocide in Bosnia, 18
EUR. J. INT’L. L. 649 (2007), available at ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/18/4/
649.full.pdfťml.
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specific acts, or have required public approval of those acts following
their commission.”150
However, the ICJ and the ITFY have disagreed vigorously about
whether this “effective control” test also applies to military and
paramilitary groups. The ICJ concluded that it does.151 In contrast, the
ITFY, emphasizing that the requisite “degree of control may . . . vary
according to the factual circumstances of each case,”152 determined
that an “overall control” test could be satisfied by “prov[ing] that the
State wields overall control over the group, not only by equipping and
financing the group, but also by coordinating or helping in the general
planning of its military activity” even if the state did not “issue . . .
instructions for the commission of specific acts contrary to interna-
tional law.”153
3. Article 8 Requires at Most the Ability to Intervene
The judicial disagreement just discussed introduces the challenge of
drawing lines in a way that faithfully interprets article 8: With how
much specificity and concurrency must drivers “at all times be able to
control their vehicles”?
Three key conclusions about the nature of control seem appropri-
ate. First, control is more than a legal fiction: The mere designation of
a driver for the purpose of legal responsibility—the approach adopted
by Nevada, Florida, and California154—might fail to satisfy article 8’s
fifth paragraph even if it satisfied the first.
Second, being “able to control” does not mean actively exercising
that control: To assert “that control may not, by definition, include the
concept of fixing within its ambit is a bit like saying the volume con-
trol on a radio only ‘controls’ the volume if it is constantly increasing
150. Prosecutor v. Dus̆ko Tadic̀, Appeals Chamber Judgment, para. 132 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). This is similar to the ICJ’s “effective
control” test. See Cassese, supra note 149.
151. In Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, the ICJ had
“distinguished between two classes of individuals not having the status of de jure or-
gans of a state but nevertheless acting on behalf of that state: (1) those totally depen-
dent on the foreign state—paid, equipped, generally supported by, and operating
according to the ‘planning and direction’ of organs of that state . . . [and] (2) persons
who, although paid, financed and equipped by a foreign state, nonetheless retained a
degree of independence of that state . . . .” Cassese, supra note 149, at 652. It then
used a test of “effective control” to conclude that alleged human rights violations
were attributable to that foreign state (the United States) when committed by the first
group but not when committed by the second group. Id. at 653. The ICJ later rejected
both the ITFY’s critique and its “overall control test.” Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb.
& Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶ 406 (Feb. 26).
152. Prosecutor v. Dus̆ko Tadic̀, Appeals Chamber Judgment, para. 117 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
153. Id. para. 131.
154. See infra Part VI.D.
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or decreasing the volume.”155 Operation of a vehicle without the
driver’s constant supervision would not necessarily violate article 8.
Third, control is limited by the characteristics of that which is being
controlled: A carriage driver is not unable to control her vehicle sim-
ply because she cannot make her horse move as fast as the motor
vehicles passing her. Similarly, a truck driver is not unable to control
her truck simply because she cannot stop it as quickly or turn it as
sharply as she could a car. Operation of a vehicle subject to certain
limitations on the method, scope, or effect of the driver’s input would
not necessarily violate article 8.156
In short, article 8 could be faithfully interpreted to permit the oper-
ation of a vehicle that determines its own path and position in the
presence of a person who is technically able to override those determi-
nations. Conversely, an interpretation of article 8 that prohibits the
operation of such a vehicle could be unreasonable if that interpreta-
tion ultimately frustrates road safety.
4. Operation Within the Bounds of Human Judgment May
Also Suffice
Article 8 may also be susceptible to a more permissive interpreta-
tion, namely that any vehicle operating within the bounds of human
judgment is being driven and controlled in a general sense, regardless
of whether a person is present for or attentive to that operation. This
interpretation treats automation as an enhancement of vehicle control
rather than as an abdication of that control. Key to this conception is
the same desire for safety through standardization that led the parties
to the Geneva Convention to “establish[ ] certain uniform rules.”157
Rather than negate decisions about a vehicle’s path and position,
automation changes how—and possibly when and by whom—those
decisions are made. Electronic stability control and antilock brakes
increase control by making the vehicle do what the driver wants rather
than what she indicates at a critical moment.158 Higher levels of auto-
mation would extend this approach. Under ideal road and traffic con-
ditions, automated vehicles might facilitate uniform compliance with
concrete rules of the road: In theory, they would stop at stop signs and
yield to pedestrians. And under conditions that are less than ideal,
they might facilitate decisions that are more deliberate, proactive, and
consistent than those reached spontaneously by humans: Again in the-
155. Axcelis Techs. v. Applied Materials, Inc., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d 1039, No. CIV.A 01-
10029DPW, 2002 WL 31761283, at *6 (D. Mass. Dec. 10, 2002).
156. In this regard, see Geneva Convention, supra note 52, annex 6 part III(g)
(“Every motor vehicle shall have an exhaust silencer in constant operation to prevent
excessive or unusual noise, the working of which cannot be interrupted by the driver
while on the road.”) (emphasis added).
157. Id. at pmbl.
158. See supra Part IV.D.1.
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ory, they would take the kind of precautions for which they are
programmed. These parameters would control such a vehicle’s behav-
ior, and a person who directs that vehicle to drive itself (i.e., the
driver) would be effectively instructing it to operate under that
control.
This interpretation depends on unproven assumptions about nas-
cent technologies. Ultimately, however, this field may develop to the
point where the certification of technology to implement standard
rules of the road is not conceptually different from—and in fact em-
pirically preferable to—the licensing of drivers to implement those
same rules. The same could not be said of the horses, mules, sheep,
cows, and geese that were unlikely to listen to whatever rules the
drafters of the 1926 Road Traffic Convention saw fit to prescribe.159
E. Article 8 May Nonetheless Arise Internationally or Domestically
The previous part concluded that article 8 probably does not pro-
hibit automated vehicles. However, if this conclusion is incorrect—or
if certain actors believe it to be either incorrect or insufficiently mani-
fest—questions about the Convention may nonetheless arise interna-
tionally or domestically. Article 8 is mandatory rather than merely
hortatory,160 it is clearly binding as international law,161 and it is prob-
ably binding as federal law.162 Regardless, U.S. actors could conceiva-
bly influence the treaty’s interpretation or clarify its domestic
application.163
1. Article 8 Is Mandatory
The legal status of chapter II’s rules of the road (which include arti-
cle 8) received considerable attention at the Geneva conference—
though perhaps not as much as that given to cycles, lights, and lights
on cycles.164 Negotiators struggled with, and at times seem to have
conflated, several questions:
1. Were these rules intended to apply to domestic traffic?
2. Would each state be internationally obligated to harmonize its
domestic law with these rules?
3. Would a state commit an internationally wrongful act every
time a driver within its territory violated any of these rules?
4. What status would these rules themselves have within each
state’s domestic law?
The answers are, now, surprisingly straightforward:
159. See supra Part IV.A.
160. See infra Part IV.E.1.
161. See infra Part IV.E.2.
162. See infra Part IV.E.3.
163. See infra Part IV.E.4.
164. The summary record in its entirety is rather illuminating on this point.




4. It depends—but as a matter of international law, it simply
doesn’t matter.
Much of the discussion regarding chapter II’s rules of the road was
in connection with the treaty’s premier article, which was ultimately
formulated as follows:
1. While reserving its jurisdiction over the use of its own roads,
each Contracting State agrees to the use of its roads for interna-
tional traffic under the conditions set out in this Convention.
2. No Contracting State shall be required to extend the benefit of
the provisions of this Convention to any motor vehicle or trailer, or
to any driver having remained within its territory for a continuous
period exceeding one year.165
The United States initially took the position that “the Convention
applied to international, and not to internal, traffic.”166 Indeed, “[i]t
was on that basis, and that basis alone, that the United States Govern-
ment was participating in the Conference,” because “internal traffic
was regulated by the [varying] legislation of the forty-eight states.”167
165. Geneva Convention, supra note 52, art. 1. The conference’s legal committee
formed a special working group to resolve interrelated disagreements about the con-
tent of article 1, the existence of article 6, and the title of the treaty. See United
Nations Economic and Social Council, United Nations Conference on Road and Mo-
tor Transport, Committee I on Legal and General Matters and Documents, Summary
Record of the Second Meeting, Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Thursday,
25 August 1949, at 11 a.m., E/CONF.8/C.I/SR.2, at 3 (Aug. 25, 1949). The group suc-
ceeded. See United Nations Economic and Social Council, United Nations Confer-
ence on Road and Motor Transport, Committee I on Legal and General Matters and
Documents, Summary Record of the Sixth Meeting, Held at the Palais des Nations,
Geneva, on Monday, 29 August 1949, at 10 a.m., E/CONF.8/C.I/SR.6, at 2 (Aug. 29,
1949); United Nations Economic and Social Council, United Nations Conference on
Road and Motor Transport, Committee I on Legal and General Matters and Docu-
ments, Summary Record of the Eighth Meeting, Held at the Palais des Nations, Ge-
neva, on Wednesday, 31 August 1949, at 3 p.m., E/CONF.8/C.I/SR.8/Rev.1, at 2, 3, 5
(Nov. 15, 1949).
166. United Nations Economic and Social Council, United Nations Conference on
Road and Motor Transport, Committee I on Legal and General Matters and Docu-
ments, Summary Record of the First Meeting, Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 24 August 1949, at 3 p.m., E/CONF.8/C.I/SR.1, at 8 (Aug. 24, 1949).
After the conference, the lead U.S. negotiator wrote that “[s]ome of the delegations
apparently desired to overlook the international character of the convention and to
emphasize as its primary purpose the regulation of internal, domestic traffic.” Kelly,
supra note 63, at 877. This may explain, in part, the 1968 Vienna Convention. See
supra Part VI.B.
167. E/CONF.8/C.I/SR.1, supra note 166, at 8–11; see also E/CONF.8/C.II/SR.17/
Rev.1, supra note 55, at 6–7 (“Mr. FAIRBANK (United States of America) stated
that, though deferring to the United Kingdom representative’s more detailed knowl-
edge of the negotiations which had led up to the formulation of the Draft Convention,
he doubted whether the intention had really been to draft rules of the road of strictly
national application. The whole purpose of the Convention was, after all, to establish
regulations for international traffic . . . .”).
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Nonetheless, the United States ultimately accepted that “the purpose
of chapter II was to establish, in effect, an international code of mini-
mum safety requirements. By indirection, the rules of the road set
forth in the convention would apply to the pattern of domestic as well
as to international traffic.”168
The general opinion at the conference was that these rules would be
mandatory, “for if they were not legally binding they could be of no
practical value.”169 To wit:
Mr. FAIRBANK (United States of America) said that if the Con-
vention was adopted and ratified by his country, it would become
the law of the land both for its own inhabitants and for visitors, and
each State would endeavour to enforce it to the best of its ability.
Undoubtedly, as the Convention was general in scope, it could not
cover every possible situation, and his country would, if necessary,
enact more detailed laws, either Federal or State, for application
whenever required.170
Although individual drivers (for the most part) are the intended
subjects of these substantive rules, states are the primary subjects of
international law. The United Kingdom therefore expressed concern
that a state would commit an internationally wrongful act every time a
driver within its territory violated any of chapter II’s rules of the road:
Governments could enact legislation in order to comply with [these
rules], but they could not ensure that such laws would not be vio-
lated. Nor, to take another example, could governments ensure that
“Drivers shall, at all times, be able and in a position to control their
vehicles or guide their animals” . . . .  No government, however to-
talitarian, could ensure that a driver was always in full control of his
vehicle.171
168. Kelly, supra note 63, at 878. Although Kelly implies that this was the consis-
tent position of the United States, the records of the conference are at best ambiva-
lent on this point.
169. E/CONF.8/C.III/SR.2/Rev.1, supra note 67, at 2–4.
170. Id. at 3; see also United Nations Economic and Social Council, United Nations
Conference on Road and Motor Transport, Summary Record of the Second Meeting,
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Thursday, 15 September [1949], at 3 p.m., E/
CONF.8/SR.11, at 6 (Sept. 15, 1949) (“The PRESIDENT [of the conference] ob-
served that, in his view, one of the objects of a Convention such as that which they
hoped to sign was that certain changes in national laws should result from the adop-
tion of the Convention’s provisions.”); Kelly, supra note 63, at 875a (“It is not antici-
pated that United States acceptance of the convention will require any changes in
motor vehicle laws in this country, nor will it entail any additional expense to public
authorities.”).
171. United Nations Economic and Social Council, United Nations Conference on
Road and Motor Transport, Committee I on Legal and General Matters and Docu-
ments, Summary Record of the Second Meeting, Held at the Palais des Nations, Ge-
neva, on Thursday, 25 August 1949, at 11 a.m., E/CONF.8/C.1/SR.2, at 4–6 (Aug. 25,
1949); see also E/CONF.8/C.1/SR.1, supra note 66, at 11; E/CONF.8/C.III/SR.2/Rev.1,
supra note 67, at 2. At least initially, this concern was not well understood by all the
representatives. See E/CONF.8/C.1/SR.2, supra note 171, at 4–6 (“Mr. BEST (United
Kingdom) thought that a misunderstanding had arisen as to the purport of the United
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Article 6, which provides that each party “shall take appropriate
measures to ensure the observance of the rules set out in” chapter II,
was a direct response to the United Kingdom’s concern.172 As dis-
cussed below, this is an important point: Article 6 was added to clarify
that each individual rule violation is not necessarily a treaty viola-
tion;173 it was not added to specify a particular means by which each
state would give effect to those obligations within its domestic law.
The latter is simply not an ordinary question of international law.174
2. The Convention Is Binding as International Law
“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith.”175 As one of ninety-five states to
ratify the Geneva Convention, the United States is obligated under
international law to “take appropriate measures to ensure the obser-
vance”176 within its territory of the rule that “[e]very vehicle or combi-
nation of vehicles proceeding as a unit . . . have a driver” and that
“[d]rivers . . . at all times be able to control their vehicles or guide
their animals.”177 By violating this obligation in the absence of circum-
stances precluding wrongfulness,178 the United States would be com-
mitting an internationally wrongful act for which it would be
Kingdom version. The difficulties of the United Kingdom delegation were connected
with the form in which the rules of the road had been cast.”). Even the UK delegation
appears to have contributed to the confusion. See E/CONF.8/C.III/SR.2/Rev.1, supra
note 65, at 2–4 (“Mr. GILLENDER (United Kingdom) said that he did not propose
to submit amendments to each article. If Committee I decided, however, that the
Convention, if adopted, required each country to enact the various articles as part of
its domestic law, his delegation reserved its right to reconsider its position on the
whole of Chapter II.”).
172. The text of this article is based on language in a UK proposal for article 1.
173. See E/CONF.8/C.I/SR.2, supra note 165, at 5–6 (“Replying to the United
Kingdom representative, the SECRETARY said that Chapter II contained provisions
which should be made binding on road users. Any State which accepted Chapter II
would be bound to take effective steps to ensure that traffic practice in their countries
conformed to those provisions. There was, however, no implication that such rules
should never be violated . . . .”); Kelly, supra note 63, at 877–78 (describing the UK
position and the U.S. response).
174. “There are almost as many ways of giving effect to international law as there
are national legal systems.” Eileen Denza, The Relationship Between International
and National Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2nd ed., at 429 (2006).
175. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, art. 26 (pacta sunt
servanda); see Gabèı́kovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, 1997
I.C.J. 7, ¶ 114 (Sept. 25).
176. Geneva Convention, supra note 52, art. 6.
177. Id. art. 8.
178. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 140. The two potentially relevant
circumstances are consent (in which the facially injured state agrees to the action) and
necessity (in which the action “is the only means for the State to safeguard an essen-
tial interest against a grave and imminent peril”). Id.
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internationally responsible.179 That responsibility, in turn, would en-
tail a secondary obligation to cease and make reparations for the
wrongful act.180
In a battle between the technology and the treaty, the technology
seems the likely winner, though this prediction is admittedly more
consistent with developments in the United States than with develop-
ments in Europe.181 Regardless, this part briefly considers, in rough
order of their likelihood, six ways that states might clarify the content
or curtail the application of the Geneva Convention. Four are ordi-
nary, two are remote, and none is exclusive of another.
First, governments might tend individually to facilitate or simply
tolerate the use of automated vehicles on public roadways, either with
or without expressly concluding that such use is consistent with the
treaty. Widespread state practice of this sort could indicate that the
proper interpretation of the treaty is one that prohibits automated ve-
hicles no more than antilock brakes, electronic stability control, drive-
by-wire, and other systems that attenuate a driver’s physical control of
the vehicle. Conversely, governments might tend individually to cite
the Geneva Convention in limiting the use of automated vehicles,
which could suggest the correctness of a more restrictive
interpretation.
Second, certain states might seek to collectively “clarify” the Con-
vention. Although the treaty provides no formal mechanism for clari-
fication (as opposed to amendment), a group of states might, in an
effort to establish state practice, announce that the treaty, in their
view, is either consistent or inconsistent with the use of automated
vehicles.
Third, states might seek to formally amend the Convention so that
it is clearly consistent with the use of automated vehicles. Under arti-
cle 31, any state may propose an amendment; if two-thirds of the par-
ties accept it (in the case that no conference is called), that
amendment becomes binding among all parties that do not timely ob-
ject.182 Notably, since forty states are parties to both the Geneva Con-
vention and the Vienna Convention, efforts to amend one might
complement efforts to amend the other.
179. Gabèı́kovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. 7 ¶ 46–48; see also Factory at
Chorzów, Jurisdiction, Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 21 (July 26); see gen-
erally Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 140.
180. Factory at Chorzów, 1927 P.C.I.J. at 21; see Articles on State Responsibility,
supra note 140.
181. The bills enacted in Nevada, Florida, and California do not reference the Ge-
neva Convention. See infra Part VI.E.
182. Article 31’s full procedure is more complex. A party may propose an amend-
ment, and each party may vote on the amendment or request a conference. Ulti-
mately, two-thirds of parties must vote to approve the amendment for it to become
binding on all parties except those that have filed timely objections to it. This lan-
guage appears to suggest that parties can thereby modify their obligations even to
parties that object to the modification.
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Fourth, a state might simply withdraw from the Geneva Conven-
tion: Under article 32’s denunciation procedure, a state need only give
one year’s notice.183 This may be conceivable if the Vienna Conven-
tion is (again) amended but the Geneva Convention is not. The practi-
cal consequences of denunciation may be limited; currently, for
example, it would not be obvious to a German driver visiting the
United States or to a U.S. driver visiting Germany that only one of
these states is a party to the Geneva Convention.184
Fifth, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the UN organ
through which the Geneva conference was conducted, might request
an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on
the meaning of the Geneva Convention’s relevant provisions.185 In its
history, ECOSOC has requested two advisory opinions.186 Given the
ICJ’s slow speed, however, cars might be flying before the court
reaches a final decision.
Sixth, an actual dispute might arise among parties to the Geneva
Convention. Two scenarios are conceivable. In one, a party would ar-
gue that the United States violated (and continues to violate) its treaty
obligations through the enactment (and continued existence) of do-
mestic laws that expressly permit the operation of automated vehicles
on public roads. These laws, though made by subnational govern-
ments, constitute action by the United States under international
law.187 In the other (potentially overlapping) scenario, a state would
exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of a national188 injured by an
automated vehicle while in the United States.189 In both scenarios, the
state that believed itself aggrieved might protest, seek consultations,
183. Geneva Convention, supra note 52, art. 32.
184. See, e.g., Internationaler Führerschein—wann braucht man ihn, ADAC, www.
adac.de/infotestrat/ratgeber-verkehr/fuehrerschein/internationaler-fuehrerschein/de-
fault.aspx?tabid=tab3 (last visited Nov. 8, 2013) (not distinguishing between Geneva
Convention parties and Vienna Convention parties). Germany was occupied at the
time of the Geneva conference. Although it never ratified the Geneva Convention, it
is a party to the Vienna Convention. In contrast, Japan—like the United States—is a
party to the Geneva Convention but not to the Vienna Convention.
185. U.N. Charter art. 96; I.C.J. Statute, art. 65; General Assembly Resolution
89(I), Authorization of the Economic and Social Council to request Advisory Opin-
ions of the International Court of Justice, G.A. Res. 89 (I), U.N. Doc. A/RES/89(I)
(Dec. 11, 1946).
186. See E.S.C. Res. 1989/75, U.N. Doc. E/1989/88 (May 24, 1989); see also E.S.C.
Res. 1998/297, U.N. Doc. E/1998/L.49/Rev.1 (Aug. 5, 1998).
187. They may also constitute a failure to act by the federal government, which can
itself constitute state action.
188. Whether natural or corporate. See, e.g., Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Company, Ltd., Report of Judgments,1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5), available at www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/50/5387.pdf.
189. International Law Commission, Articles on Diplomatic Protection; ¶ 9–10,
U.N. Doc. (2006); see also E/CONF.8/C.I/SR.8/Rev.1, supra note 165, at 4 (“Mr.
BEST (United Kingdom) said that . . . [o]nly a Contracting State which considered
that it suffered injury in the person of one of its citizens, could take proceedings
against another Contracting State which had failed to apply the Convention.”).
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or ultimately apply to the ICJ for a decision pursuant to article 33 of
the Geneva Convention.190
3. The Convention Is Probably Binding and Enforceable as
Federal Law
The remainder of this part analyzes the Geneva Convention as fed-
eral rather than merely international law. It considers how article 8
might be domestically relevant,191 and how courts might address ques-
tions of self-execution,192 standing,193 and constitutionality.194 In con-
trast to the foregoing discussion, it generally uses the term “state” to
refer to U.S. states rather than to countries.
i. Article 8 May Be Considered by Domestic Actors
Article 8 could arise in several domestic contexts. Of the four scena-
rios introduced below, only the final one would require that the Ge-
neva Convention be self-executing;195 the first three, to varying and
variable extents, arguably represent “softer” uses of this treaty in the
domestic sphere.
First, government actors might simply exercise their respective au-
thority in a way that complies with their understanding of the treaty.
For example, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) might require that all vehicles be manufactured with speed
and steering controls that are useable by a human. Or a governor may
veto a bill declaring that automated vehicles need not have a human
driver in a technical or legal sense. There are many potential explana-
tions for this subtle deference: That governor, for example, may be-
lieve that she is bound by international law,196 that she is bound by
federal law,197 or that such comity is prudent or appropriate even if it
is not mandatory.198
190. Geneva Convention, supra note 52, art. 33.
191. See infra Part IV.E.3.i.
192. See infra Part IV.E.3.ii.
193. See infra Part IV.E.3.iii.
194. See infra Part IV.E.3.iv.
195. See infra Part IV.E.3.ii.
196. In other words, that she must not act in a way that places the United States in
violation of its treaty obligation.
197. In other words, that she must not act in a way that places her state in violation
of a treaty that is binding as federal law.
198. As Justice Breyer recounts:
In Avena, the ICJ expressed “great concern” that Oklahoma had set the
date of execution for one of the Mexican nationals involved in the judgment,
Osbaldo Torres, for May 18, 2004. Responding to Avena, the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals stayed Torres’ execution and ordered an eviden-
tiary hearing on whether Torres had been prejudiced by the lack of consular
notification. On the same day, the Governor of Oklahoma commuted
Torres’ death sentence to life without the possibility of parole, stressing that
(1) the United States signed the Vienna Convention [on Consular Relations
(1963)], (2) that treaty is “important in protecting the rights of American
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Second, a court applying statutory or regulatory law might interpret
that law in a way that is consistent with its understanding of the Ge-
neva Convention. For example, it might hold that even an automated
vehicle has a human driver under a state’s vehicle code. Or, it might
use the language of article 8 to conclude that the state code implicitly
requires human control of every vehicle.199 This approach reflects the
longstanding principle, expressed in Murray v. The Charming Betsy,
that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the
law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”200
Third, a court might consider the Geneva Convention otherwise rel-
evant to certain elements of a cause of action (or an affirmative de-
fense thereto), particularly duty, breach, and causation. In at least
three cases, courts have discussed the Convention in the course of re-
jecting a plaintiff’s claim that a rental agency negligently entrusted a
vehicle to a foreign driver.201 In a fourth case, the court held that the
citizens abroad,” (3) the ICJ ruled that Torres’ rights had been violated, and
(4) the U.S. State Department urged his office to give careful consideration
to the United States’ treaty obligations.
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 514 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal cita-
tions omitted); cf. also Exec. Order No. 13491, Ensuring Lawful Interrogations, 74
Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009). Prudence may also reflect a more pragmatic desire to
avoid protracted litigation.
199. Cf. Gasser, supra note 34, at 13.
200. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804); see gener-
ally Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Re-
thinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479 (1998).
201. Although civil liability falls outside the scope of this article, these three cases
are nonetheless illuminating. Schofield v. Hertz Corporation arose when Albertino
Duriatti, in the course of a single day, arrived in the United States, presented an
international driving permit to and rented a car from Hertz, and drove that car into
William Schofield. Schofield v. Hertz Corp., 412 S.E.2d 853, 853 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991).
Schofield sued Hertz for negligent entrustment, arguing “that actual knowledge can
be imputed to Hertz that Duriatti was incompetent to drive the vehicle he rented
because . . . the Hertz employee who assisted Duriatti violated Hertz’s policy of ob-
taining a valid driver’s license, in addition to an international driving permit, before
renting to foreigners.” Id. at 856. The appeals court held that this failure “cannot be
the proximate cause of injury to Schofield,” because “[r]egardless of what Duriatti
presented to the Hertz employee before he rented an automobile, he had a valid
license issued by Great Britain, which pursuant to the Convention on Road Traffic,
allowed him to rent an automobile in this country and to drive it without further
examination.” Id. (This premise is incorrect, or at least incomplete: Renting a vehicle
is different than driving a vehicle, and the Geneva Convention does not by itself com-
pel private companies to rent cars to foreigners.) Similarly (and under similar facts),
the court in Ortiz v. North Amherst Auto Rental, Inc., held that a rental company
could reasonably use the international driving permit “as a representation of the fact
that the driver has a driver’s license.” Ortiz v. N. Amherst Auto Rental, Inc., 834
N.E.2d 273 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005). The court explained that while the permit “itself
does not confer driving privileges,” it “may only be obtained if the holder already has
a valid driver’s license.” Id. at 501. Finally, in Eskew v. Young, the court relied on
Schofield to hold that a recreational vehicle rental company had no obligation to in-
struct its British customer on how to drive in the United States, because under the
Geneva Convention that driver’s “possession of a valid British driver’s license ena-
bled Cruise America to rent the RV to him without any further examination.” Eskew
2014] AUTOMATED VEHICLES ARE PROBABLY LEGAL 449
defendant, a Mexican citizen who had “lived in the United States for
two years” but had only a driver’s license from Mexico, could not le-
gally drive in the United States under the Geneva Convention.202 And
in a fifth case, an Illinois court held that the defendant, a Canadian
citizen who obtained a Canadian driver’s license after revocation of
his Illinois license, had been properly convicted of “driving while his
license was revoked.”203
Finally, a court might be asked to decide whether the Geneva Con-
vention precludes a federal agency, a state legislature, or a state
agency from expressly permitting or actively facilitating the use of au-
tomated vehicles on public roads.204 The court may face this question
through an action under the federal Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), under a state equivalent, or under the U.S. constitution.
The federal APA governs actions taken by federal agencies, includ-
ing NHTSA. 5 U.S.C. § 706 provides that:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the review-
ing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret consti-
tutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or
applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court
shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be—(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of dis-
cretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to
constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory
right . . . .205
v. Young, 992 F. Supp. 1049, 1052-53 (S.D. Ill. 1998). This case is particularly striking,
because but for a possible difference in driving norms between the United States and
the United Kingdom (where “it is customary for a driver to flash his headlights to
signal that he is yielding the right-of-way”), the collision between the British driver
and the plaintiff would not have occurred. Id. at 1050.
202. State v. Campos, 899 N.E.2d 215, 216 (Hamilton Cnty. Mun. Ct., Ohio 2005).
The court ultimately concluded that Ohio law both (a) prohibited the defendant from
driving without an Ohio license and (b) failed to specify any penalty for doing so. Id.
at 216-17.
203. People v. Platts, 274 Ill. App. 3d 753, 753, 655 N.E. 2d 300 (App. Ct. 1995).
Notably, the defendant does not appear to have argued that the statute under which
he was convicted unlawfully impaired his right to drive under the Convention. In-
stead, he unsuccessfully argued that “(1) Illinois failed to follow the notice provision
of a treaty governing foreign drivers when [his] Illinois driver’s license was revoked;
(2) [his] Illinois revocation was terminated when he was issued a Canadian driver’s
license; and (3) [his] revocation ended when he returned to Canada.” Id. at 754 (inter-
nal citations omitted), 755 (discussing Geneva Convention art. 24).
204. As noted below, the U.S. Congress can constitutionally enact a law that con-
travenes a treaty. See infra Part IV.E.4.
205. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1966).
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At least one federal court has enforced a self-executing treaty through
the APA,206 and scholars have endorsed the viability of such a
claim.207
Action by a state agency is typically subject to corresponding review
under state law. The 2010 Revised Model State Administrative Proce-
dure Act provides that a “court may grant relief only if it determines
that” the state agency has prejudiced the plaintiff by “erroneously in-
terpret[ing] the law” or by taking action that is “arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,”
among other grounds.208 A court applying Nevada law considers
whether the agency’s final decision is “[i]n violation of constitutional
or statutory provisions,” “[i]n excess of the statutory authority of the
agency,” or “affected by other error of law,” among other grounds.209
In California, “[e]ach regulation adopted, to be effective, shall be
within the scope of authority conferred and in accordance with stan-
dards prescribed by other provisions of law.”210 And in Florida, “[a]ny
person substantially affected by a rule or a proposed rule may seek an
administrative determination of the invalidity of the rule on the
ground that the rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative
authority.”211
State statutes as well as state regulations may be subject to chal-
lenge directly under the supremacy clause of the U.S. constitution.
This is an open question—and a confusing concept.212 In general, a
plaintiff must have authority to assert a legal theory about a matter
over which the court has jurisdiction. In a challenge to a final rule
adopted by a federal agency, for example, 5 U.S.C. § 702213 might pro-
vide that authority, 5 U.S.C. § 706214 might provide, at least in part,
206. Rainbow Nav., Inc. v. Dep’t of Navy, 686 F. Supp. 354, 356 (D.D.C. 1988)
(enjoining the Navy from undertaking certain procurement actions); cf. also Comm.
of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(recognizing the possibility of a treaty claim under the APA but rejecting it in this
case because of a subsequent federal statute).
207. Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2183
(1999); David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-Exe-
cuting Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 129, 216 (1999);
Bryant Walker Smith, International Obligations Enforceable as Agency Constraints
(on file with author).
208. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Revised
Model State Administrative Procedure Act (2010) § 508(a)(3), available at www.japc.
state.fl.us/publications/USAPA/MSAPA2010.pdf.
209. NEV. REV. STAT. § 233B.135(3).
210. CAL. GOV. CODE § 11342.1 (West 2011).
211. FLA. STAT. § 120.56(1)(a) (2011).
212. It is also at least somewhat distinct from standing, which is discussed below.
See infra Part VI.E.3.iii.
213. “A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely af-
fected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is enti-
tled to judicial review thereof . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012).
214. See supra note 205, and accompanying text.
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that legal theory, and 28 U.S.C. § 1331215 might provide that jurisdic-
tion. However, not every injured person is entitled to assert every le-
gal theory; only a government, for example, can criminally prosecute a
burglar.216 Now consider a challenge to a state statute expressly per-
mitting driverless vehicles: What authorizes a private party to argue
that the Geneva Convention trumps that statute under the supremacy
clause? The answer may be that this authority is implicit in the legal
theory itself—that is, the Convention or the supremacy clause evinces
what is known as an implied cause of action.217
One possibility is that the Geneva Convention’s incorporation into
federal law implies this authority.218 This question is, or at least should
be, distinct from the question of whether the Convention is self-exe-
cuting—that is, whether it can supply a legal theory.219 Indeed, in
prior cases, the Convention generally arises as a defense rather than
as a basis for the action.220 Nonetheless, in light of judicial aversion
both to vindicating treaties within domestic law221 and to finding im-
plied statutory causes of action,222 this possibility appears remote.
215. “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
216. The individual victim, however, might nonetheless be able to recover under
the common law of tort or property.
217. “Cause of action” is itself a confusing term often applied to describe both the
authority and the legal theory. See David Sloss, When Do Treaties Create Individually
Enforceable Rights? The Supreme Court Ducks the Issue in Hamdan and Sanchez-
Llamas, 45 COLUMBIA J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. 20, 30 (2006) (“In contemporary
usage, lawyers and judges say that a statute, for example, creates a private right of
action if it grants an individual plaintiff a right of access to court.”).
218. Id. at 71.
219. In a footnote in Medellin, the Supreme Court remarked that “[e]ven when
treaties are self-executing in the sense that they create federal law, the background
presumption is that ‘[i]nternational agreements, even those directly benefiting private
persons, generally do not create private rights or provide for a private cause of action
in domestic courts.’” Medellin, 552 U.S. at 506 n.3 (quoting 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 907, Comment a, p. 395
(1986)). One scholar convincingly discredits nearly every part of that footnote. See
Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the
Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L.R. 599, 626–27 n.131 (2008). For exam-
ple, this “background presumption” is at most an empirical observation that most
treaties of a certain type tend not to create such rights. Id. This is an important dis-
tinction: A high rate of criminal convictions, for example, does not imply a “back-
ground presumption” that criminal defendants are guilty.
220. See supra note 201.
221. See infra Part IV.E.3.ii.
222. See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). Though not directly relevant, the
opinion of the UK delegation to the Geneva Conference that the Convention “con-
ferred no right on any individual to take proceedings against any State under the
Convention” is notable: “Mr. BEST (United Kingdom) said that the provision in par-
agraph (ii) of the text proposed by his delegation was incorporated in the text for
Article 1 recommended by the Working Group, although perhaps, less explicitly. That
text conferred no right on any individual to take proceedings against any State under
the Convention. Only a Contracting State which considered that it suffered injury in
the person of one of its citizens, could take proceedings against another Contracting
State which had failed to apply the Convention; even had the provision in question
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The other possibility is that the supremacy clause of the U.S. consti-
tution implies this authority. The U.S. Supreme Court recently de-
clined to decide this question, returning it to the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit. In Douglas v. Independent Living Center of South-
ern California, certain Medicaid providers and beneficiaries argued
that statutory changes to California’s Medicaid plan violate a federal
statutory condition under which Congress funds this joint state-federal
program. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs could bring an ac-
tion directly under the supremacy clause (rather than under a statu-
tory cause of action).223 After the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review that particular holding, the federal agency responsible for re-
viewing state Medicaid plans approved some of California’s changes.
Citing this approval, a narrow majority224 of the Supreme Court then
vacated the Ninth Circuit judgments and remanded the cases for argu-
ment on whether “these cases may proceed directly under the
Supremacy Clause now that the agency has acted.”225 The four dis-
senters226 objected that agency action was irrelevant to the question
on which the court had granted certiorari, and they argued that the
answer to this question should be that “[w]hen Congress did not in-
tend to provide a private right of action to enforce a statute enacted
under the Spending Clause, the Supremacy Clause does not supply
one of its own force.”227
Raising the Geneva Convention in court might in turn raise three
related issues, which are discussed in the three sections that follow.
ii. The Convention Is Probably Self-Executing
As part 4.5.2 noted, ratification of the Geneva Convention was an
international act by which the United States committed itself to as-
suming certain international obligations.228 But ratification was also a
domestic act by which the president, “by and with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate,”229 made the Geneva Convention part of federal
not been included under international law any person finding himself in a country
other than his own was obliged to comply with the laws of that State.” E/CONF.8/C.I/
SR.8/Rev.1, supra note 165, at 4–5.
223. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. California, Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 F.3d 644 (9th Cir.
2009), vacated and remanded sub nom. Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. California,
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 182 L. Ed. 2d 101 (2012).
224. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan.
225. Douglas, 132 S. Ct. at 1211.
226. Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.
227. The dissenters also noted that deciding the broader question of “whether the
Supremacy Clause can ever provide a private cause of action” is not necessary. Doug-
las, 132 S. Ct. at 1212 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
228. Provided that four other countries did as well. See Geneva Convention, supra
note 52, art. 29.
229. U.S. CONSTITUTION, art. II, § 2, cl. 2. President Harry S Truman submitted the
treaty to the Senate, and the Senate gave its consent without any declaration that the
treaty was non-self-executing. See Geneva Convention, 3 U.S.T. 3008, T.I.A.S. No.
2487.
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law. The so-called “supremacy clause” of the U.S. constitution
declares:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the su-
preme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound
thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the con-
trary notwithstanding.230
Notwithstanding this supremacy clause, the Supreme Court has di-
vided international agreements into two domestic categories: “self-ex-
ecuting treaties (those ‘equivalent to an act of the legislature’) and
non-self-executing treaties (those ‘the legislature must execute’ to
have domestic effect).”231 According to the court in Medellin v. Texas,
a treaty is either self-executing or non-self-executing in its entirety (a
conclusion that appears to depart from earlier case law),232 and only
self-executing treaties can be applied by domestic courts as U.S.
law.233 Absent strong indications that it is addressed to Congress, a
treaty is presumed to be self-executing.234
The Supreme Court has not directly decided whether the Geneva
Convention is self-executing, but it has specified the required analysis.
“The interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a statute,
begins with its text. Because a treaty ratified by the United States is an
agreement among sovereign powers, [the court has] also considered as
aids to its interpretation the negotiation and drafting history of the
treaty as well as the postratification understanding of signatory na-
tions.”235 This is in some ways a challenging statement when applied
230. U.S. CONSTITUTION, art. VI cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause).
231. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 514 (quoting Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829)).
International agreements are also divided into categories (treaties, congressional-ex-
ecutive agreements, agreements pursuant to treaties, and presidential agreements)
that have distinct meanings within U.S. law but not within international law. See Trea-
ties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the United States Senate (2001),
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-106SPRT66922/pdf/CPRT-106SPRT66922.pdf.
232. Compare Medellin, 552 U.S. at 514–15 with id. at 508–09 (considering the na-
ture of only art. 94 of the United Nations Charter rather than the entire Charter)
(“We agree with this construction of Article 94. The Article is not a directive to do-
mestic courts.”); see id. at 538 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Jean d’Aspremont & Catherine
Brölmann, Challenging International Criminal Tribunals Before Domestic Courts, in
CHALLENGING ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS BEFORE NATIONAL
COURTS 111, 117 n.23 (discussing whether art. 94 is self-executing); Presumably, some
provisions of a self-executing treaty are not directly enforceable (or enforced) for
other reasons, such as justiciability or standing.
233. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 504. But see William J. Carter, Jr., Treaties as Law and
the Rule of Law: The Judicial Power to Compel Domestic Treaty Implementation, 69
MD. L. REV. 344, 346 (2010), available at www.law.umaryland.edu/academics/journals/
mdlr/print/articles/69_2-344.pdf (arguing that non-self-executing treaties can obligate
the United States domestically).
234. Vázquez, supra note 217, at 645 (citing United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7
Pet.) 51, 88–89 (1833)).
235. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 506–07 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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(as the Supreme Court proceeded to apply it) to the question of a
treaty’s domestic status, because different states use different domes-
tic mechanisms to adhere to their treaty obligations. International law
is largely concerned with results rather than with methods.236
Part 4.1 above discussed the relevant text and history of the Geneva
Convention, particularly articles 1, 6, and 8.237 Article 1 states in part
that no party “shall be required to extend the benefit of the provisions
of this Convention to any motor vehicle or trailer, or to any driver
having remained within its territory for a continuous period exceeding
one year.”238 This provision, on its face, indicates that the parties rec-
ognized that the treaty would benefit individuals. In no way does this
recognition compel a conclusion that the Convention is self-executing,
but it does suggest that the treaty is of a type that the Senate might
have understood to be directly enforceable.
Article 6 provides that each party “shall take appropriate measures
to ensure the observance of the rules set out in” chapter II.239 This
language might be read as evidence that no party intended to give
direct domestic effect to those rules or that the Senate, in consenting
to ratification, reasonably discerned such intent. However, as ex-
plained above, article 6 actually clarifies that each individual rule vio-
lation is not necessarily a treaty violation.240 It does not and need not
specify the particular status of the Convention within a state’s domes-
tic law. Although the Convention obligates a party to enforce rules of
the road that are consistent with those in chapter II, the source of
those domestic rules could include existing statutes, new statutes, in-
corporation of the treaty itself, or any number of other possibilities.
With respect to the United States, it was “not anticipated that . . .
acceptance of the convention will require any changes in motor vehi-
cle laws in this country, nor will it entail any additional expense to
public authorities.”241
Article 8, and indeed all of the rules of the road contained in chap-
ter II, are mandatory in tone and specific as to audience. Then ten
substantive articles of chapter II (excluding article 6) use the word
“shall” 46 times,242 and most impose duties directly on “the driver.”243
While some of the rules “are necessarily of an ‘admonitory’ nature
and undoubtedly present difficulties in enforcement,”244 the same
236. James Crawford & Simon Olleson, The nature and forms of international re-
sponsibility, in INTERNATIONAL LAW (Malcolm Evans ed., 2010).
237. See supra Part IV.A.
238. Geneva Convention, supra note 52, art. 1.
239. Id. art. 6.
240. See supra Part IV.E.1.
241. See Kelly, supra note 63, at 875a.
242. Article 8 contains eight of them. See Geneva Convention, supra note 52, art. 8.
243. See supra text accompanying note 56.
244. See Kelly, supra note 63, at 879.
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might well be said of provisions within the vehicle codes enacted by
the various U.S. states.245
Courts appear to generally assume that the Geneva Convention is a
source of U.S. law. In his Medellin dissent, Justice Breyer noted that
the Geneva Convention’s provisions regarding the “rights and obliga-
tions of drivers” “are of the sort that this Court has found self-execut-
ing,”246 an observation that the majority did not address. Schofield v.
Hertz Corporation expressly states, in regard to the Geneva Conven-
tion, that “[c]ourts of this state must take judicial notice of all treaties
or conventions and they predominate over any statutory provision of
the State of Georgia or private guidelines.”247 And State v. Campos
describes the Geneva Convention as an “exemption” from Ohio’s li-
censing statute.248
Furthermore, the U.S. Department of State also considers the Con-
vention to be binding on U.S. states. In response to an inquiry by the
U.S. state of Georgia regarding the application of the treaty to foreign
nationals who had entered or remained in the United States without
authority, the department responded in part that:
we believe that the State of Georgia, consistent with the [Conven-
tion on Road Traffic (“CRT”)], (1) must permit an alien to drive in
Georgia using a foreign driver’s license issued by a country party to
the CRT only if the alien has been lawfully admitted to the United
States; (2) must permit a lawfully admitted alien to drive in Georgia
using a foreign driver’s license of a CRT party only during the first
year after the alien’s admission; and (3) may, in accordance with
Georgia’s residency laws, require an alien resident in Georgia to
obtain a Georgia driver’s license as a condition for continued au-
thorization to drive. By the same token, nothing in the CRT would
prevent the State of Georgia from applying more liberal rules with
respect to the driving privileges of aliens.249
For these reasons, it is likely that courts will continue to treat the Ge-
neva Convention as self-executing. Nonetheless, a court might con-
clude that, with respect to section II’s rules of the road, the
245. See infra Part VI.C.3.
246. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 570 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
247. Schofield v. Hertz Corp., 412 S.E.2d 853, 856 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (internal
citations and quotations omitted). The third negligent entrustment case discussed
above, see supra note 201, found “the Schofield opinion to be well reasoned and an
accurate statement of the law.” Eskew v. Young, 992 F. Supp. 1049, 1053 (S.D. Ill.
1998).
248. State v. Campos, 899 N.E.2d 215, 216. The relevant statute had an explicit
exemption for nonresident drivers who possess a license from another U.S. state but
no explicit exemption for nonresident drivers who possess a license from a foreign
country. Id.
249. Letter from Catherine W. Brown, Assistant Legal Adviser for Consular Af-
fairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Charles C. Olson, General Counsel, Prosecuting Attor-
ney’s Council of Georgia (Apr. 12, 2002), quoted in Sean D. Murphy, ed., State
Responsibility and Liability, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 96 AM. J. INTL. L. 706, 710 (2002).
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governmental obligation is merely to “take appropriate measures”
and that such an obligation is too vague to be enforced judicially.250
iii. Not Every Plaintiff Would Have Standing to Invoke Article 8
A party lacks standing to initiate legal action “if it does not have an
actual and substantial interest in, or would not be benefited or harmed
by, the ultimate outcome of an action.”251 Accordingly, a person who
wished to challenge governmental action as contrary to the Geneva
Convention would need to demonstrate that automated vehicles had
caused or were soon to cause her harm. Taxi drivers, truck drivers, and
others whose livelihoods were immediately threatened might satisfy
this requirement. However, a court may also conclude that these
plaintiffs are not entitled to the protections of the Convention, partic-
ularly since the United States is not “required to extend the benefit of
the provisions of this Convention to any motor vehicle or trailer, or to
any driver having remained within its territory for a continuous period
exceeding one year.”252
iv. Domestic Application of the Convention Is Constitutional
When Congress seeks to impose particular requirements for the
noncommercial use of highways (such as maximum lawful blood alco-
hol content or, in the past, maximum lawful speed),253 it tends to do so
through the power of the purse—in this case, the rather large purse
that is the federal transportation fund. This context may prompt some
uncertainty about the extent of federal power in this area, particularly
if the Supreme Court turns toward a more narrow view of Congres-
sional authority.254 However, under the court’s precedent, the federal
government can use its treaty power as a means to ends that it could
not reach through its other powers.255
250. Geneva Convention, supra note 52, art. 6.
251. City of Santa Monica v. Stewart, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 84 (Ct. App. 2005); see
also CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 367 (West 2012) (“Every action must be prosecuted in
the name of the real party in interest.”). Standing rules for the federal courts and each
state’s courts are not uniform.
252. Geneva Convention, supra note 52, art. 1 para. 2.
253. See, e.g., Christopher O’Neill, Legislating Under the Influence: Are Federal
Highway Incentives Enough to Induce State Legislatures to Pass A 0.08 Blood Alcohol
Concentration Standard?, 28 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 415 (2004); Robert E. King and
Cass R. Sunstein, Doing Without Speed Limits, 79 B.U. L. REV. 155, 158–59 (1999);
see also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987) (holding that Congress
may constitutionally link some highway funding to a state’s minimum drinking age).
254. See National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 2566
(2012).
255. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). The Supreme Court may, however,
revisit Holland when it decides Bond v. United States, No. 12-158, appealed from
United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149 (3d Cir. 2012).
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4. Certain Domestic Responses to the Convention Are Possible
Even if the Geneva Convention is self-executing, its domestic status
remains vulnerable. Congress and the president each have some
power over the domestic application of treaties. Under the last-in-
time rule, Congress could negate the domestic effect of the treaty by
enacting legislation that is irreconcilably inconsistent with it—al-
though this would also place the United States in breach of its interna-
tional obligations.256 In contrast, the president could cause the United
States to denounce the treaty pursuant to article 32;257 this would both
relieve the United States of its international obligations and, arguably,
negate the treaty’s domestic effect.258
U.S. states have less direct power. Although their actions could
have the practical effect of placing the United States in breach of its
international obligations,259 these actions would alter neither the do-
mestic nor the international status of the treaty’s provisions. However,
by establishing good-faith practice, U.S. states could shape how these
provisions are interpreted at the domestic and international levels. For
example, a legislature that expressly authorizes automated vehicles
might:
hereby find[ ] that operation of automated vehicles under the condi-
tions prescribed herein is consistent with article 8 of the Convention
on Road Traffic because (1) such operation has the potential to sig-
nificantly improve highway safety, one of the objects of the Conven-
tion; (2) this State shall make such operation reasonably knowable
to the foreign visitors contemplated by the Convention; (3) the Con-
vention implicitly permits indirect control over vehicles and ani-
mals; (4) there shall remain a driver of each vehicle who shall be
able to specify or accept the parameters of operation; and (5) these
parameters shall be consistent with the traffic laws of this State.260
State attorneys general, the U.S. State Department’s office of legal
counsel, and other domestic legal actors that undertake to interpret
the Geneva Convention might reasonably reach a similar conclusion.
This paper now turns to one of these actors, namely the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
256. Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 936
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
257. See supra Part IV.E.2.
258. See Emily K. Penney, Is That Legal?: The United States’ Unilateral Withdrawal
from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 1287, 1310–11 (2002).
259. See Medellin, 552 U.S. 491; cf. In the proceeding between The Loewen Group,
Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen and United States of America, Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3,
Award, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES (June
26, 2003), www.state.gov/documents/organization/22094.pdf.
260. See infra Part IV.E.
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V. FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS DO NOT
CATEGORICALLY PROHIBIT AUTOMATED DRIVING
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) reg-
ulates the performance of motor vehicles in part through the promul-
gation and enforcement of rules,261 including the performance-based
standards262 to which manufacturers, importers, and distributors must
certify their new vehicles.263
Neither these Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSSs)
nor NHTSA’s other rules appear to directly preclude the sale or im-
portation of automated vehicles.264 These rules, for example, assume
but do not expressly require the presence of a driver265 (defined as
261. See generally 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30102, 30111 (2012); 49 C.F.R. §§ 501–599
(2012).
262. 49 U.S.C. §§ 30102(a)(8) (“‘[M]otor vehicle safety’ means the performance of
a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment in a way that protects the public against
unreasonable risk of accidents occurring because of the design, construction, or per-
formance of a motor vehicle, and against unreasonable risk of death or injury in an
accident, and includes nonoperational safety of a motor vehicle.”), 30102(a)(9)
(“‘[M]otor vehicle safety standard’ means a minimum standard for motor vehicle or
motor vehicle equipment performance.”).
263. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 30102 (definitions), 30112(a)(1) (“Except as [otherwise pro-
vided], a person may not manufacture for sale, sell, offer for sale, introduce or deliver
for introduction in interstate commerce, or import into the United States, any motor
vehicle or motor vehicle equipment manufactured on or after the date an applicable
motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter takes effect unless the
vehicle or equipment complies with the standard and is covered by a certification
issued under section 30115 of this title.”), 30112(b) (excluding from this restriction
“the sale, offer for sale, or introduction or delivery for introduction in interstate com-
merce of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment after the first purchase of the
vehicle or equipment in good faith other than for resale”), 30115(a) (“A manufacturer
or distributor of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment shall certify to the dis-
tributor or dealer at delivery that the vehicle or equipment complies with applicable
motor vehicle safety standards prescribed under this chapter. A person may not issue
the certificate if, in exercising reasonable care, the person has reason to know the
certificate is false or misleading in a material respect. Certification of a vehicle must
be shown by a label or tag permanently fixed to the vehicle. Certification of equip-
ment may be shown by a label or tag on the equipment or on the outside of the
container in which the equipment is delivered.”); see generally 49 C.F.R. § 571; see
also 49 U.S.C. § 30126 (requiring the promulgation of “uniform motor vehicle safety
standards applicable to all used motor vehicles”).
264. A detailed analysis of NHTSA’s statutory authority with respect to automated
vehicles is likely forthcoming. See Steve Wood, The Potential Regulatory Challenges of
Increasingly Autonomous Motor Vehicles, SANTA CLARA L. REV. (2012). That au-
thority may be broader in theory than in practice. See Jerry L. Mashaw & David L.
Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON
REG. 257 (Spring 1987) (arguing that the courts and Congress frustrated the agency’s
rulemaking and that NHTSA “legitimized its existence by abandoning its statutory
mandate”).
265. See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. § 571.101 (“Controls and displays”) (“The purpose of this
standard is to ensure the accessibility, visibility and recognition of motor vehicle con-
trols, telltales and indicators, and to facilitate the proper selection of controls under
daylight and nighttime conditions, in order to reduce the safety hazards caused by the
diversion of the driver’s attention from the driving task, and by mistakes in selecting
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“the occupant of a motor vehicle seated immediately behind the steer-
ing control system”266), do not categorically prohibit drive-by-wire-
systems,267 require no specific description of the technology in a vehi-
cle identification number (VIN),268 and impose no event data record-
ing (EDR) requirements269 that would uniquely burden automated
vehicles.270 Similarly, automated vehicles that were designed for par-
ticular low-speed applications might fall under NHTSA’s less de-
manding low-speed vehicle standard.271
FMVSS 108, however, may be a source of two potential complica-
tions, particularly in light of the agency’s strikingly conservative ap-
proach to this lighting standard.272 This detailed rule requires a motor
controls.”). In this way, the FMVSSs may compel the installation of unnecessary
equipment on a fully automated vehicle.
266. 49 C.F.R. § 571.3(b)(2).
267. See generally 49 C.F.R. § 571. Indeed, the safety standard for “[p]assenger car
brake systems” references the electrical actuation of both service and parking brakes.
49 C.F.R. § 571.135, at S4(3) (defining “[e]lectrically-actuated service brakes” and
“[s]plit service brake system”), S5.2 (“Each vehicle shall be equipped with a parking
brake system of a friction type with solely mechanical means to retain engagement.”),
S5.5.1(e)–(f) (brake system warning indicator), S6.3.12 (“State of charge of batteries
for electrically-actuated service brakes”), S7.10.3(f) (particular test procedure for hy-
draulic failure), S7.11.1 (particular test procedure for power failure), S7.12.2(i) (spe-
cific test procedure for parking brake).
268. VINs must identify, inter alia, a vehicle’s manufacturer as well as “[m]ake,
line, series, body type, engine type, and all restraint devices and their location.” 49
C.F.R. § 565.15. NHTSA may, at some point, expand the information communicated
by the VIN, but it has yet to do so. See Vehicle Identification Number Requirements,
Notice of Final Rulemaking, Docket No. NHTSA 2008-0022, RIN 2127-AJ99 at 18
(“The agency is not adopting at this time amendments to address any of the recom-
mendations for the VIN to include additional information elements, not because
those recommendations lack merit, but instead because there is a pressing need for
today’s rule to be in place to assure the uninterrupted continuation of the VIN
system.”).
269. NHTSA does not require the installation of EDRs but does regulate those
that are installed, see 49 C.F.R. § 563. Congress considered mandating EDRs in all
new passenger vehicles as part of its reauthorization of highway funding, see S.B.
1813, 112th Cong., § 31406 (2012), available at www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/
s1813/text, but declined to do so in the final bill, see H.R. 4348 (MAP-21), 112th Cong.
(2012), available at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr4348enr/pdf/BILLS-112hr
4348enr.pdf. The final bill does require “an examination of the need for safety stan-
dards with regard to electronic systems in passenger motor vehicles.” Id. § 31402.
270. Indeed, “event data do not include audio and video data.” 49 C.F.R. § 563.
271. 49 C.F.R. § 571.500.
272. See, e.g., Letter from John Womack, Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Rich-
ard King, Manager/Director, Wheel Lighting Devices, Ltd. (July 5, 2001) (“Please
note that the agency is growing increasingly conservative in its views about the per-
missibility under Federal law of novelty lighting items which have no discernable [sic]
safety benefit, given the possibility of these devices causing confusion to drivers and
distracting them from the safety messages sent by required lighting equipment.”); Let-
ter from Stephen P. Wood, Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Herbert E. Stoel (Apr.
8, 1990) (“We are learning that changes in lamp function, operation, and color should
be approached in a conservative fashion, so as not to confuse the operators of other
vehicles.”); Letter from Frank Seales, Jr., Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Richard S.
Lugar, U.S. Senate (May 9, 2000) (“Over the years we have come to believe that
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vehicle to be equipped with a “vehicular hazard warning signal oper-
ating unit” that conforms to the January 1966 version of SAE Recom-
mended Practice J910.273 That document in turn defines “vehicular
hazard warning signal operating unit” as a “driver controlled device
which causes all turn signal lamps to flash simultaneously to indicate
to the approaching drivers the presence of a vehicular hazard.”274 On
at least three occasions, NHTSA has advised that the phrase “driver
controlled” precludes automatic activation of hazard flashers.275
This is a curious interpretation for two reasons. First, it implies that
drivers do not, for example, “control” their brakes, since antilock ser-
vice brakes are not exclusively “activated and deactivated by the
driver.”276 Second, the actual standard distinguishes between the
flashers and their operating unit, which suggests that the flashers
might be automatically actuated even if the operating unit is not.277
That is, the “vehicular hazard warning signal operating unit” defined
in SAE J910 is only one part of an entire vehicular hazard warning
signal system that also includes flashers (covered by SAE J945)278 and
turn signal lamps (covered by SAE J1395).279 An automatic controller
need not supplant the manually switchable operating unit; it could
lamps must perform only their assigned function, and our interpretations of Standard
No. 108 have become more conservative.”); cf. also, e.g., NHTSA, NHTSA Illegal
Lighting Crackdown Continues, Press Release, NHTSA 43-04 (Oct. 19, 2004), availa-
ble at www.nhtsa.gov/nhtsa/announce/press/pressdisplay.cfm?year=2004&filename=
pr43-04.html (describing a crackdown on illegal lighting rather than an illegal crack-
down on lighting).
273. 49 C.F.R. § 571.108 tbls. I, III.
274. SAE Int’l, Recommended Practice J910 (Jan. 1966). Later versions of this doc-
ument are not incorporated into a safety standard and are hence not legally binding.
275. See Letter from John Womack, Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Paul
Michelotti, PM Technology (Feb. 15, 2001) (“We interpret ‘driver controlled’ as
meaning that the hazard warning signal unit must be activated and deactivated by the
driver and not by automatic means.”); Letter from Frank Seales, Jr., Chief Counsel,
NHTSA, to Eric Reed (Feb. 29, 2000) (“An automatic activation of the hazard warn-
ing unit would not be ‘driver controlled’ and is therefore not permitted.”); Letter
from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Ted Gaston, Dir. of Maint.,
Muncie Ind. Transit Sys. (Apr. 25, 2005) (“We have previously interpreted ‘driver
controlled’ to mean that the hazard warning signal system must be activated and deac-
tivated by the driver and not by automatic means. . ..”); cf. also 49 C.F.R. § 571.108
S5.5.11(1)(a) (2012) (“Any pair of lamps on the front of a passenger car, multipurpose
passenger vehicle, truck, or bus, whether or not required by this standard, other than
parking lamps or fog lamps, may be wired to be automatically activated, as deter-
mined by the manufacturer of the vehicle, in a steady burning state as daytime run-
ning lamps (DRLs) and to be automatically deactivated when the headlamp control is
in any “on” position, and as otherwise determined by the manufacturer of the vehicle,
provided that each such lamp [meets certain requirements].”).
276. Letter from John Womack, supra note 275; see, e.g., Letter from Frank Seales,
Jr., Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to C. Thomas Terry, Dir., Safety Affairs & Regulation,
Gen. Motors N. Am. (May 26, 2000) (discussing the activation of service brakes by
adaptive cruise control and electronic stability control systems).
277. 49 C.F.R. § 571.108 tbls. I, III.
278. SAE Int’l, Recommended Practice J945 (Feb. 1966).
279. SAE Int’l, Recommended Practice J1395 (Apr. 1985).
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merely provide a second method of actuating the flashers (and there-
fore a third method of actuating the turn signals). If that controller
performs appropriately, it need not “impair[ ] the effectiveness of” the
required equipment.280
FMVSS 108 also provides that “[n]o additional lamp, reflective de-
vice or other motor vehicle equipment shall be installed that impairs
the effectiveness of lighting equipment required by this standard.”281
Because the LiDAR (“light detection and ranging”) devices used on
some automated vehicles are arguably lamps (since they emit light,
whether visible or not) and certainly motor vehicle equipment,
NHTSA may apply its strict interpretation of FMVSS 108 to these
devices as well. NHTSA has previously taken a cautiously permissive
approach to certain laser devices projecting in the visible spectrum.282
In addition to specifying particular performance standards, NHTSA
imposes specific obligations on an entity that alters a vehicle. In par-
ticular, “[w]ith respect to the vehicle alterations it performs, an al-
terer: (1) Has a duty to determine continued conformity of the altered
vehicle with applicable Federal motor vehicle safety, Bumper, and
Theft Prevention standards, and (2) Assumes legal responsibility for
all duties and liabilities for certification under the Vehicle Safety
Act.”283 The conversion of a conventional motor vehicle to an auto-
mated vehicle would constitute an alteration if the changes are signifi-
cant and made before the vehicle is first sold to a consumer.284
280. 49 C.F.R. § 571.108 S5.1.3.
281. Id.
282. See Letter from Samuel J. Dubbin, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Mark A. Ev-
ans, Photometric Eng’r, Calcoast – ITL (Apr. 12, 1996) (concluding that “no Federal
motor vehicle safety standard . . . applies” to “a rear fog anti-collision laser system”
but noting that FMVSS 108 requires that the device not “impair the effectiveness of
the [proximate] center lamp”); Letter from John Womack, Acting Chief Counsel,
NHTSA, to Jacqueline Frohman, Chief Fin. Officer, Astron Grp., Inc. (Apr. 11, 2001)
(stating that “[w]e have no requirements for fog lamps at this time,” concluding that
the laser-based rear fog lamp described would not impair required rear lighting equip-
ment, and cautioning about the possibility of hazards to other drivers); Letter from
Frank Seales, Jr., Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to [Redacted] (June 19, 2000) (stating that
a laser device that “would shine on the hood of a passing vehicle . . . could create
actual hazards”); see also infra notes 293, 503.
283. 49 C.F.R. § 567.7(a).
284. An “altered vehicle” is “a completed vehicle previously certified . . . that has
been altered other than by the addition, substitution, or removal of readily attachable
components, such as mirrors or tire and rim assemblies, or by minor finishing opera-
tions such as painting, before the first purchase of the vehicle other than for resale, in
such a manner as may affect the conformity of the vehicle with one or more Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard(s) or the validity of the vehicle’s stated weight ratings
or vehicle type classification.” 49 C.F.R. § 567.3. An “alterer” is “a person who alters
by addition, substitution, or removal of components (other than readily attachable
components) a certified vehicle before the first purchase of the vehicle other than for
resale.” Id.
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Furthermore, an automated vehicle that presents an “unreasonable
risk” of crashes, death, or injury285 would impose obligations on
NHTSA as well as on the relevant manufacturer and its dealers.286 In
chief, the manufacturer would be independently obligated to provide
notice of and a remedy for such a defect,287 NHTSA would otherwise
be required to order that manufacturer to do so,288 and a dealer would
be prohibited from selling a vehicle that remains defective.289
Such a vehicle could be defective even if it complies with NHTSA’s
performance standards. The statutory provisions governing recalls ap-
ply to vehicles and equipment that “contain[ ] a defect related to mo-
tor vehicle safety” as well as those that “do[ ] not comply with an
applicable motor vehicle safety standard.”290 A defect “includes any
defect in performance, construction, a component, or material of a
motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment,”291 and motor vehicle
safety “means the performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle
equipment in a way that protects the public against unreasonable risk
of accidents occurring because of the design, construction, or perform-
ance of a motor vehicle, and against unreasonable risk of death or
injury in an accident, and includes nonoperational safety of a motor
vehicle.”292
Finally, rules promulgated by other agencies may also be relevant.
The Federal Communications Commission regulates the electromag-
netic spectrum, parts of which may be used or affected by automated
vehicles.293 The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration regu-
lates commercial trucking.294 And, depending on the extent of govern-
mental involvement,295 certain research that involves human subjects
may be regulated under a federal policy for the protection of human
subjects.296 These examples, while outside this article’s scope, illus-
trate the range of federal law potentially implicated by automated ve-
hicles. Relevant state law, to which this article now turns, is similarly
expansive.
285. 49 U.S.C § 30102(a)(8) (2012).
286. See generally id. §§ 30101–30170.
287. Id. §§ 30118-30120; see also id. § 30166(m)(3)(c) (possible defects).
288. Id. § 30118(b).
289. Id. § 30120(i).
290. Id. § 30118(a).
291. Id. § 30102(a)(2).
292. Id. § 30102(a)(8).
293. See, e.g., Dedicated Short-Range Communications, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. RE-
SEARCH & INNOVATIVE TECH. ADMIN. (RITA), www.its.dot.gov/factsheets/
dsrc_factsheet.htm (Nov. 8, 2013, 9:28 PM); supra note 282 (LiDAR).
294. See USDOT, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, USDOT, www.
fmcsa.dot.gov/rules-regulations/rules-regulations.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2014).
295. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 11.101–102 (2012).
296. See generally 49 C.F.R. § 11.
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VI. STATE VEHICLE CODES DO NOT CATEGORICALLY PROHIBIT
AUTOMATED DRIVING
This section surveys the statutory vehicle codes of every U.S. state
plus the Uniform Vehicle Code and a selection of other domestic
codes. It also reviews some of the case law related to these codes,
though by no means comprehensively. It generally does not consider
administrative agency rules or practices implementing vehicle codes.
And it looks at relevant ordinances in only a tiny fraction of U.S.
municipalities.297
Because of the broad way in which the term and others like it are
defined, an automated vehicle probably has a human “driver.”298 Ob-
ligations imposed on that person may limit the independence with
which the vehicle may lawfully operate.299 In addition, the automated
vehicle itself must meet numerous requirements, some of which may
also complicate its operation.300 Although several states have ex-
pressly established the legality of automated vehicles under certain
conditions, their respective laws do not resolve many of the questions
raised in this section.301 Other states that wish to address the question
of legality might consider the draft provisions provided as an initial
basis for eventual legislation.302
A. An Automated Vehicle Probably Has a Driver
Unlike the Geneva Convention, no state statute expressly requires
that a vehicle have a driver. However, state vehicle codes do variously
impose obligations on a vehicle’s “driver,” “operator,” or “owner” or
on any “person” who “drive[s]” or “operate[s]” or has “actual physi-
cal control of” that vehicle. They also establish certain vehicle require-
ments that similarly reference the “driver” or “operator.” These
provisions raise the threshold question of whether an automated vehi-
cle has any such person or persons—and, if so, whom.
“Driver” is a broad concept303—so much so that, at least textually,
even nonhuman persons can be drivers.304 In addition, an owner who
is not driving her vehicle may nonetheless be responsible for it.305 This
expansive view of responsibility suggests that various persons could be
deemed to operate an automated vehicle.306
297. This is why note 307, infra, takes up only three pages and not thirty.
298. See infra Part VI.A.
299. See infra Part VI.B.
300. See infra Part VI.C.
301. See infra Part VI.D.
302. See infra Part VI.E.
303. See infra Part VI.A.1.
304. See infra Part VI.B.2.
305. See infra Part VI.A.3.
306. See infra Part VI.A.4.
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1. “Driver” Is a Broad Concept
“Driver” and “operator” are broad terms that, in general, refer to
anyone who “drives,” “operates,” or “is in actual physical control of”
a vehicle.307 These three descriptors, which form a vexing Venn dia-
307. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 32-1-1.1(14) (2013) (“DRIVER. Every person who
drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle.”); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 13
(2013) (defining neither term); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-101.18 (2013) (“‘Driver’
means a person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle.”), 28-101 (“39.
‘Operator’ means a person who drives a motor vehicle on a highway, who is in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle on a highway or who is exercising control over or
steering a vehicle being towed by a motor vehicle.”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-16-204(a)
(2013) (“‘Driver’ means every person who is in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle upon a highway or who is exercising control over or steering a vehicle being
towed by a motor vehicle. [registration]”), 27-49-208(c) (“‘Driver’ means every per-
son who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle. [rules of road]”); CAL.
VEH. CODE § 305 (West 2013) (“A ‘driver’ is a person who drives or is in actual physi-
cal control of a vehicle. The term ‘driver’ does not include the tillerman or other
person who, in an auxiliary capacity, assists the driver in the steering or operation of
any articulated firefighting apparatus.”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-1-102(27) (2013)
(“‘Driver’ means every person, including a minor driver under the age of twenty-one
years, who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle.”); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-1(25) (2013) (“‘Driver’ means any person who drives, operates or is in physical
control of a commercial motor vehicle, or who is required to hold a commercial
driver’s license;”), 14-1(62) (“‘Operator’ means any person who operates a motor ve-
hicle or who steers or directs the course of a motor vehicle being towed by another
motor vehicle and includes a driver as defined in subdivision (25) of this section;”);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 101(42) (2013) (“‘Operator’ includes every person who is
in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a highway, except that for the pur-
poses of Chapter 29 of this title the term ‘operator’ shall include a chauffeur.”); FLA.
STAT. § 316.003(10) (2013) (“DRIVER.—Any person who drives or is in actual physi-
cal control of a vehicle on a highway or who is exercising control of a vehicle or
steering a vehicle being towed by a motor vehicle.”); GA. CODE § 40-1-1(14) (2013)
(“‘Driver’ means every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehi-
cle.”), 40-1-1(38) (“‘Operator’ means any person who drives or is in actual physical
control of a motor vehicle.”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 286-2 (2013) (“‘Driver’ means every
person who drives, operates, or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in any
place open to the general public for purposes of vehicular traffic or who is exercising
control over or steering a vehicle being towed or pushed by a motor vehicle.”); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 49-105(15) (2013) (“‘Driver’ means every person who drives or is in
actual physical control of a vehicle.”), 49-116(1) (“‘Operator’ means every person
who is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a highway or private prop-
erty open to public use.”);  625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-116 (2013) (“Driver. Every per-
son who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle.”), 1-154.2 (“Operator.
Every person who operates or is in actual physical control of any device or vehicle
whether motorized or propelled by human power.”); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-13-2-47
(West 2013) (“‘Driver’ means a person who drives or is in actual physical control of a
vehicle.”), 9-13-2-118(a) (“Except as provided in subsection (b), ‘operator’, when
used in reference to a vehicle, means a person, other than a chauffeur or a public
passenger chauffeur, who: (1) drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle upon a
highway; or (2) is exercising control over or steering a motor vehicle being towed by
another vehicle. (b) ‘Operator’, for purposes of IC 9-25, means a person other than a
chauffeur who is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle. As added by P.L.2-
1991, SEC.1. Amended by P.L.125-2012, SEC.17.”); IOWA CODE § 321.1.48 (2013)
(“‘Operator’ or ‘driver’ means every person who is in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle upon a highway.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1416 (2013) (“‘Driver’ means
every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle.”); KY. REV.
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STAT. ANN. § 189.010(7) (West 2013) (“‘Operator’ means the person in actual physi-
cal control of a vehicle.”); LA. REV. STAT. § 32:1(16) (2013) (“‘Driver’ means every
person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle.”), 1(44) (“‘Operator’
means every person, other than a chauffeur, who drives or is in actual physical control
of a motor vehicle upon a highway or who is exercising control over or steering a
vehicle being towed by a motor vehicle.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 1 (2013) (“‘Op-
erator’, any person who operates a motor vehicle or trackless trolley.”); MD. CODE
ANN. TRANSP. § 11-115 (2013) (“‘Driver’ means any individual who drives a vehi-
cle.”), 11-142 (“‘Operator’, as used in reference to a vehicle, means driver, as defined
in this subtitle.”); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 29-a, § 101.22 (2013) (“‘Driver’ has the same
meaning as ‘operator’ as defined in subsection 48.”), 101.48 (“‘Operator’ means an
individual who drives or is in control of a vehicle or who is exercising control over or
steering a towed vehicle.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.13 (2013) (“‘Driver’ means
every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle.”); MINN. STAT.
§ 169.011 (2013) (“Subd. 24. Driver. ‘Driver’ means every person who drives or is in
actual physical control of a vehicle.”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 63-3-121(b) (2013)
(“‘Driver’ means every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehi-
cle.”), 63-1-3(c) (“The term ‘operator’ means any person in actual physical control of
a motor vehicle on the highway;”); MO. REV. STAT. § 300.010(10) (2013) (“‘Driver’,
every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle”); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 61-1-101(20) (2013) (“‘Driver’ means a person who drives or is in actual phys-
ical control of a vehicle.”), 61-1-101(51) (“‘Operator’ means a person who is in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-4.01(7) (2013)
(“Driver.—The operator of a vehicle, as defined in subdivision (25). The terms
‘driver’ and ‘operator’ and their cognates are synonymous.”), 20-4.01(25) (“Opera-
tor.—A person in actual physical control of a vehicle which is in motion or which has
the engine running. The terms ‘operator’ and ‘driver’ and their cognates are synony-
mous.”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-01-01.16 (2013) (“‘Driver’ means every person who
drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle.”), 39-01-01.49 (“‘Operator’ means
every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a
highway or who is exercising control over or steering a vehicle being towed by a mo-
tor vehicle.”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-642 (2013) (“Operator or driver shall mean any
person who operates, drives, or is in actual physical control of a vehicle.”); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 484A.080 (2013) (“‘Driver’ means every person who drives or is in actual
physical control of a vehicle.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 259:25 (2013) (“‘Driver’ shall
mean a person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle as defined
in RSA 259:60 or an OHRV or snowmobile.”); N.J. STAT. § 39:1-1 (West 2013)
(“‘Driver’ means the rider or driver of a horse, bicycle or motorcycle or the driver or
operator of a motor vehicle, unless otherwise specified.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-1-
4.4.K (2013) (“‘driver’ means every person who drives or is in actual physical control
of a motor vehicle, including a motorcycle, upon a highway, who is exercising control
over or steering a vehicle being towed by a motor vehicle or who operates or is in
actual physical control of an off-highway motor vehicle;”), 66-1-4.13.E (“‘operator’
means driver, as defined in Section 66-1-4.4 NMSA 1978”); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW
§ 113 (McKinney 2013) (“Driver. Every person who operates or drives or is in actual
physical control of a vehicle. Whenever the terms ‘chauffeur’ or ‘operator’ or ‘chauf-
feur’s license’ or ‘operator’s license’ are used in this chapter, such terms shall be
deemed to mean driver and driver’s license respectively.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4511.01(Y) (West 2013) (“‘Driver or operator’ means every person who drives or is
in actual physical control of a vehicle, trackless trolley, or streetcar.”), 4501.01(X)
(“‘Operator’ includes any person who drives or operates a motor vehicle upon the
public highways.”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 1-114 (2013) (“Every person who drives or
is in actual physical control of a vehicle.”), 1-140 (“Every person, including a commer-
cial operator or driver, as defined in Section 47-1-108 of this title, who operates, drives
or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle or who is exercising control over or
steering a vehicle being towed by a motor vehicle.”); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 102 (2013)
(“‘Driver.’ A person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle.”); R.I.
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GEN. LAWS § 31-1-17(c) (2013) (“‘Driver’ means any operator or chauffeur who
drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle.”), (d) (“‘Operator’ means every
person, other than a chauffeur, who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle upon a highway or who is exercising control over or steering a vehicle being
towed by a motor vehicle.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-400 (2013) (“Every person who
drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle is a ‘driver.’”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
tit. 32 (2013) (defining neither term); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-8-101(15) (2013)
(“‘Driver’ means every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehi-
cle;”), 55-8-101(39) (“‘Operator’ means every person, other than a chauffeur, who
drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a highway or who is
exercising control over or steering a vehicle being towed by a motor vehicle;”); TEX.
TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 541.001(1) (West 2013) (“‘Operator’ means, as used in refer-
ence to a vehicle, a person who drives or has physical control of a vehicle.”); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 41-6a-102(39) (West 2013) (“‘Operator’ means a person who is in actual
physical control of a vehicle.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-100 (West 2013) (“‘Operator’
or ‘driver’ means every person who either (i) drives or is in actual physical control of
a motor vehicle on a highway or (ii) is exercising control over or steering a vehicle
being towed by a motor vehicle.”); WASH. REV. CODE § 46.04.370 (2013) (“‘Operator
or driver’ means every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehi-
cle.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 4(25) (2013) (“‘Operator’ shall include all persons 18
years of age or over, properly licensed to operate motor vehicles.”); WIS. STAT.
§ 340.01(41) (2013) (“‘Operator’ means a person who drives or is in actual physical
control of a vehicle.”); W. VA. CODE § 17C-1-31 (2013) (“‘Driver’ means every per-
son who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle.”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 31-
5-102(x) (2013) (“‘Driver’ means every person who drives or is in actual physical
control of a vehicle”); MUN. CODE OF CHI. § 9-4-010 (2013) (“‘Driver’ means every
person who operates or is in actual physical control of a vehicle . . . . ‘Operator’ means
every person who operates or is in actual physical control of any device or vehicle
whether motorized or propelled by human power.”); D.C. CODE § 50-1501 (2013)
(defining neither term); L.A. MUN. CODE § 80.00(a) (2013) (incorporating definitions
in the California Vehicle Code); HOUSTON MUN. CODE § 45-2 (2013) (“Driver means
every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle.”); N.Y.C. TRAF-
FIC RULES AND REGULATIONS (2012), available at www.nyc.gov/html/dot/downloads/
pdf/trafrule.pdf (not directly defining driver or operator); GUAM CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§ 1102(f) (2013) (“A driver is a person who drives or is in actual physical control of a
vehicle.”), 1102(v) (“An operator is a person, other than a chauffeur, who drives or is
in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a highway.”); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit.
27, § 5001(31) (2013) (“Driver.—Shall mean any person who drives or has physical
control in the area of the steering wheel of a vehicle or motor vehicle. He/she shall be
deemed to be an authorized driver when he/she has obtained a driving license, which
is in effect.”); cf. also NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 14, § 105.K (2013) (“‘Driver’ means
every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle, including a
motor-driven cycle, upon a highway or any lands under the jurisdiction of the Navajo
Nation or who is exercising control over or steering a vehicle being towed by a motor
vehicle.”), 105.AA (“‘Operator’ means a person other than a chauffeur, who drives or
is in actual physical control over a motor vehicle upon a highway or who is exercising
control over or steering a vehicle being towed by a motor vehicle or exercising control
over a motor-driven cycle, all-terrain vehicle, moped, or recreational vehicle, upon a
highway, roadway or any lands within the Navajo Nation.”); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 20,
§ 101 (2013) (“‘operator’ includes a chauffeur, driver, or any person operating a mo-
tor vehicle”); 36 C.F.R. § 1.4 (2012) (National Park Service regulation) (“Operator
means a person who operates, drives, controls, otherwise has charge of or is in actual
physical control of a mechanical mode of transportation or any other mechanical
equipment.”); supra note 262 (FMVSS); UNIF. VEH. CODE (2000) § 1-126 (“Driver –
Every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle.”); UNIF. VEH.
CODE §§ 1-114 (1954) (consolidating previous acts) (“Driver.—Every person who
drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle.”), 1-136 (“Operator.—Every per-
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gram that shifts by jurisdiction, collectively encompass a wide range of
circumstances. In California, for example, “drivers” have included a
person who was exiting her vehicle from the front left seat,308 a person
who failed to engage the parking brake before exiting the vehicle,309 a
person who was towing an occupied vehicle,310 and a person who was
manually pushing an inoperable vehicle owned by an acquaintance.311
Indeed, a vehicle can simultaneously have multiple drivers.312
son, other than a chauffeur, who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle upon a highway or who is exercising control over or steering a vehicle being
towed by a motor vehicle.”); UNIF. VEH. CODE, Act V, UNIF. ACT REGULATING
TRAFFIC ON HIGHWAYS § 10(c) (1952) (“Driver.—Every person who drives or is in
actual physical control of a vehicle.”), (1948) (same); §§ 10(c) (1944) (same), 10(c)
(1939) (same), (1926) (not defined); UNIF. VEH. CODE, Act II, UNIF. MOTOR-VEHI-
CLE OPERATORS’ & CHAUFFEURS’ LICENSE ACT §§ 2(b) (1944) (“Operator.—Every
person, other than a chauffeur, who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle upon a highway or who is exercising control over or steering a vehicle being
towed by a motor vehicle.”), 1(f) (1926) (“‘Operator.’ Every person, other than a
chauffeur, who is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a highway.”);
UNIF. Veh. Code, UNIFORM ACT REGULATING THE OPERATION OF VEHICLES ON
HIGHWAYS (1926) (not defined); see also MODEL TRAFFIC ORDINANCE FOR MUNICI-
PALITIES §§ 1-11 (1962) (“Driver.—Every person who drives or is in actual physical
control of a vehicle.”), 1-11 (1956) (same); MODEL TRAFFIC ORDINANCE § 9(b)
(1946) (same); MODEL MUNICIPAL TRAFFIC ORDINANCE §§ 8(b) (same) (1936), 1
(1930) (“Operator. Any person who is in actual physical control of a vehicle.”); Mili-
tary Police, Motor Vehicle Traffic Supervision, Army Reg. 190-5, OPNAV 11200.5D,
AFI 31-218(I), MCO 5110.1D, DLAR 5720.1 (May 22, 2006), available at www.apd.
army.mil/pdffiles/r190_5.pdf, at 36 (“Driver [means] [a]ny person who drives or is in
physical control of a motor vehicle. A driver is in physical control when in position to
control the motor vehicle, whether to regulate or restrain its operation or movement.
For example, sitting in a parked car behind the steering wheel, keeping it in restraint
or in a position to control its movement. The word ‘driver’ is interchangeable with the
word ‘operator.’”); STANFORD UNIV. TRAFFIC & PARKING CODE (Aug. 2011), availa-
ble at transportation.stanford.edu/pdf/Stanford_University_Traffic_and_Parking_
Code.pdf (not directly defining driver or operator); supra Part IV.C (Geneva
Convention).
308. Adler v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 228 Cal. App. 3d 252, 258 (1991).
309. Panopulos v. Maderis, 303 P.2d 738, 742 (Cal. 1956).
310. Fairman v. Mors, 130 P.2d 448, 450–51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942) (applying Califor-
nia guest statute) (“A driver is one who ‘is in actual physical control of a vehicle.’ An
operator is one who directs or superintends it. [The plaintiff] neither actually con-
trolled the movements of the roadster nor directed its course. One sitting behind a
steering wheel of a towed car is utterly helpless so far as directing the course or con-
duct of such car. He is not the driver either in the statutory sense or in any sense. No
amount of turning of the steering wheel by him will alter its course. The allegation
that the roadster was towed warrants the inference that it had no power to propel
itself. An automobile incapable of moving under its own power is not ‘driven’ by any
of its occupants when being towed by another automobile.”) (internal citations
omitted).
311. Arellano v. Moreno, 33 Cal. App. 3d 877, 882–83 (1973). Presumably, the ac-
quaintance who was steering the vehicle from the outside was also a driver. See id.
312. See id.; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Coughran, 303 U.S. 485, 491 (1938)
(“If, as found, the automobile was being jointly operated by the wife and the girl
[then] the risk was not within the policy.”); People v. Yamat, 714 N.W.2d 335, 336
(Mich. 2006) (applying the state’s felonious driving statute to a passenger who
grabbed the steering wheel). But see State v. Myers, 223 N.W. 166 (Iowa 1929)
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Definitions of the individual terms, however, create a thicket of in-
consistency and logical impossibility.313 As Maryland’s high court ob-
served, “[t]he legislature’s definition of ‘drive’ as meaning, among
other things, ‘to drive,’ unquestionably engenders some confu-
sion”314—especially since “drive” also includes “operate,” which in
turn means “drive,”315 even though “operating” had been (and per-
haps still is) interpreted more broadly than “driving.”316
And that is just one state. Jurisdictions—whether by statute or
through case law—define these terms differently: Whereas California
distinguishes between driving (as sometimes requiring some motion)
and operating (as not),317 Illinois probably does not.318 And jurisdic-
tions also employ the terms differently: While New York directs that
“[n]o person shall operate a motor vehicle unless such person is re-
strained by a safety belt,”319 Colorado requires that “every driver . . .
shall wear a fastened safety belt while the motor vehicle is being oper-
ated on a street or highway in this state.”320
The significance of these adventures in connotation depends in part
on the interpretive methods that a court applies to the provisions at
issue. Courts have occasionally favored practical import over linguistic
nuance.321 Nonetheless, the fiction that statutes contain no superflu-
ous language322 has led to valiant efforts to distinguish between “driv-
ing” and “actual physical control.” Accordingly, a person in “actual
physical control of” a vehicle can be its “driver” even if she does not
(“[O]nly one person can be engaged in the physical operation of a motor vehicle at
one time . . . .”).
313. See generally Operate and Drive; Operation, 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 11
(2013); Operator and Driver, 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 12 (2013).
314. Atkinson v. State, 627 A.2d 1019, 1022 (Md. 1993).
315. Id. at 1022 n.4.
316. Id. at 1022 (quoting Thomas v. State, 353 A.2d 256, 258–59 (Md. 1976) and
McDuell v. State, 231 A.2d 265, 267 (Del. 1967)). Maryland defined “drive” in 1977.
See MD. CODE ANN. TRANSP. § 11-114 (2013).
317. See Mercer v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 809 P.2d 406, 410 n.6, 411 n.8 (Cal.
1991) (noting this difference in interpreting the state’s drunk driving law). But see
People v. Nelson, 200 Cal. App. 4th 1083 (2011), review denied (Feb. 29, 2012) (hold-
ing that a driver whose vehicle is stopped at a red traffic signal is “driving” for the
purpose of the state’s cell phone law).
318. See 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-115.8 (West 2008) (“Drive. To drive, oper-
ate, or be in physical control of a motor vehicle.”). Illinois courts did distinguish be-
tween “drive” and “physical control” prior to legislative enactment of this definition.
See, e.g., City of Naperville v. Watson, 677 N.E.2d 955, 957 (Ill. 1997).
319. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1229-c.3 (Consol. 1992); see also infra note 342.
320. COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-237 (2013).
321. See supra text accompanying nn. 17–20.
322. See e.g., Atkinson v. State, 627 A.2d 1019, 1024 (Md. 1993) (“[I]t is a generally
accepted principle of statutory construction that a statute is to be read so that no word
or phrase is ‘rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory.’”) (quoting
Mgmt. Pers. Servs. v. Sandefur, 478 A.2d 310, 315 (Md. 1984)). Presumably, no part of
the phrase “surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory” is “surplusage, super-
fluous, meaningless, or nugatory.”
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“drive” it,323 and a person who “drives” a vehicle can be a “driver”
even if she is not in “actual physical control.”324
Consider, for example, the question of whether an intoxicated per-
son commits drunk driving by “sleeping it off” in her stationary vehi-
cle.325 Some courts have asked whether the safety goals behind a
drunk-driving prohibition are better served by a construction that dis-
courages drivers from drinking or by one that discourages drunks
from driving,326 and some have looked to whether the statute at issue
refers to driving, operating, or actual physical control.327 So how do
these terms compare?
“Drive” is generally defined broadly by legislatures328 and narrowly
323. Adler v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 228 Cal. App. 3d 252, 258 (1991).
324. Panopulos v. Maderis, 303 P.2d 738, 742 (Cal. 1956) (“It is significant that the
statute defines driver to be one ‘who drives’ as distinguished from one ‘who is driv-
ing.’ One who is driving is, of course, also a driver and falls within the category of
those who are ‘in actual physical control of a vehicle.’ Since the statute contemplates
both as drivers it must be assumed that the Legislature intended that one not at a
particular moment in actual control of a vehicle may also be deemed to be a driver.”).
325. See generally James O. Pearson, Jr., What Constitutes Driving, Operating, or
Being in Control of Motor Vehicle for Purposes of Driving While Intoxicated Statute or
Ordinance, 93 A.L.R.3d 7 (1979); Jonathan Layton, Proof That Driver Was “Operat-
ing” Motor Vehicle While Intoxicated, 61 AM. JUR. 3d Proof of Facts § 115 (2001);
Mercer v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 809 P.2d 406, 441–45 (Cal. 1991) (describing judi-
cial and legislative approaches and responses); Kimberley F. Scott, “Driving” Under
the Influence in California: Mercer v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 28 CAL. W. L.
REV. 123, 128 (1992); David Salvin, The “D” In DUI Stands for Driving, Doesn’t It?
(What Is “Driving” and Do You Know When You Are Doing It?), ORANGE CNTY.
LAW. 18 (Jan. 2007); ROBERT F. KOETS, WILLIAM LINDSLEY, SARAH NEWCOMB, &
SUSAN L. THOMAS, MEANING OF “DRIVE”, 17 CAL. JUR. 3D CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMES
AGAINST ADMIN. OF JUSTICE § 312 (2013).
326. Compare, e.g., Atkinson, 627 A.2d at 1025 with City of Naperville v. Watson,
677 N.E.2d 955, 959 (Ill. 1997).
327. See supra text accompanying note 325.
328. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 28-101.17 (2013) (“‘Drive’ means to operate or be in ac-
tual physical control of a motor vehicle.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-1(24) (2013)
(“‘Drive’ means to drive, operate or be in physical control of a motor vehicle, includ-
ing a motor vehicle being towed by another;”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 286-2 (2013)
(“‘Drive’ means to drive, operate, or be in physical control of a motor vehicle in any
place open to the general public for purposes of vehicular traffic.”); 625 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/1-115.8 (West 1998) (“Drive. To drive, operate, or be in physical control of a
motor vehicle.”); MD. CODE TRANSP. § 11-114 (West 1977) (“‘Drive’ means to drive,
operate, move, or be in actual physical control of a vehicle, including the exercise of
control over or the steering of a vehicle being towed by a motor vehicle.”); MO. REV.
STAT. § 577.001.2 (2012) (“As used in this chapter, the term ‘drive’, ‘driving’, ‘oper-
ates’ or ‘operating’ means physically driving or operating a motor vehicle.”); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 60-468 (1989) (“Drive shall mean to operate or be in the actual physical
control of a motor vehicle.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 259:24 (2013) (“‘Drive,’ in all
its moods and tenses, shall mean to operate or be in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle, [off-highway recreational vehicle], or snowmobile.”).WIS. STAT. § 346.63(3)
(2013) (“In this section [on drunk driving]: (a) ‘Drive’ means the exercise of physical
control over the speed and direction of a motor vehicle while it is in motion.”); UNI-
FORM VEH. CODE §§ 1-123 (2000) (“Drive—to operate or be in physical control of a
vehicle.”), 1-125 (“Driven—to have operated or been in physical control of a
vehicle.”).
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by courts.329 The Uniform Vehicle Code defines the term as “to oper-
ate or be in physical control of a vehicle,” and the statutory definitions
of general application take a similar approach.330 Wisconsin provides
a useful statutory formulation of the “common law definition”331:
“Drive,” for the purpose of that state’s drunk-driving law, “means the
exercise of physical control over the speed and direction of a motor
vehicle while it is in motion.”332 The requirement of vehicular move-
ment, in the words of California’s high court, captures the “plain
meaning”333 that corresponds to “everyday usage.”334
“Operate,” in turn, has also been defined by legislatures335 and by
courts.336 Vermont provides the broadest statutory definition: “‘Oper-
ate’, ‘operating’ or ‘operated’ as applied to motor vehicles shall in-
clude ‘drive,’ ‘driving’ and ‘driven’ and shall also include an attempt to
operate, and shall be construed to cover all matters and things con-
nected with the presence and use of motor vehicles on the highway,
329. See Pearson, supra note 325, § 2[a].
330. See supra text accompanying note 328.
331. Mercer v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 809 P.2d 404, 411 n.9 (Cal. 1991).
332. WIS. STAT. § 346.63 (2013) (emphasis added).
333. Mercer, 809 P.2d at 413.
334. Id. at 763. But see cases cited supra note 317.
335. D.C. CODE § 50-1501.01(10) (2013) (“The terms ‘operate’ and ‘operated’ shall
include operating, moving, standing, or parking any motor vehicle or trailer on a pub-
lic highway of the District of Columbia.”); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-154.1 (2013)
(“Operate. To ride in or on, other than as a passenger, use or control in any manner
the operation of any device or vehicle whether motorized or propelled by human
power.”); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-13-2-117.5(a) (West 2013) (“‘Operate’, except as pro-
vided in subsection (b), means to navigate a vehicle. (b) ‘Operate’, for purposes of IC
9-31, means to navigate or otherwise use a motorboat. As added by P.L.71-1991,
SEC.6. Amended by P.L.125-2012, SEC.16.”); MD. CODE TRANSP. § 11-141 (2013)
(“‘Operate’, as used in reference to a vehicle, means to drive, as defined in this subti-
tle.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.35a (2013) (“‘Operate’ or ‘operating’ means being in
actual physical control of a vehicle regardless of whether or not the person is licensed
under this act as an operator or chauffeur.”); MO. REV. STAT. § 577.001.2 (2013) (“As
used in this chapter, the term ‘drive’, ‘driving’, ‘operates’ or ‘operating’ means physi-
cally driving or operating a motor vehicle.”); OHIO REV. CODE § 4511.01(HHH)
(West 2013) (“‘Operate’ means to cause or have caused movement of a vehicle,
streetcar, or trackless trolley.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 801.370 (2013) (“‘Operation’
means any operation, towing, pushing, movement or otherwise propelling.”); VT.
STAT. tit. 23, § 4(24) (2013) (“‘Operate,’ ‘operating’ or ‘operated’ as applied to motor
vehicles shall include ‘drive,’ ‘driving’ and ‘driven’ and shall also include an attempt to
operate, and shall be construed to cover all matters and things connected with the
presence and use of motor vehicles on the highway, whether they be in motion or at
rest.”); WIS. STAT. § 346.63(3) (2013) (“In this section [on drunk driving]: . . . (b)
‘Operate’ means the physical manipulation or activation of any of the controls of a
motor vehicle necessary to put it in motion.”).
336. See Pearson, supra note 325, pt. B. The meaning of “operate” and its cognates
has also been considered in other legal contexts, notably automobile liability policies
and owner-liability statutes. See generally W. R. Habeeb, Meaning of “Operate” or
“Being Operated” Within Clause of Automobile Liability Policy Limiting Its Coverage,
51 A.L.R.2d 924 (2013); Marlene A. Attardo, What Constitutes “Use” or “Operation”
Within Statute Making Owner of Motor Vehicle Liable for Negligence in its Use or
Operation, 103 A.L.R.5th 339 (2013).
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whether they be in motion or at rest.”337 “Operate” is statutorily de-
fined in Illinois as “[t]o ride in or on, other than as a passenger, use or
control in any manner the operation of any device or vehicle,”338 in
Ohio as “to cause or have caused movement of a vehicle,”339 and in
Indiana as “to navigate a vehicle.”340
Courts also tend to broadly construe the term when interpreting the
numerous rules of the road that use it.341 Operation usually includes
inchoate driving,342 and “some courts have specifically recognized that
a person may operate a vehicle without driving it.”343 The high court
in Massachusetts explained, presciently for 1928, that “[a] person op-
erates a motor vehicle . . . when, in the vehicle, he intentionally does
any act or makes use of any mechanical or electrical agency which
alone or in sequence will set in motion the motive power of that vehi-
cle.”344 And Michigan’s high court has held that, for the purpose of
the state’s drunk-driving statute, “once a person using a motor vehicle
as a motor vehicle has put the vehicle in motion, or in a position pos-
ing a significant risk of causing a collision, such a person continues to
operate it until the vehicle is returned to a position posing no such
risk.”345
These broad definitions suggest that a person who is not physically
proximate to either a vehicle or the vehicle’s driving mechanism might
337. VT. STAT. tit. 23, § 4(24) (2013). This definition has a long history. See State v.
Lansing, 184 A. 692, 694 (Vt. 1936).
338. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-154.1 (2013).
339. OHIO REV. CODE § 4511.01(HHH) (West 2013); see also Columbus v. Free-
man, 908 N.E.2d 1026 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (discussing whether trial court improp-
erly elaborated on this definition in instructions to jury).
340. IND. CODE ANN. § 9-13-2-117.5(a) (West 2013).
341. See, e.g., State v. Ebert, 871. A.2d 664, 669 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005)
(“The term ‘operate’ [in the drunk-driving statute] must be given broad construc-
tion.”); State v. Mulcahy, 107 N.J. 467, 478 n.4 (N.J. 1987) (describing “applications of
[the] general rule that [may] strain its outer limits”). For relevant statutes, see infra
Parts VI.B.–VI.C. In Texas, for example, a person generally “may not operate a mo-
tor vehicle on a highway” without a valid driver’s license. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN.
§ 521.021 (2013). And in New Jersey, “it shall be unlawful for any person to drive or
operate a motor vehicle in an unsafe manner likely to endanger a person or prop-
erty.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-97.2 (2013).
342. See Pearson, supra note 325, pt. B; People v. Hakimi-Fard, 137 Misc. 2d 116,
117, (N.Y. City Ct. 1987) (“A person ‘operates’ a motor vehicle when he begins to use
the mechanisms of the automobile for the purpose of putting the automobile in mo-
tion.”); accord WIS. STAT. § 346.63(3)(b) (2013) (defining “[o]perate” for the purpose
of the state’s drunk driving statute as “the physical manipulation or activation of any
of the controls of a motor vehicle necessary to put it in motion”). The phrase “incho-
ate driving” assumes a narrow definition of driving. See supra Part III.
343. Pearson, supra note 325, § 3[b].
344. Commonwealth v. Uski, 263 Mass. 22, 24 (Mass. 1928); accord, e.g., People v.
Prescott, 95 N.Y.2d 655, 662 (N.Y. 2001); State v. Donaldson, 663 N.W.2d 882, 887
(Iowa 2003) (theft of van); State v. Morris, 666 A.2d 419, 419 (R.I. 1995) (driving on
suspended license).
345. People v. Wood, 450 Mich. 399, 404–05 (1995).
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nonetheless “operate” it.346 However, there may be a limit to this at-
tenuation. In particular, while a person can “operate” a vehicle
through limited machine agency,347 she generally cannot do so
through full human agency.348 While recognizing that “operate” has
different meanings in other contexts,349 New York’s high court dis-
cerned “a definite meaning” in the Highway Law:
The word ‘operate’ is used throughout the statute as signifying a
personal act in working the mechanism of the car. The driver oper-
ates the car for the owner, but the owner does not operate the car
unless he drives it himself. If the meaning were extended to include
an owner acting either by himself or by agents or employees, the
provisions of the Highway Law would be replete with repetitious
jargon.350
346. But cf. Anderson v. Mehaidli, 83 F.3d 422 (6th Cir. 1996) (unpublished deci-
sion) (applying Michigan law) (declining to find operation in part because the individ-
ual was not “in or near the vehicle while the engine was running at the time of the
accident”).
347. See cases cited supra note 344.
348. See Witherstine v. Employers’ Liab. Assur. Corp., Ltd., of London, Eng., 139
N.E. 229 (N.Y. 1923) (interpreting the phrase “operated by” in an automobile insur-
ance policy); Brown v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 409 N.E.2d 253, 257 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978);
Le v. Vaknin, 722 N.W.2d 412, 415 (Iowa 2006); Twogood v. Am. Farmers Mut. Auto.
Ins. Ass’n, 296 N.W. 239, 242 (Iowa 1941) (“This does not mean that one who has
general authority over a driver with respect to the destination, route, or rate of speed
of the vehicle, is operating the vehicle.”); Elgar v. Nat’l Cont’l/Progressive Ins. Co.,
849 A.2d 324, 327–28 (R.I. 2004).
349. Witherstine, 139 N.E. at 230 (“A surgeon operates when he amputates a pa-
tient’s leg; a railroad company operates its railroad. The Workmen’s Compensation
Law provides compensation for injuries sustained by employees of those who are en-
gaged in the business of operating vehicles on the street. Under the Labor Law the
words ‘to operate a machine’ mean ‘to regulate and control its management or opera-
tion.’”) (internal citations omitted); see also TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 542.002
(West 1995) (“A provision of this subtitle applicable to an operator of a vehicle ap-
plies to the operator of a vehicle owned or operated by the United States, this state, or
a political subdivision of this state, except as specifically provided otherwise by this
subtitle for an authorized emergency vehicle.”) (emphasis added).
350. Witherstine, 139 N.E. at 230 (internal citations omitted). Nine years later, how-
ever, the court did extend the meaning of “operation” in the state’s owner-liability
statute. See Arcara v. Moresse, 179 N.E. 389 (N.Y. 1932); see also N. v. Kolomyjec,
502 N.W.2d 765, 767 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (“The purpose of [such a] statute is to
place the risk of damage or injury on the person who has the ultimate control of the
motor vehicle, as well as on the person who is in immediate control.”). In Arcara, the
vehicle’s owner loaned his car to his nephew, who in violation of his uncle’s express
instructions permitted his friend to drive while he rode as passenger. Arcara, 179 N.E.
at 389. Perhaps unsurprisingly, that friend then crashed the car, and his victims sought
compensation from the uncle under the common statutory provision that a motor
vehicle’s owner is liable for injuries “‘resulting from negligence in the operation of
such motor vehicle . . . by any person legally using or operating the same with the
permission, express or implied, of such owner.’” Id. at 389 (quoting the state’s owner-
liability statute). After determining that the uncle’s proscription “related to the oper-
ation of the car, not to the use which might be made of it,” id. at 390, the court held
that “the legal user [i.e., the owner’s nephew] may be guilty of negligence in ‘opera-
tion,’ though not ‘operating’ the car, in the sense that he is driving with his own hands.
The clear implication is that, if the legal user at the time be present in the car, still ‘the
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“Actual physical control” can be broader than operation but proba-
bly does involve physical presence. Under the classic definition first
proffered by Montana’s high court, a person is in actual physical con-
trol of a motor vehicle if she “has existing or present bodily restraint,
directing influence, domination or regulation, of” it.351 Florida juries
are told that “‘[a]ctual physical control’ of a motor vehicle means the
defendant must be physically in or on the vehicle and have the capa-
bility to operate the vehicle, regardless of whether [he] [she] is actu-
ally operating the vehicle at the time.”352 Where the phrase is used in
drunk-driving statutes, some states provide a precise definition,353
while others ask juries to consider the “totality of the circum-
stances”354 with a view toward establishing whether the defendant
“actually posed a threat to the public by the exercise of actual control
over it while impaired.”355
director of the enterprise,’ still ‘the master of the ship,’ the operation of the car is his
operation, though the hands at the wheel are those of a substitute, and the negligent
driving will bind the owner, with whose permission the car is used.” Id. (quoting
Grant v. Knepper, 156 N.E. 650 (N.Y. 1927) (Cardozo, J.)). Similar cases have found
permissive “use” by a person not even present in the vehicle. See Attardo, supra note
333, § 3 (discussing additional owner-liability cases); Neel v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N.
Am., 6 A.2d 722, 723 (N.J. 1939) (interpreting the phrase “while riding in or operat-
ing” an automobile in an automobile liability policy to mean that “a person who is
‘operating’ a car is not necessarily the one who is ‘riding in’ it”). But see Habeeb,
supra note 333, § 3 (discussing contrary insurance decisions).
351. State v. Ruona, 321 P.2d 615, 618 (Mont. 1958) (combining definitions from
WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1934)). A more precise ver-
sion would refer to “existing bodily restraint or existing bodily directing influence or
existing bodily domination or existing bodily regulation or present bodily restraint or
present bodily directing influence or present bodily domination or present bodily
regulation.”
352. In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 958 So. 2d 361, 362–63 (Fla.
2007); see also Jackson v. Moore, 883 P.2d 622, 626 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding
that operation requires more than just actual physical control); State v. Osgood, 605
A.2d 1071, 1072 (N.H. 1992) (“Nothing in the statute requires that a motor vehicle
actually be operable in order for an individual to ‘drive’ it.”); Bearden v. State, 430
P.2d 844, 845 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1967) (“Defendant, who was lying unconscious at
the side of the road, outside his vehicle; cannot be said to have existing or present
bodily restraint, directing influence, domination or regulation of an automobile, while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor; and cannot be said to be in ‘actual physical
control’; and, therefore, could not commit an offense within the provisions of the
statute.”) (from court syllabus).
353. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.194 (West 2012) (“‘Physical control’ means be-
ing in the driver’s position of the front seat of a vehicle or in the driver’s position of a
streetcar or trackless trolley and having possession of the vehicle’s, streetcar’s, or
trackless trolley’s ignition key or other ignition device.”) (codifying City of Cincinnati
v. Kelley, 351 N.E.2d 85, 87 (Ohio 1976)); IDAHO CODE § 18-8002(7) (2012) (“‘Actual
physical control’ as used in this section and section 18-8002A, Idaho Code, shall be
defined as being in the driver’s position of the motor vehicle with the motor running
or with the motor vehicle moving.”). But see Cagle v. City of Gadsden, 495 So. 2d
1144, 1145–46 (Ala. 1986) (criticizing these criteria as easily avoidable).
354. Cagle, 495 So. 2d at 1145; Atkinson v. State, 627 A.2d 1019, 1024 (Md. 1993);
State v. Prawitt, 262 P.3d 1203, 1208 (Utah Ct. App. 2011).
355. N.M. UNIF. JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 14-4512 (2011).
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That, then, is a driver. Importantly, this paper does not attempt to
distinguish among these various terms or to trace their specific usage
in individual statutory provisions. Even though the particular wording
of a particular statute in a particular state may matter to the particular
court applying it to the particular facts of a particular case, the reader
may find such an immense undertaking to be neither particularly in-
teresting nor particularly illuminating. Instead, this paper broadly uses
driver as shorthand for any statutory references to drivers, operators,
persons who drive or operate vehicles, and any other related concepts.
The remainder of this section proceeds from this stipulation to con-
sider, generally, who those persons might be and what obligations
they may have.
2. Nonhuman Persons Can Technically Be Drivers
On a literal reading of many vehicle codes, those persons may not
even need to be human. More than half of states expressly include
firms, corporations, partnerships, and other legal entities within the
meaning of “person.”356 Although such a definition appears as early
as 1926,357 its original rationale is not entirely clear. Indeed, only a few
scattered statutes refer to the operation of vehicles by persons other
than humans.358 This quirk may actually make sense in the context of
356. See ALA. CODE § 32-1-1.1(42) (2013); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 27-16-204, 27-49-
208(c) (2013); CAL. VEH. CODE § 470 (West 2013); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-1-102(69)
(2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-1(69) (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 101(47)
(2013); FLA. STAT. § 316.003(29) (2013); GA. CODE § 40-1-1(43) (2013); Idaho Code
§ 49-117(7)(a); 625 ILL. COMP. 5/1-159 (2013); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-13-2-124(a) (West
2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1447 (2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 1 (2013); ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 29-a, § 101.54 (2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.40 (2013); MINN. STAT.
§ 169.011.54 (2013); MISS. CODE ANN. § 63-3-121(a) (2013); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 300.010(23) (2013); MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-1-101(53) (2013); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 20-4.01(28) (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-01-01.55 (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 259:74, 21:9 (2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-1-4.14.E (2013); N.J. STAT. § 39:1-1 (West
2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.01 (West 2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 1-144
(2013); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 102 (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-8-101(43) (2013);
TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 541.001(4) (West 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-
102(44) (2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 4(27) (2013); WASH. REV. CODE § 46.04.405
(2013); W. VA. CODE § 17C-1-29 (2013); GUAM CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1102(x) (2013);
see also NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 14, § 105.FF (2013); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 27,
§ 5001(74) (2013); UNIF. VEH. CODE § 1-169 (2000); see generally Operator and
Driver, supra note 310. But see MD. CODE ANN. TRANSP. § 11-115 (2013) (“‘Driver’
means any individual who drives a vehicle.”) (emphasis added).
357. See UNIFORM VEH. CODE, UNIFORM MOTOR VEHICLE REGISTRATION ACT
(1926) § 1(p); UNIFORM MOTOR VEHICLE ANTI-THEFT ACT (1926) § 1(d); UNIFORM
MOTOR-VEHICLE OPERATORS’ AND CHAUFFEURS’ LICENSE ACT (1926) § 1(d), UNI-
FORM ACT REGULATING THE OPERATION OF VEHICLES ON HIGHWAYS (1926) § 1(l).
The definition makes sense for some but not all of these constituent acts.
358. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. TRANSP. § 21-1107(c)(3) (2013) (excluding from a
prohibition on riding in a vehicle’s cargo area persons in “[a] vehicle owned or oper-
ated by the U.S. Department of Defense if the vehicle is controlled or operated by: (i)
Active duty military personnel. . .”); TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 542.002 (West 2013)
(“A provision of this subtitle applicable to an operator of a vehicle applies to the
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automated vehicles.359 For now, however, charging a corporation with
reckless driving or negligent homicide may be conceivable360 but is
not likely361 and in any case lacks known precedent. The best explana-
tion for these definitions is also the reason why treating a corporation
as a driver is generally unnecessary: Vehicle owners need not be natu-
ral persons, and as the next section describes, they might be liable for
their vehicles even if they are not driving them.
3. Vehicle Owners May Be Responsible for Their Vehicles
A brief but important aside: To varying degrees, states impose crim-
inal or quasicriminal liability on owners who permit others to drive
their vehicles.362 In Washington, “[b]oth a person operating a vehicle
with the express or implied permission of the owner and the owner of
the vehicle are responsible for any act or omission that is declared
unlawful in this chapter. The primary responsibility is the owner’s.”363
Some states permit an inference that the owner of a vehicle was its
operator for certain offenses;364 Wisconsin provides what is by far the
most detailed statutory set of rebuttable presumptions.365 Many
others punish owners who knowingly permit their vehicles to be
operator of a vehicle owned or operated by the United States, this state, or a political
subdivision of this state, except as specifically provided otherwise by this subtitle for
an authorized emergency vehicle.”).
359. See infra Part VI.D.
360. Paul J. Becker, Arthur J. Jipson, & Alan S. Bruce, State of Indiana v. Ford
Motor Company Revisited, 26 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 181 (2002); James W. Harlow, Cor-
porate Criminal Liability for Homicide: A Statutory Framework, Note, 61 DUKE L.J.
123 (2011); Michael Willats, Death by Reckless Design: The Need for Stricter Criminal
Statutes for Engineering-Related Homicides, 58 CATH. U. L.R. 567 (2009). Literature
in this area sometimes conflates the prosecution of companies with the prosecution of
individuals within those companies.
361. See supra note 350.
362. This is in addition to civil liability. See, e.g., Sarah E. Williams, Florida’s Dan-
gerous Instrumentality Doctrine, 25 STETSON L. REV. 177 (1995) (discussing the un-
usually broad civil liability of vehicle owners in Florida); CAL. VEH. CODE § 17150
(West 2013) (“Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for death or
injury to person or property resulting from a negligent or wrongful act or omission in
the operation of the motor vehicle, in the business of the owner or otherwise, by any
person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of the
owner.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.401(1) (West 2013) (“The owner of a motor
vehicle is liable for an injury caused by the negligent operation of the motor vehicle
whether the negligence consists of a violation of a statute of this state or the ordinary
care standard required by common law.”); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 388 (McKinney
2013) (same).
363. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.16A.500 (West 2013).
364. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-20 (2013) (red light cameras); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 39:4-129(e) (West 2013) (injury crashes).
365. See WIS. STAT. §§ 346.175 (2013) (fleeing traffic officer), 346.195 (failing to
yield to authorized emergency vehicle), 346.205 (failing to yield to funeral proces-
sion), 346.452 (crossing railroad tracks), 346.457 (passing fire truck), 346.465 (crossing
school crossing), 346.485 (passing school bus), 346.945 (radios).
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driven unlawfully.366 Although these owners are not drivers, they are
assumed to exercise some judgment or control with respect to those
drivers—an instance of vicarious liability that suggests an owner of an
automated vehicle might be liable for merely permitting its automated
operation.367
4. Various Persons Could Be an Automated Vehicle’s Driver
These expansive definitions suggest that even an automated vehicle
probably has a driver—and quite possibly multiple drivers—under ex-
isting state law. The driver determination will ultimately depend on
the particular technology, jurisdiction, and statutory provision at issue.
However, in a highly generalized descriptive sense, any person who
directly commands a vehicle to perform some act or omission likely
qualifies as its driver with respect both to that act or omission and to
the consequences that follow proximately from it. “Directly com-
mands” implies that the person issues specific instructions without any
human intermediary.368 It also implies that the person has the means
to issue these instructions and some degree of culpability in their issu-
ance. This definition applies to natural persons and might apply to
corporate persons.
On the human side, physical presence would likely continue to pro-
vide a proxy for or presumption of driving.369 In other words, an indi-
vidual who is physically positioned to provide real-time input to a
motor vehicle may well be treated as its driver. This is particularly
likely at levels of automation that involve human input for certain
portions of a trip.
In addition, an individual who starts or dispatches an automated
vehicle, who initiates the automated operation of that vehicle, or who
specifies certain parameters of operation probably qualifies as a driver
under existing law. That individual may use some device—anything
from a physical key to the click of a mouse to the sound of her voice—
to activate the vehicle by herself. She may likewise deliberately re-
quest that the vehicle assume the active driving task. And she may set
the vehicle’s maximum speed or level of assertiveness.
This working definition is unclear in the same ways that existing law
is likely to be unclear. Relevant acts might occur at any level of the
primary driving task, from a decision to take a particular trip to a deci-
sion to exceed any speed limit by ten miles per hour.370 A tactical
366. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 12 (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4511.203 (West 2013); TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 542.302 (West 2013).
367. See infra Part VI.B.3.
368. This is why the “driver” of a chauffeured vehicle is the chauffeur rather than
the owner who rides in it. See supra note 348.
369. See, e.g., Pearson, supra note 325, § 8 (discussing persons sitting in stationary
cars); see also infra Part VI.D.3 (discussing California’s autonomous driving statute).
370. See supra Part III.
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decision like speeding is closely connected with the consequences—
whether a moving violation or an injury—that may result. But treating
an individual who dispatches her fully automated vehicle as the driver
for the entirety of the trip could attenuate the relationship between
legal responsibility and legal fault.371 Nonetheless, strict liability of
this sort is accepted within tort law372 and present, however controver-
sially, in U.S. criminal law.373 It is often connected with a generalized
rather than a particularized notion of control—the control exercised
by a vehicle owner over her vehicle,374 the control exercised by a pet
owner over her pet,375 the control exercised by an employer over its
employees,376 and the control exercised by an executive over her com-
pany.377 It is also common for infractions that are considered minor,
including many traffic violations.378 In this sense, perhaps it is “signifi-
cant” that driver is often defined as “one ‘who drives’ as distinguished
from one ‘who is driving.’”379
371. See supra note 44.
372. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (1944); Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, 377 P.2d 897 (1963).
373. See Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 828
(1999); In re Reference re: Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act, 2 S.C.R. 486 (Ca-
nada 1985) (dual-language version available at scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/
100/1/document.do).
374. See supra Part VI.A.3; CAL. VEH. CODE § 17150 (West 2013) (“Every owner
of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for death or injury to person or property
resulting from a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of the motor
vehicle, in the business of the owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating
the same with the permission, express or implied, of the owner.”).
375. Ramona C. Rains, Clemmons v. Fidler: Is Man’s Best Friend A Landlord’s
Worst Enemy?, 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 197 (1995); cf. also Geneva Convention,
supra note 50, art. 8.
376. See, e.g., Mark E. Roszkowski & Christie L. Roszkowski, Making Sense of
Respondeat Superior: An Integrated Approach for Both Negligent and Intentional
Conduct, 14 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 235 (2005).
377. These are so-called public welfare crimes often related to financial disclosure,
environmental protection, and consumer safety. Aaron F. Kass, Mindless Guilt: Nega-
tive Aspects of State Environmental Prosecutions Using the Public Welfare Exception,
29 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 517 (2005).
378. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 40000.1 (West 2013) (“Except as otherwise pro-
vided in this article, it is unlawful and constitutes an infraction for any person to
violate, or fail to comply with any provision of this code, or any local ordinance
adopted pursuant to this code.”); OREG. REV. STAT. §§ 161.095 (West 2013) (estab-
lishing a minimum level of culpability for criminal liability), 161.105 (excluding viola-
tions from this requirement).
379. Panopulos v. Maderis, 303 P.2d 738, 742 (Cal. 1956). But see CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 21701 (West 2013) (“No person shall wilfully interfere with the driver of a vehicle or
with the mechanism thereof in such manner as to affect the driver’s control of the
vehicle.”). The distinction between status and conduct arises elsewhere in the law.
See, e.g., Nielsen v. Moroni Feed Co., 162 F.3d 604, 608–09 (10th Cir. 1998) (recogniz-
ing a statutory “dichotomy between a disability and disability-caused misconduct . . .
where the disability is related to alcoholism or illegal drug use”); European Court of
Human Rights App no 26629/95, Judgment of 4 April 2000, supra note 25 (interpret-
ing the term “alcoholics”).
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The scope of a command may also be unclear. This uncertainty is
related in part to the difference between instructions and data. Con-
sider a personal rapid transit system consisting of pods that can each
transport several passengers on demand around a public campus.
Does the passenger actively instruct the vehicle to drive when she re-
quests a pick-up or presses the “go” button upon entering? Or is she
merely indicating to the vehicle that she is ready to be driven? In the
same way, is a police officer who waves an automated vehicle into a
detour instructing that vehicle or merely providing an environmental
input? And is a human who tampers with a vehicle’s automated func-
tionality commanding the vehicle?
On the corporate side, a firm that designs or supplies a vehicle’s
automated functionality or that provides data or other digital services
might qualify as a driver under existing law. The key element, as pro-
vided in the working definition, may be the lack of a human interme-
diary: A human who provides some input may still seem a better fit
for a human-centered vehicle code than a company with other rele-
vant legal exposure. However, as noted above, public outrage is an-
other element that may motivate new uses of existing laws.380
A person’s status as driver might become a mixed question of law
and fact that is resolved categorically or contextually. A categorical
approach would fix the identity of the driver largely ex ante: Some
class of natural or corporate person—the one who sits in the driver’s
seat, initiates automated operation, owns the vehicle, or provides the
automation system, for example—would be deemed to drive some
class of automated vehicle. Regulators in Nevada and legislators in
Florida and California have already taken this approach,381 and judges
anywhere could as well. Conversely, a contextual approach would de-
termine the identity of the driver largely ex post: The human or corpo-
rate person or persons with a causal connection to a particular, and
probably unlawful or tortious, driving behavior would be the driver or
drivers. In an easy case, the person who instructs an automated vehi-
cle to exceed the speed limit might be the effective driver for the pur-
pose of a prohibition against speeding. If that same vehicle fails to
reduce its speed during a blizzard, the manufacturer might be its effec-
tive driver.382
380. See supra Part VI.A.2.
381. See infra Part VI.D.
382. In the securities fraud context, there are three “competing theories” to deter-
mining whether a defendant controlled those who committed the primary fraud. See
Laura Greco, Note, The Buck Stops Where?: Defining Controlling Person Liability, 73
S. CAL. L. REV. 169, 173–185 (1999). The first “determines who controls by looking at
the individual’s position in the company and . . . relationship with the person or entity
liable for the primary violation.” Id. at 173. The second requires an additional finding
that the individual was “‘in some meaningful sense [a] culpable participant[ ] in the
fraud perpetrated by controlled persons.’” Id. at 176 (quoting and modifying Lanza v.
Drexel, 479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973)). The third “consider[s] the power or po-
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It is also possible that an automated vehicle could actually have no
driver for the purpose of a particular statutory provision. The sections
that follow consider a number of provisions that may on their face be
inapposite to automated vehicles. In California, for example, “[n]o
person shall drive upon any highway any vehicle designed or used for”
transporting people or freight for more than a certain number of
hours in a certain period.383 Applying this provision with respect to an
automated vehicle that operates without any human presence may be
like charging a building owner with the violation of wage and hour
laws for running the building’s elevators 24 hours a day without
pay.384 In contrast, a far less plausible claim would be that a prohibi-
tion on speeding does not apply to an automated vehicle because no
“person” is driving it.385
The vehicle itself is not a driver under existing law. While wholly
speculative, this approach—granting legal personhood to robots—is
nonetheless intriguing. It is notable that an early draft of Nevada’s
pertinent regulation provided that “[i]f a driver is not required, the
autonomous technology shall be granted all of the rights and shall be
subject to all of the duties applicable to the driver of a vehicle, except
those provisions which by their nature can have no application.”386
The practical effect of such a provision might be to put more legal
pressure on the vehicle owner, who might be treated as the vehicle’s
principal.387
Finally, a caution: Identifying the driver is hardly dispositive for the
purpose of product liability, as an automated vehicle may be defective
even if a human remains the sole legal driver. The rules of the road
may establish standards to which retailers, manufacturers, and suppli-
ers are held,388 and companies can also be liable for the foreseeable
tential power of an individual to control another person’s activities, even if that power
was not actually exercised.” Id. at 180.
383. CAL. VEH. CODE § 21702 (West 2013).
384. Elevator regulations offer an interesting analogy. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 143 § 71G (2013) (“No person shall work as an elevator operator unless he has
received a license therefor from the commissioner of public safety.”); OHIO REV.
CODE § 4105.14 (2013) (“Any person, firm, or corporation operating a passenger ele-
vator shall provide a seat for the use of the operator of such elevator.”); MINN. STAT.
§§ 326B.169 (2013) (requiring designation of a “competent person or competent per-
sons regularly to operate” “a passenger or freight elevator”), 326B.163 (excluding
from the definition of “[p]assenger or freight elevator” any elevator that complies
with safety rules and has “automatic operation or continuous pressure operation”);
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 203-a (McKinney 2013) (“Every passenger elevator operated and
maintained for use by the public shall be equipped or furnished with a seat, collapsi-
ble or otherwise, for the use of the operator when the elevator is not being operated
[unless certain conditions apply].”).
385. E.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 22350 (West 2013); see infra notes 438, 512.
386. Nevada DMV, Pre-Draft (Sept. 15, 2011), at 6 (on file with author).
387. See supra Part VI.A.3.
388. See supra Part II.
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misuse of their products.389 Conversely, passengers may bear some re-
sponsibility for the operation of the vehicles in which they ride.390
These limited observations, while beyond the scope of this paper,
nonetheless demonstrate that the question of who drives an auto-
mated vehicle is only the beginning of the legal analysis. On the as-
sumption that this initial question is answerable, the next section
considers the obligations of an automated vehicle’s driver.
B. Drivers Must Act Safely
Whoever or whatever drives an automated vehicle has certain obli-
gations; these obligations in turn may determine how and by whom
any such vehicle may lawfully be used. As discussed above, a person is
likely to be identified as the driver of an automated vehicle. Accord-
ingly, even though the statutes in this section do not expressly require
a driver, there is likely to be some person connected to the vehicle
who must be licensed,391 who may need to be physically present,392
and who must act prudently.393
Furthermore, offenses like driving without a license, permitting op-
eration by a person without a license, leaving a vehicle without engag-
ing its brakes, driving with an obstructed view, driving recklessly, or
operating an unsafe vehicle may prove appealing to a government
agency trying to discourage automated vehicles or to an attorney try-
ing to establish negligence in the operation of such a vehicle.
1. Drivers Must Be Licensed
A person without a valid driving license can generally be a driver or
operator—simply not a lawful one. In California, for example, “[a]
person may not drive a motor vehicle upon a highway, unless the per-
son then holds a valid driver’s license issued under this code.”394 In-
deed, “[n]o owner of a motor vehicle may knowingly allow another
person to drive the vehicle upon a highway unless the owner deter-
389. See, e.g., Truchan v. Nissan Motor Corp. U.S.A., 720 A.2d 981 (N.J. App.
1998).
390. See, e.g., Wilding v. Norton, 319 P.2d 440 (Cal. App. 1957)
391. See infra Part VI.B.1.
392. See infra Part VI.B.2.
393. See infra Part VI.B.3. Similarly, NHTSA does not require event data recorders
(EDRs), but it does impose requirements on those EDRs that are installed. See supra
note 269; see also infra note 384 (discussing elevators).
394. CAL. VEH. CODE § 12500 (West 2013) (specifying certain exceptions); see also
UNIFORM VEH. CODE § 6-101 (2000) (“Drivers must be licensed.”). Notably, Califor-
nia’s requirement also applies to “offstreet parking facilit[ies].” However, “[a] peace
officer shall not stop a vehicle for the sole reason of determining whether the driver is
properly licensed.” CAL. VEH. CODE § 14607.6 (2013).
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mines that the person possesses a valid driver’s license that authorizes
the person to operate the vehicle.”395
To receive a California driver’s license, a person must provide cer-
tain identifying information, be of legal age, have satisfactory cor-
rected eyesight, understand signs and signals, possess a “reasonable
knowledge” of the rules of the road, be able to “safely operate a mo-
tor vehicle upon a highway,” and meet other requirements.396 How-
ever, “[a] physical defect of the applicant that, in the opinion of the
department, is compensated for to ensure safe driving ability, shall not
prevent the issuance of a license to the applicant.”397
The mechanism by which someone other than a human would ob-
tain a driving license is unclear. For example, some companies may
possess great vision, but “a test of the applicant’s eyesight” may none-
theless be difficult.398 And while General Motors may (or may not)399
meet a state’s minimum age requirement, Google would not.400
Automated vehicles could lead to changes in these licensing re-
quirements to the benefit of disabled persons or, conceivably, corpo-
rate persons. A state department of motor vehicles might determine
that certain disabilities do not prevent the safe operation of an auto-
mated vehicle,401 a state legislature might amend the relevant statu-
tory provisions, or a person denied a license might challenge those
provisions or their application as a violation of the state or federal
constitution (particularly due process or equal protection guarantees)
or the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).402 As the sec-
tions that follow describe, however, a license is just the beginning.
395. CAL. VEH. CODE § 14604 (2013); see UNIFORM VEH. CODE § 11-1603 (2000);
see also id. § 6-305 (extending this prohibition to authorizing a vehicle to be driven “in
violation of any of the provisions of this chapter”).
396. CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 12800–12805 (2013).
397. Id.
398. See, e.g., UNIF. VEH. CODE § 6-112 (2000).
399. See GM 363 Asset Sale Approved by U.S. Bankruptcy Court, GM NEWS (July
6, 2009), media.gm.com/media/us/en/gm/news.detail.html/content/Pages/news/us/en/
2009/Jul/0706_AssetSale.html (“[The court] approved the sale of substantially all of
General Motors Corporation’s assets to NGMCO, Inc., an entity funded by the U.S.
Department of the Treasury. In connection with the closing of the sale transaction,
NGMCO, Inc. will change its name to General Motors Company and continue to
operate under GM’s historic corporate and sub brands.”).
400. See Google’s Mission Is to Organize the World’s Information and Make It Uni-
versally Accessible and Useful, GOOGLE, www.google.com/intl/en/about/company/
(last visited Dec. 13, 2013). In some states, Google might be allowed to drive itself to
school. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 483.270 (2013); NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 483.200
(2013).
401. Note, however, that certain requirements are statutory and hence binding on
the relevant state agency. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 12805 (West 2013) (specifying
“[m]andatory grounds” for a “[r]efusal to issue or renew driver’s license” and provid-
ing that “[n]o person may use a bioptic telescopic or similar lens to meet the 20/200
visual acuity standards”).
402. These arguments have been made, largely unsuccessfully, by persons with low
vision who wish to use bioptic telescopics to pass a driver’s license examination. See,
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2. Drivers May Need to Be Present
No statute expressly requires that a motor vehicle’s operator must
be physically present in the vehicle. To the contrary, the ordinary defi-
nition of the broader term “vehicle” is inconsistent with any such re-
quirement: Trailers and semitrailers, which are typically designed for
cargo rather than people, qualify as vehicles,403 and some states even
prohibit riding in house trailers while they are being moved.404 De-
pending on the jurisdiction and the context, however, these towed ve-
hicles may or may not qualify as “motor vehicles,”405 which generally
means “a vehicle that is self-propelled.”406
Regardless, a number of rules either imply that physical presence is
required or make compliance without such presence impractical.
These rules fall into seven rough categories: unattended vehicles,
abandoned vehicles, crash obligations, safety belts, driver sight, driver
interference, and “control.” With the exception of particular rules re-
garding “control,” they are also quite common and fairly consistent.
Depending on the extent of automation and the identity of the driver,
their application to this person may be clear and reasonable, clear but
absurd, or—in the case of a nonhuman driver—wholly
metaphysical.407
The most conspicuous provisions are those relating to unattended
vehicles. The formulation in California, which is similar to that in
many other states, specifies that “[n]o person driving, or in control of,
or in charge of, a motor vehicle shall permit it to stand on any highway
unattended without first effectively setting the brakes thereon and
e.g., Hatch v. Sec’y of State of Me., 879 F. Supp. 147, 148 (D. Me. 1995); Gooch v.
Iowa Dept. of Transp., 398 N.W.2d 845, 845 (Iowa 1987); Sharon v. Larson, 650 F.
Supp. 1396, 1397 (E.D. Pa. 1986); cf. Theriault v. Flynn, 162 F.3d 46, 47–48 (1st Cir.
1998).
403. See, e.g., UNIF. VEH. CODE §§ 1-192, 1-209.
404. E.g., id. § 11-106; 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3706 (2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-22-
19 (2013).
405. See generally Motor Vehicle—Trailer or Semitrailer, 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles
§ 3 (2013) (“A trailer or semitrailer is generally recognized as being a vehicle, and
depending on the particular facts and circumstances, it may, or may not, be consid-
ered to be a motor vehicle. Insofar as it facilitates the primary function of a motor
vehicle of transporting persons and things, after being attached to the motor vehicle
for that purpose, it may be regarded as becoming a part of the motor vehicle although
as to the latter proposition, there is also authority to the contrary.”) (internal foot-
notes omitted); see also, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-4.01(23) (West 2013) (includ-
ing within the definition of “motor vehicle” “every vehicle designed to run upon the
highways which is pulled by a self?propelled vehicle”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 340.01(35)
(West 2013) (including “a combination of 2 or more vehicles or an articulated vehi-
cle”); cases cited supra note 304 (listing multiple definitions of driver referring to
“steering a vehicle being towed by a motor vehicle”); cf. also 49 C.F.R. § 387.15
(2013) (defining motor vehicle as “a land vehicle, machine, truck, tractor, trailer, or
semitrailer propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used on a highway for trans-
porting property, or any combination thereof”).
406. E.g., UNIF. VEH. CODE § 1-156 (2000); CAL. VEH. CODE § 415(a) (West 2013).
407. Cf. also supra note 14. And thanks for reading the footnotes.
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stopping the motor thereof.”408 Other states also require the operator
to stop the engine and remove the key from the ignition409—or even
from the vehicle.410 And the Navajo Nation specifies that “[a]ll rea-
sonable precautions . . . be taken to prevent the movement of any
vehicle left unattended.”411 These provisions, however, are presuma-
bly directed at more conventionally “driverless”412 vehicles. Auto-
mated vehicles might well be permanently “attended” by computers,
companies, or remote humans, and a literal construction of many of
these provisions would not necessarily prohibit a vehicle from auto-
matically disengaging its brakes and keylessly resuming motion after
its driver’s departure.
Some statutes relating to abandoned vehicles may pose similarly
surmountable textual obstacles. In Washington, for example, “[i]t is
unlawful for the operator of a vehicle to leave the vehicle unattended
within the limits of any highway unless the operator of the vehicle
arranges for the prompt removal of the vehicle.”413 Vehicles “left un-
attended” on Illinois freeways may be removed after only two
hours.414 And “any peace officer who discovers a motor vehicle which
has been left unattended on a public” highway in Georgia shall “im-
mediately” perform a safety check.415
Other requirements may be difficult for a remote driver to satisfy.
Drivers typically have certain obligations following serious crashes, in-
cluding immediately stopping and remaining at or near the scene to
provide contact information and, in some cases, to render aid to the
injured.416 And drivers of certain vehicles are required to “listen”
when crossing a railroad track.417
An operator removed from a vehicle may even be obliged to buckle
up—at least textually. In Ohio, for example, “[e]ach driver and pas-
senger of a motor vehicle operated on a street or highway in this State
shall wear a properly adjusted and fastened seat safety belt.”418 Given
408. CAL. VEH. CODE § 22515 (West 2013).
409. E.g., TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.404 (West 2013); 75 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 3701 (2013).
410. E.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1210 (McKinney 2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
90, § 13 (2013).
411. NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 14, § 533 (2013).
412. See, e.g., Solartomcotter, Unmanned Car Stuck in Reverse Doing Donuts, YOU-
TUBE (Dec. 11, 2012), www.youtube.com/watch?v=xuGlIFlZ0CI (not to be attempted
at home). An astute reader might wonder at what point the man who jumped in the
car became its driver.
413. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.61.590 (West 2013).
414. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-1302 (2013).
415. GA. CODE ANN. § 40-11-3.1 (2013).
416. E.g., 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3744 (2013). Furthermore, would another driver
involved in a crash with an unoccupied automated vehicle be expected to simply at-
tach a note to its windshield? See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 316.063 (2013).
417. E.g., ALA. CODE § 32-5A-151 (2013).
418. OHIO REV. CODE § 4513.263 (2013).
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the broad definitions of both “driver” and “operate,”419 literal con-
structions of such provisions could produce absurd results on high-
ways today: A vehicle’s driver may experience some difficulty exiting
her vehicle with her seatbelt securely fastened. However, while this
suggests the need for a flexible interpretation of the provision, it does
not dictate the result of that interpretation in the context of an auto-
mated vehicle.
Although a human driver’s mere physical (and belted) presence in a
vehicle would satisfy these four issues, more may be required. Take
the particular example of mirror requirements found in most states. In
Ohio, “[o]perators of vehicles . . . shall have a clear and unobstructed
view to the front and to both sides of their vehicles . . . and shall have
a clear view to the rear.”420 And in Washington, “[e]very motor vehi-
cle shall be equipped with a mirror mounted on the left side of the
vehicle and so located to reflect to the driver a view of the highway for
a distance of at least two hundred feet to the rear.”421 A vehicle with a
human driver seated in the rear may not comply with a literal con-
struction of these provisions.
Similarly, most states have adopted some variant of the rule that
“[n]o person shall drive a vehicle when it is so loaded, or when there
are in the front seat such number of persons as to obstruct the view
of the driver to the front or sides of the vehicle or as to interfere
with the driver’s control over the driving mechanism of the
vehicle.”422
While this requirement would not, under a literal construction, pre-
clude a backseat driver, it both reflects the assumption that a driver is
able to see and introduces the difficult question of “control” in the
context of state law.
Notably, these provisions refer to “control” rather than “actual
physical control.” As noted above, that longer term appears fre-
quently in definitions of “driver” and “operator” as well as in prohibi-
tions of drunk driving.423 In light of the canon, however absurd, that
legislatures choose their words carefully,424 this is an important dis-
419. See supra Part VI.A.1.
420. OHIO REV. CODE § 4513.23 (2013).
421. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.37.400 (West 2013).
422. E.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 21700 (West 2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-242 (West
2013); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-21-8-43 (West 2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.677
(West 2013); TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.417 (West 2013); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 46.61.615 (West 2013). Sight is mentioned in other provisions as well. E.g.,
OHIO REV. CODE § 4513.24 (2013) (permitting certain electronic devices provided
that, inter alia, they do “not restrict the vehicle operator’s sight lines to the road and
highway signs and signals”); TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 544.010(c) (West 2013) (“In
the absence of a stop line, the operator shall stop at the place nearest the intersecting
roadway where the operator has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting
roadway.”).
423. See supra Part VI.A.1.
424. Id.
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tinction. It suggests that “control over the driving mechanism,” just
like the “control” required by the Geneva Convention, need not be
actual, physical, or actually physical.
A significant exception is New York. One provision states, some-
what innocuously, that “[e]very motor vehicle, operated or driven
upon the public highways of the state, shall be provided with adequate
brakes and steering mechanism in good working order and sufficient
to control such vehicle at all times when the same is in use.”425 But a
more striking provision directs that “[n]o person shall operate a motor
vehicle without having at least one hand or, in the case of a physically
handicapped person, at least one prosthetic device or aid on the steer-
ing mechanism at all times when the motor vehicle is in motion.”426 In
other words, an automated vehicle in New York would need to quite
literally steer its human driver.
New York may be the only state with such a categorical statutory
requirement. Massachusetts provides that “[n]o person, when operat-
ing a motor vehicle, shall permit to be on or in the vehicle or on or
about his person anything which may interfere with or impede the
proper operation of the vehicle or any equipment by which the vehicle
is operated or controlled, except that a person may operate a motor
vehicle while using a . . . 2-way radio or mobile telephone [except as
otherwise provided] as long as 1 hand remains on the steering wheel
at all times.”427 And Puerto Rico directs that “[n]o person shall oper-
ate a vehicle, carriage or motorcycle, carrying packages or other ob-
jects that prevent him/her from keeping both hands on the bridle or
handlebars simultaneously.”428 These requirements, however, do not
apply to regular driving—unless regular driving now involves a cell
phone.429
“Control” is susceptible to a much broader array of meanings. Some
uses are clearly abstract; Michigan, for example, prohibits a person
from “knowingly authoriz[ing] or permit[ting] a motor vehicle owned
by him or under his control to be driven in violation of” the vehicle
425. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 375 (McKinney 2013).
426. Id. § 1226
427. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 13 (2013).
428. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 27, § 5296 (2013). A separate provision, directed at motor
vehicles, specifies that “[n]o person shall drive a motor vehicle on the public roads
with persons, animals or objects obstructing the visibility of the driver towards the
front or the sides of the vehicle or that interfere with the control of the driving mecha-
nism of the vehicle.” Id. § 5288.
429. See, e.g., Accident Report, Multivehicle Collision, Interstate 44 Eastbound, Gray
Summit, Missouri, August 5, 2010, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRANSP. SAFETY BD. (Dec. 13,
2011), www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2011/HAR1103.pdf.
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code,430 and Texas restricts where a person may “move a vehicle that
is not lawfully under [her] control.”431
Others are somewhat more concrete. New Jersey’s unattended vehi-
cle provision, unlike those quoted above, states that a “person who
leaves a motor vehicle, with its engine running, stationary on the high-
way and unoccupied by a person able to control it, and without setting
the hand brake in such manner as to prevent the vehicle from moving,
shall be fined not less than ten nor more than twenty-five dollars for
each offense.”432 An unrelated provision in North Carolina directs
430. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.326 (West 2013); see also ARK. CODE § 27-16-
304 (2013) (“No person shall authorize or knowingly permit a motor vehicle owned by
him or her or under his or her control to be driven upon any highway by any person
who is not authorized under this chapter or is in violation of any of the provisions of
this act.”); CAL. VEH. CODE § 22515(a) (West 2013)(“No person driving, or in control
of, or in charge of, a motor vehicle shall permit it to stand on any highway unattended
without first effectively setting the brakes thereon and stopping the motor thereof.”);
DEL. CODE tit. 21, § 4172A (2013) (“No owner or person in charge of a motor vehicle
shall permit that motor vehicle or any motor vehicle under the person’s control to be
operated by another person in such a manner as to cause wilful, wanton or reckless
damage to or destruction of property owned by another person, party, company or
corporation, nor so as to cause or threaten to cause injury or death to any person.”);
FLA. STAT. § 316.56 (2013) (“Such damage may be recovered in any civil action
brought by the authorities in control of the highway or highway structure.”); 625 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/11-203 (2013) (“No person shall willfully fail or refuse to comply with
any lawful order or direction of any police officer, fireman, or school crossing guard
invested by law with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic.”); LA. REV. STAT.
§ 32:53 (2013) (“No person shall drive or move, nor cause or knowingly permit any
vehicle owned or controlled by him to be driven or moved, on any highway of this
state, at any time, any [unsafe] vehicle . . . .”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 12(b) (2013)
(“Whoever knowingly permits a motor vehicle owned by him or under his control to
be operated by a person who is unlicensed or whose license has been suspended or
revoked shall be punished . . . .”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.602 (2013) (“A person
shall not refuse to comply with a lawful order or direction of a police officer when
that officer, for public interest and safety, is guiding, directing, controlling, or regulat-
ing traffic on the highways of this state.”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-6,168 (2013) (“No
person having control or charge of a motor vehicle shall allow such vehicle to stand
unattended on a highway without first stopping the motor of such vehicle, locking the
ignition, removing the key from the ignition, and effectively setting the brakes
thereon and, when standing upon any roadway, turning the front wheels of such vehi-
cle to the curb or side of such roadway.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.203 (West
2013) (“No person shall permit a motor vehicle owned by the person or under the
person’s control to be driven by another if any of the following apply . . . .”); 75 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 3102 (2013) (same); WIS. STAT. §§ 346.175 (2013) (“if the person oper-
ating the vehicle or having the vehicle under his or her control at the time of the
violation . . . .”), 346.945 (same); W. VA. CODE § 17B-4-4 (2013) (“No person shall
authorize or knowingly permit a motor vehicle owned by him or under his control to
be driven upon any highway by any person who is not authorized hereunder or in
violation of any of the provisions of this chapter.”); UNIF. VEH. CODE § 16-102 (2000)
(“Offenses by persons owning or controlling vehicles”).
431. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.304 (West 2013). Texas, among other states,
also refers to “control” of a vehicle’s speed. E.g., id. § 545.351; FLA. STAT. § 316.183
(2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.61.400 (2013).
432. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-53 (West 2013); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-228
(2013).
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that “[t]he steering mechanism of every self-propelled motor vehicle
operated on the highway shall be maintained in good working order,
sufficient to enable the operator to control the vehicle’s movements
and to maneuver it safely.”433 And Ohio requires drivers to “be[ ] in
reasonable control” of their motor vehicles.434
These three uses of control evoke the Geneva Convention’s re-
quirement that “[d]rivers shall at all times be able to control their ve-
hicles.”435 And, like article 8, though these provisions could refer to
the physical manipulation of a vehicle’s driving mechanisms, their pri-
mary objective is the safe operation of that vehicle vis-à-vis other road
users. This primary objective may or may not be satisfied by a particu-
lar automated vehicle. But if it is,436 then a reasonable interpretation
of these ambiguous provisions would not extend them beyond their
literal requirements.437 Control in this sense becomes an obligation of
prudence, to which this paper now turns.
3. Drivers Must Act Prudently
Within most jurisdictions, diverse statutes collectively impose on
drivers what might be called an obligation of prudence.438 This obliga-
tion has two overlapping aspects. The first focuses on the driver in her
vehicle: Is she exercising responsibility for the task of driving? Is she
distracted or impaired in any other way? The second focuses on the
vehicle in its environment: Is it speeding or swerving? Is it disposed to
cause a crash—or has it already? This dual focus is often present in
the specific rules that demand prudence—in their enforcement if not
in their formulation.
Foremost among these rules is the common prohibition against
reckless driving, typically defined as “driv[ing] in willful or wanton
disregard for the safety of persons or property.”439 “[T]he offense of
reckless driving contains three distinct elements: (1) the conscious and
intentional operation of a motor vehicle, (2) in a manner which cre-
ates an unreasonable risk of harm to others, (3) where such risk is or
433. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-123.1 (West 2013).
434. OHIO REV. CODE § 4511.202 (2013).
435. See supra Part IV.
436. See infra Part VI.C.3 for a discussion of what standard might apply.
437. See supra IV.D.1.
438. This obligation might also be, and in some cases is, called a duty of care, but
this term has a somewhat different meaning in tort law. The term “prudence” regu-
larly appears in the “basic speed law,” e.g., Wilding v. Norton, 319 P.2d 440, 443 (Cal.
App. 1957), which in its common formulation holds that “[n]o person shall drive . . . at
a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having re-
gard to the actual and potential hazards then existing,” e.g., FLA. STAT. § 316.183(1)
(2013). In contrast, the German Traffic Code (Strassenverkehrsordnung (StVO))
specifies that “der Fahrzeugführer darf nur so schnell fahren, dab er sein Fahrzeug
ständig beherrscht” (the driver may travel only as fast as he can while constantly
controlling his vehicle). 3 Abs. 1 S. 1 StVO (2013).
439. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 316.192 (2013).
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should be known to the driver.”440 A person can commit reckless driv-
ing by operating a vehicle that she knows to be in an unsafe condi-
tion;441 Virginia expressly provides that a “person shall be guilty of
reckless driving who drives a vehicle which is not under proper control
or which has inadequate or improperly adjusted brakes on any high-
way in the Commonwealth.”442
A number of states additionally punish driving that is careless or
negligent but not reckless. Persons in Florida and Louisiana are to
drive “in a careful and prudent manner.”443 And in New Jersey,
“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, it shall
be unlawful for any person to drive or operate a motor vehicle in an
unsafe manner likely to endanger a person or property.”444 New
Jersey further provides that “[a] person who drives a vehicle care-
lessly, or without due caution and circumspection, in a manner so as to
endanger, or be likely to endanger, a person or property, shall be
guilty of careless driving.”445
Other states also incorporate the notion of “due care” in their
codes. In Georgia, “[a] driver shall exercise due care in operating a
motor vehicle on the highways of this state and shall not engage in any
actions which shall distract such driver from the safe operation of such
vehicle.”446 Hawaii prescribes a penalty for operating a vehicle “with-
440. State v. Conyers, 506 N.W.2d 442, 444 (Iowa 1993).
441. Id. at 445. But see People v. Friesen, 374 N.E.2d 15, 19 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978)
(driver who killed a pedestrian while driving with only parking lights was negligent
but not criminally negligent). More generally, as one Illinois court explained,
“[r]eckless driving cases appear to fall into three general categories.” People v.
Paarlberg, 612 N.E.2d 106, 110 (1993). In the first, the driver commits multiple traffic
offenses, such as speeding and weaving, that collectively demonstrate her culpability.
Id. In the second, the driver consciously and egregiously disregards “particular sur-
roundings and circumstances” by, for example, deliberately forcing a pedestrian off
the road. Id. at 110–11. And in the third, the “willful and wanton conduct is based, in
part, upon the driver’s intoxication or impaired state.” Id. at 111.
442. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-853 (West 2013). In addition, “[a] person shall be guilty
of reckless driving who drives a motor vehicle on the highways in the Commonwealth
(i) at a speed of twenty miles per hour or more in excess of the applicable maximum
speed limit or (ii) in excess of eighty miles per hour regardless of the applicable maxi-
mum speed limit.” Id. §§ 46.2–862. This second prong means that a person driving 81
mph on a Virginia freeway that is signed for 70 mph is driving recklessly—and could
lose her DC license as long as reckless driving in Virginia and reckless driving in the
District of Columbia are treated as equivalent offenses. Mike DeBonis, D.C. Drivers
Hurt by Tough Interpretation of Va. Offenses, WASH. POST, July 30, 2012, available at
www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/dc-drivers-hurt-by-tough-interpretation-of-
va-offenses/2012/07/30/gJQAzPbBLX_story.html; Mike DeBonis, D.C. Council Fixes
DMV’s Reckless Driving Lunacy, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2012, available at www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/blogs/mike-debonis/post/dc-council-fixes-dmvs-reckless-driving-lu-
nacy/2012/09/19/6bb5ceca-0291-11e2-8102-ebee9c66e190_blog.html.
443. FLA. STAT. § 316.1925 (2013); LA. REV. STAT. § 32:58 (2013).
444. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-97.2 (West 2013).
445. Id. § 39:4-97.
446. GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-241 (West 2013).
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out due care.”447 Washington specifies that “[c]ompliance with speed
requirements . . . shall not relieve the operator of any vehicle from the
further exercise of due care and caution as further circumstances shall
require.”448 Wyoming provides that “[a]ny person who drives any ve-
hicle in a manner inconsistent with the exercise of due and diligent
care normally exercised by a reasonably prudent person under similar
circumstances and where such operation of a motor vehicle creates an
unreasonable risk of harm to other persons or property is guilty of
careless driving.”449 And New York, among others, requires drivers to
“exercise due care to avoid colliding with any bicyclist, pedestrian, or
domestic animal upon any roadway”—an obligation that applies
“[n]otwithstanding the provisions of any other law to the contrary.”450
Oklahoma’s vehicle code uniquely specifies that “[t]he operator of
every vehicle, while driving, shall devote their full time and attention
to such driving.”451 However, “[n]o law enforcement officer shall issue
a citation” for the violation of this provision unless she “observes that
the operator of the vehicle is involved in an accident or observes the
operator of the vehicle driving in such a manner that poses an articul-
able danger to other persons on the roadway that is not otherwise
specified in statute.”452 Tennessee specifies somewhat similar driver
requirements, but with more attenuation—and with enough length to
consign the full text to the footnote below.453
Rather than affirmatively require attentiveness, a few jurisdictions
prohibit distraction. A driver in Georgia “shall not engage in any ac-
tions which shall distract such driver from the safe operation of such
vehicle.”454 In Wisconsin, “[n]o person while driving a motor vehicle
shall be so engaged or occupied as to interfere with the safe driving of
447. HAW. REV. STAT. § 291-12 (2013).
448. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.61.445 (West 2013).
449. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 31-5-236.
450. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1146 (McKinney 2013); accord ARIZ. REV. STAT.
§ 28-794 (2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1535 (2013); LA. REV. STAT. § 32:214 (2013);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 63-3-1112 (2013); MO. REV. STAT. § 300.410 (2013); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 55-8-136 (2013); UNIF. VEH. CODE § 11-504 (2000).
451. OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 11-901b (2013).
452. Id.
453. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-8-136 (2013) (“Notwithstanding any speed limit or
zone in effect at the time, or right-of-way rules that may be applicable, every driver of
a vehicle shall exercise due care by operating the vehicle at a safe speed, by maintain-
ing a safe lookout, by keeping the vehicle under proper control and by devoting full
time and attention to operating the vehicle, under the existing circumstances as neces-
sary in order to be able to see and to avoid endangering life, limb or property and to
see and avoid colliding with any other vehicle or person, or any road sign, guard rail
or any fixed object either legally using or legally parked or legally placed, upon any
roadway, within or beside the roadway right-of-way including, but not limited to, any
adjacent sidewalk, bicycle lane, shoulder or berm.”).
454. GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-241 (West 2013). However, “the proper use of a radio,
citizens band radio, mobile telephone, or amateur or ham radio shall not be a viola-
tion of this Code section.” Id.
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such vehicle.”455 Arkansas prohibits “any person” from “driv[ing] or
operat[ing] any vehicle in such a careless manner as to evidence a fail-
ure to keep a proper lookout for other traffic, vehicular or otherwise,
or in such a manner as to evidence a failure to maintain proper con-
trol.”456 Maine punishes an operator who, while engaged in an activity
“[t]hat is not necessary to the operation of the vehicle” and “actually
impairs, or would reasonably be expected to impair, [her ability] to
safely operate the vehicle,” either commits another traffic offense or is
involved in a reportable crash.457 And Washington, D.C. prohibits
“distracted driving,”458 which “means inattentive driving while operat-
ing a motor vehicle that results in the unsafe operation of the vehicle
where such inattention is caused by reading, writing, performing per-
sonal grooming, interacting with pets or unsecured cargo, using per-
sonal communications technologies, or engaging in any other activity
which causes distractions.”459
In contrast to these jurisdictions, the majority of states simply re-
strict (a narrower set of) particular distracting activities. These include
bans on the use of video displays visible to the operator for purposes
unrelated to driving, conditions on the use of cell phones and other
electronic devices, and prohibitions both on interfering with the vehi-
cle’s operation and driving during such interference.460 Oregon and
Washington are particularly concerned about drivers “embracing”
their passengers.461 Curiously, few states address actual sleeping;
“Maggie’s Law” in New Jersey specifies that extreme fatigue may con-
stitute recklessness for the purpose of that state’s vehicular homicide
law,462 and Ohio directs that “[n]o person shall drive a ‘commercial
motor vehicle’ . . . while [her] ability or alertness is so impaired by
455. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 346.89 (West 2013).
456. ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-51-104 (2013).
457. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 29-a, § 2118 (2013). Notably, the statute does not specify
that the driver be at fault in the crash. Id.
458. D.C. CODE § 50-1731.03 (2013).
459. Id. § 50-1731.02(1).
460. E.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 1225-c, 1225-d, 1229-c (McKinney 2013);
UNIF. VEH. CODE §§ 11-104, 12-410 (2000); Distracted Driving Laws, GOVERNORS
HIGHWAY SAFETY ASS’N, (Mar. 2014), www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfo/laws/cellphone_
laws.html.
461. OR. REV. STAT. § 811.190 (2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.61.665 (West
2013). Alaska has not been concerned since 1979. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 13,
§ 02.540 (repealed June 28, 1979) (“Embracing another while driving”).
462. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-5(a) (West 2013) (“Proof that the defendant fell
asleep while driving or was driving after having been without sleep for a period in
excess of 24 consecutive hours may give rise to an inference that the defendant was
driving recklessly.”); see generally Joshua D. Levine, A Road to Injustice Paved with
Good Intentions: Maggie’s Misguided Crackdown on Drowsy Driving, 56 HASTINGS
L.J. 1297 (2005); cf. also Tasmania Law Reform Inst., Criminal Liability of Drivers
Who Fall Asleep Causing Motor Vehicle Crashes Resulting in Death or Other Serious
Injury: Jiminez, UNIV. TASMANIA, AUSTL. (Oct. 2010), www.utas.edu.au/__data/as-
sets/pdf_file/0010/283744/JiminezA4.pdf (Final Report No. 13).
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fatigue, illness, or other causes that it is unsafe for the person to drive
such vehicle.”463
A driver’s actions may constitute civil negligence without reaching
the level of criminal culpability.464 (The terminology is not particularly
helpful: A tort action may allege civil negligence; a minor traffic of-
fense may constitute a civil infraction.) The difference in some cases
merely goes to the result of the conduct: California, for example, stat-
utorily penalizes generalized negligent driving only if death results.465
Drivers may therefore have duties of care that extend beyond express
statutory directives.466
These duties become relevant only if there has been an injury to
person or property. In the case of no crash, any related negligence
lacks a requisite injury. And in the case of a crash that vigilance could
not have prevented, the lack of such vigilance cannot be the cause of
the crash, regardless of whether that inattention would constitute neg-
ligence as a matter of law.467 Only in the case of a crash that vigilance
would have prevented is the human driver’s conduct relevant.
463. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.79 (West 2013).
464. See, e.g., People v. Friesen, 374 N.E.2d 15, 19 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
465. See Robert F. Koets, William Lindsley, Sarah Newcomb, & Susan L. Thomas,
What Amounts to Reckless Driving of Motor Vehicle Within Statute Making Such a
Criminal Offense, 52 A.L.R.2d 1337 (1957); CAL. VEH. CODE § 12 (West 2013) (penal-
izing reckless driving and particular acts that may be negligent, but not categorically
penalizing negligent driving); CAL. PEN. CODE § 192(c)(2)) (West 2013) (defining one
type of vehicular manslaughter as “the unlawful killing of a human being without
malice” while “driving a vehicle in the commission of a lawful act which might pro-
duce death, in an unlawful manner, but without gross negligence”); People v. Bussel,
118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 159, 163 (Cal. App. 2002) (discussing CAL. PEN. CODE § 192(c)(2)).
Drivers who kill or seriously injure pedestrians and cyclists without serious legal con-
sequence provide particularly tragic examples of the inadequacy and underenforce-
ment of existing vehicle laws. See, e.g., Jason R. Holmes, Share the Road: Why the
Current Laws in Arizona Do Not Adequately Protect Cyclists, and A Call to Legisla-
tors to Change Those Laws, 5 PHOENIX L. REV. 591 (2012); Alex Goldmark, Killed
While Cycling: Why So Few Fatal Bike Crashes Lead to Arrest in NYC, TRANPS. NA-
TION (Apr. 8, 2012, 9:00 PM), transportationnation.org/2012/04/08/killed-while-cycling
-why-so-few-fatal-bike-crashes-lead-to-arrest-in-nyc; Brad Aaron, Is There Really a
“Rule of Two”?, STREETSBLOG NYC (Feb. 22, 2012), www.streetsblog.org/2012/02/22/
is-there-really-a-rule-of-two; Deadly Driving Unlimited: How the NYPD Lets Drivers
Run Wild, TRANSP. ALTERNATIVES, www.transalt.org/files/newsroom/reports/2012/
Deadly_Driving_Unlimited_Report.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2013); Samantha Shimo-
gawa, Kill a Cyclist and Get Away With It?, BICYCLEPAPER.COM, www.bicyclepaper.
com/articles/389-Kill-a-Cyclist-and-Get-Away-With-It- (last visited Dec. 14, 2013).
466. See 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 587 (2013) (“The duty to operate a motor
vehicle with due and reasonable care and caution under the circumstances exists at
common law and is not dependent on any statutory requirements.”).
467. Compare, e.g., Berlin v. Violett, 18 P.2d 737, 738 (Cal. App. 1933) (“Appellant
objects to the giving immediately thereafter of the following instruction: ‘All drivers
of vehicles on a public highway are required by law to keep a vigilant lookout ahead
so as to avoid, if reasonably possible, a collision with any other vehicle or person
lawfully upon such highway. Failure to keep such lookout, or failure to see that which
may be readily seen, if the driver is looking, would constitute negligence as a matter
of law.’ We find no error in this instruction.”) with Fielder v. Magnolia Beverage Co.,
757 So. 2d 925, 935 (Miss. 1999) (“[T]his Court has held that instructions which re-
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Nonetheless, civil suits alleging driver negligence can inform this
broader sense of prudence, particularly with respect to any expecta-
tion of vigilance.468 In its simplest formulation, “the control that is
required of a motorist is such as will prevent the collision with another
vehicle not being operated negligently.”469 To this end, “drivers are
under a duty (1) to maintain a reasonably safe rate of speed; (2) to
have their automobiles under reasonable control; (3) to keep a proper
lookout, under the circumstances then existing, to see and be aware of
what was in their view; and (4) to use reasonable care to avoid an
accident.”470 They must “exercise a diligence commensurate with
hazards disclosed under surrounding circumstances, and the lookout
which . . . is . . . most effective in the light of all present conditions and
those reasonably to be anticipated.”471 The driver is “chargeable with
knowledge of what a prudent and vigilant operator would have seen,
and is negligent if he fails to discover a vehicle which, or a traveler
whom, he could have discovered in time to avoid the injury in the
exercise of reasonable care.”472
These statutory or common law obligations might apply to the
human driver of an automated vehicle in at least three ways. The first
involves inputs: Depending on actual, perceived, and expected per-
formance of the particular vehicle, the instructions that this human
issues to it may be imprudent. For example, dispatching an untested
vehicle without supervision might be reckless, even if no harm results.
But using a widely accepted technology in the manner intended is un-
likely to be considered reckless or even negligent.473
The second involves outputs: Particularly with less mainstream
technologies, the driver may function as a guarantor of vehicle per-
formance. In this sense, prudence would be measured by what the ve-
quire vigilance on the part of a driver [are to be] condemned as requiring more than
the exercise of reasonable care on the part of a motorist. See Turner v. Turner, 524 So.
2d 942, 947 (Miss. 1988) (holding an instruction erroneous because it placed a higher
burden on the driver Turner than that of reasonable care); Crossley v. James, 365 So.
2d 957 (Miss. 1978) (holding that it was reversible error to grant an instruction which
places upon defendant the burden of avoiding a collision); Jones v. Phillips, 263 So. 2d
759, 762–63 (Miss. 1972) (“avoid the collision” and “vigilant lookout” instructions
were erroneous, because both instructions, considered together, placed a higher duty
upon defendant than the law requires). But see Miles v. Duckworth, 481 So. 2d 757,
758 (Miss. 1985) (upheld an instruction that stated that if defendant ‘failed to keep a
reasonable and proper lookout for other traffic and vehicles; or if he failed to have his
vehicle under reasonable and proper control . . . . [T]hen such action or actions, if any,
. . .  constitutes negligence’).”).
468. See generally 8 AM. JUR. 2d Automobiles §§ 420–22 (2013); 60A C.J.S. Motor
Vehicles §§ 662–67 (2013).
469. Warren v. Bostock, 102 N.W.2d 55, 58 (Neb. 1960).
470. Hodder v. United States, 328 F. Supp. 2d 335, 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing New
York cases to characterize New York law) (internal citations omitted).
471. Jones v. Schabron, 113 P.3d 34, 38 (Wyo. 2005) (quotation omitted).
472. Pike Taxi Co. v. Patterson, 63 So. 2d 599, 602 (Ala. 1952) (quotation omitted).
473. This conclusion describes not only motor vehicles generally but specific con-
temporary features like cruise control.
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hicle actually does in its environment. For example, a driver whose
vehicle performs poorly might be driving recklessly.474 Again, percep-
tions of the technology may influence expectations, and outcomes that
are seen as unforeseeable might not be attributed to the driver.
The third involves vigilance. The key question here is whether a
particular state’s generalized obligation of vigilance is absolute or con-
textual. If that obligation is absolute, then the driver must be attentive
regardless of the vehicle’s performance. If, however, the obligation of
vigilance is contextual rather than absolute, then what the driver must
do (or cannot do) depends on what the vehicle can do.475
A German project group concluded that the German traffic code476
read in connection with the Vienna Convention on Road Traffic estab-
lishes an absolute obligation: The (presumably human) driver must be
in control of her vehicle and attentive to her surroundings, regardless
of the level of automation.477 Similarly, state law prohibitions on par-
ticular distractions—like watching television—are generally without
relevant exception.478
In contrast, much of the language in statutes and case law implies a
relative approach. “[D]ue care,” “safe operation,” “proper lookout,”
and “proper control,” for example, raise the question of what is
“due,” “safe,” and “proper.”479 These terms do not provide certainty,
but they do imply context. The variation present in the common law
duty of due care tends to support this conclusion.480
Importantly, this analysis applies to the human driver, not to the
automated vehicle: The manufacturer of such a vehicle may be held to
474. This could also be described in terms of omission: The driver fails to prevent
this poor performance.
475. This also applies to civil negligence in the case of a crash that vigilance would
have prevented. The driver is negligent if her duty of vigilance is absolute, but she
might not be negligent if her duty is contextual and her reliance on her vehicle was
reasonable. The underlying common law duty can vary by environment but not by
driver. See 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 584 (2013) (“Notwithstanding that the degree
of diligence or attention required to constitute due care may vary with the circum-
stances, the legal standard of care required is unvarying and alike at all times and, in
the absence of a statute providing otherwise, applies equally to all, regardless of age,
sex, experience, or mental or physical ability.”). Skeptical judges and juries may con-
ceivably treat automated vehicles (and their drivers) differently than conventional ve-
hicles (and their drivers), and, to the extent that mere presence of an automated
vehicle on the highway is the cause of an injury, the doctrine of inherently dangerous
products may arguably supply a legal basis for that difference. Cf. generally 60 C.J.S.
Motor Vehicles § 22 (2013).
476. German Traffic Code, Strassenverkehrsordnung (StVO), 3 Abs. 1 S. 1 StVO
(2013).
477. Gasser, supra note 34, at 13. The report notes concern that higher levels of
automation could lead the driver to neglect these obligations. Id. at 14–16. However,
it distinguishes (and condones) a vehicle’s assumption of control if the driver becomes
unexpectedly incapacitated. Id. at 16–17.
478. See sources cited supra note 460.
479. See supra Part VI.B; infra Part VI.C.3.
480. See text accompanying supra note 475.
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a higher standard under product liability law. That issue is beyond this
Article’s scope. However, it introduces the second prong of the legal-
ity analysis: In addition to requiring that human drivers be safe, ex-
isting law requires the vehicles they drive to be safe as well.
C. Automated Vehicles Must Be Safe
The previous section surveyed relevant obligations currently im-
posed on human drivers. These obligations extend to automated vehi-
cles in two senses. First, an automated vehicle that is driving
imprudently is probably being driven imprudently; in other words, the
human driver of an imprudently driving automated vehicle is probably
driving imprudently. Second, an automated vehicle that is driving un-
safely is likely unsafe. Texas makes this relationship explicit: In its ve-
hicle code, “a reference to an operator includes a reference to the
vehicle operated by the operator if the reference imposes a duty or
provides a limitation on the movement or other operation of that ve-
hicle.”481 Automated vehicles must satisfy vehicular analogs to the
prohibitions on unlicensed and unsafe drivers.482 They must also com-
ply with rules of the road that were written for humans rather than
machines.483
1. Unsafe Vehicles Are Prohibited
The various statutory mechanisms with which states keep “unsafe”
motor vehicles off their roadways fall generally into three categories:
operation, registration, and modification.484 Application of these pro-
visions to automated vehicles may depend on both the actual and the
perceived performance of these vehicles.485
Many states expressly prohibit the operation of dangerous vehi-
cles.486 In California, “[i]t is unlawful to operate any vehicle or combi-
481. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.002 (West 2013).
482. See infra Parts VI.C.1–2.
483. See infra Part VI.C.3.
484. States may also impose particular requirements on motor vehicle manufactur-
ers. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-67a (2013) (registration); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/5-109 (2013); UNIF. VEH. CODE § 12-106 (2000) (proof of compliance with stan-
dards). The definition of manufacturer may be particularly relevant to any person
retrofitting a conventional motor vehicle with automation technology.
485. In general, a “vehicle” is “[e]very device in, upon, or by which any person or
property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, excepting devices used
exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.” UNIF. VEH. CODE § 1-215 (2000) (empha-
sis added). A “motor vehicle” is “[e]very vehicle which is self-propelled, and every
vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires but
not operated upon rails, except vehicles moved solely by human power and motorized
wheelchairs.” Id. § 1-156.
486. Many states also restrict “foreign” or “injurious” substances. E.g., FLA. STAT.
§ 316.2044(1) (2013) (“Any person who drops, or permits to be dropped or thrown,
upon any street or highway any destructive or injurious material shall immediately
remove the same or cause it to be removed.”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 346.94(5) (West
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nation of vehicles which is in an unsafe condition, or which is not
safely loaded, and which presents an immediate safety hazard.”487 In
Texas, it is a misdemeanor to “operate[ ] or move[ ] or, as an owner,
knowingly permit[ ] another to operate or move, a vehicle that . . . is
unsafe so as to endanger a person.”488 Police officers in some states
are specifically empowered to order a vehicle’s driver “to stop and
submit such vehicle to an inspection and any tests as may be
appropriate.”489
Some states explicitly limit the registration of unsafe vehicles. (In
general, registration is required for vehicles that are used on highways
or other publicly accessible areas.490) In California, “registration or
the renewal or transfer of registration of a vehicle” may be refused if
“the vehicle is mechanically unfit or unsafe to be operated or moved
on the highways.”491 In New York, “the commissioner may refuse to
register any vehicle or class of vehicles for use on the public highways
where he determines that the characteristics of such vehicle or class of
vehicles make such vehicle or vehicles unsafe for highway opera-
tion.”492 In Massachusetts, the registrar may additionally “suspend or
revoke” the registration of an unsafe motor vehicle.493
Jurisdictions take a variety of statutory approaches to the modifica-
tion of vehicles. North Dakota prohibits, with certain exceptions, the
operation of a motor vehicle “with alterations or changes from the
manufacturer’s original design of the suspension, steering, or braking
2013) (“No person shall place or cause to be placed upon a highway any foreign sub-
stance which is or may be injurious to any vehicle or part thereof.”).
487. CAL. VEH. CODE § 24002 (West 2013). The Uniform Vehicle Code extends this
prohibition to owners: “It is a misdemeanor for any person to drive or move or for the
owner to cause or knowingly permit to be driven or moved on any highway any vehi-
cle or combination of vehicles which is in such unsafe condition as to endanger any
person, or which [violates a vehicle equipment regulation].” UNIF. VEH. CODE § 12-
101(a) (2000).
488. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 547.004 (West 2013).
489. UNIF. VEH. CODE § 13-102 (2000). California’s provision is more formal:
“Every driver of a passenger vehicle shall stop and submit the vehicle to an inspection
of the mechanical condition and equipment of the vehicle at any location where mem-
bers of the California Highway Patrol are conducting tests and inspections of passen-
ger vehicles and when signs are displayed requiring such stop.” CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 2814 (2013).
490. In California, for example, “[a] person shall not drive, move, or leave standing
upon a highway, or in an offstreet public parking facility, any motor vehicle . . . unless
it is registered.” Id. § 4000(a)(1). An “offstreet public parking facility” is “[a]ny pub-
licly owned parking facility” or “[a]ny privately owned parking facility for which no
fee for the privilege to park is charged and which is held open for the common public
use of retail customers,” unless the vehicle is stored in that private facility “by, or with
the express permission of,” that facility’s owner. Id. § 4000(a)(2).
491. Id. § 4751; see also id. § 24002 (“(a) It is unlawful to operate any vehicle or
combination of vehicles which is in an unsafe condition, or which is not safely loaded,
and which presents an immediate safety hazard. (b) It is unlawful to operate any vehi-
cle or combination of vehicles which is not equipped as provided in this code.”).
492. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 400 (McKinney 2013).
493. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 2 (2013).
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system.”494 California expressly restricts only those modifications that
impair vertical clearance.495 Pennsylvania, Hawaii, and, notably, Ne-
vada require certain modified vehicles to undergo special inspec-
tions.496 Wisconsin prohibits the use of such vehicles to “transport
passengers for hire.”497 And Rhode Island specifically criminalizes
tampering with a vehicle without the consent of its owner—a provi-
sion that could have interesting application if, in the future, a vehicle’s
software is sabotaged by hackers or remotely updated by its devel-
oper.498 In addition to imposing different requirements, states also de-
fine key terms differently: A conventional motor vehicle retrofitted
with automation technology is probably a “reconstructed vehicle” in
Hawaii but not Pennsylvania.499
494. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-21-45.1 (2013).
495. CAL. VEH. CODE § 24008 (2013).
496. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1165.1(b) (2013); HAW. REV. STAT. § 286-85(a) (2013);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 482.223 (2013).
497. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 341.268(e) (West 2013).
498. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-9-3 (2013).
499. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 286-2 (2013) (“‘Reconstructed vehicle’ means a
vehicle that is registered to be operated on a public highway, and that is: (1) Assem-
bled from new or used parts by a person other than a recognized manufacturer of new
vehicles; (2) Modified to the extent that the identity of the vehicle’s make, model, or
type is obscured by material changes in its appearance; or (3) Modified by the re-
moval, addition, alteration, or substitution of other than original replacement essen-
tial parts, including the vehicle’s body, power train, steering system, suspension
system, exhaust system, intake system, or bumper system; excluding ordinary body
repair that does not change the exterior structure of the vehicle. The term does not
include a special interest vehicle or a motorcycle.”). NEV. REV. STAT. § 482.100 (2013)
(“‘Reconstructed vehicle’ means any vehicle which shall have been assembled or con-
structed largely by means of essential parts, new or used, derived from other vehicles
or makes of vehicles of various names, models or types, or which, if originally other-
wise constructed, shall have been materially altered by the removal of essential parts
or by the addition or substitution of essential parts, new or used, derived from other
vehicles or makes of vehicles.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 801.408 (2013) (“‘Reconstructed
vehicle’ means either: (1) A vehicle that: (a) Has a body that resembles and primarily
is a particular year model or make of vehicle; (b) Is not a vehicle rebuilt by a manu-
facturer; (c) Is not a vehicle built in a factory where the year model and make are
assigned at the factory; and (d) Is not a replica; or (2) A motor truck that has been
rebuilt using a component kit if the manufacturer of the kit assigns a vehicle identifi-
cation number and provides a manufacturer’s certificate of origin for the kit.”); 75 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 102 (2013) (“‘Reconstructed vehicle.’ A vehicle, other than an antique
or classic vehicle, for which a certificate of salvage was issued and is thereafter re-
stored to operating condition to meet the vehicle equipment and inspection standards
under Part IV (relating to vehicle characteristics)”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-1-106(2)
(2013) (“‘Reconstructed vehicle’ means every vehicle of a type required to be regis-
tered hereunder materially altered from its original construction by the removal, addi-
tion, or substitution of essential parts, new or used . . . .”); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 341.268(d) (West 2013) (“‘Reconstructed vehicle’ means a motor vehicle of any age
which has been substantially altered or modified from original manufacturers specifi-
cations to such an extent that it no longer resembles the original manufactured vehi-
cle.”), (f) (“‘Street modified vehicle” means a motor vehicle of any age which has
been modified from original manufacturers specifications, but does not include any
reconstructed vehicle as defined under para. (d).”). “Essential parts” are generally
“[a]ll integral and body parts . . . , the removal, alteration, or substitution of which
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There are two key points about these provisions. First, they are in
one sense the vehicular counterparts to the obligations of prudence
imposed on drivers. Whereas a human who drives unreasonably may
be committing “reckless driving,” a vehicle that does the same may be
“unsafe for highway operation.” Second, like the prudential require-
ments, these vehicle requirements depend in large part on administra-
tive discretion, in this case the clerk who determines whether to deny
registration to a vehicle or the police officer who decides to pull it
over.
2. Particular Equipment Requirements Apply
Some states have fairly obscure equipment requirements that may
at least superficially conflict with potential elements of an automated
vehicle’s operation. The common mirror requirement discussed above
is one such example.500 Consider three others:
• California prohibits “any lamp or illuminating device not re-
quired or permitted in this code.”501 A lamp is a device that
emits light.502 The LiDAR (“light detection and ranging”) de-
vices used on some automated vehicles also emit light.503 Are
they prohibited?504
• Missouri forbids, with some exceptions, the operation of a motor
vehicle or trailer with “any device which emits an electronic
message directed to the front, side or rear of the exterior of the
vehicle or trailer,” including “words, phrases, sentences, num-
bers and other symbols or combinations thereof.”505 Although
this is presumably directed at advertising and other distractions,
might it nonetheless limit how an automated vehicle can com-
municate with human road users?
• Georgia requires that “[o]ne of the means of brake operation
shall consist of a mechanical connection from the operating
lever to the brake shoes or bands.”506 If this requirement is not
would tend to conceal the identity of the vehicle or substantially alter its appearance,
model, type or mode of operation.” UNIF. VEH. CODE § 1-130 (2000). Theft and fraud
are primary targets of the vehicle modification statutes. See, e.g., 75 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 1165.1(b) (2013).
500. See sources cited supra notes 420–421; cf. also supra note 115.
501. CAL. VEH. CODE § 24003 (West 2013).
502. Lamp, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2013) (“A vessel containing oil, which
is burnt at a wick, for the purpose of illumination. Now also a vessel of glass or some
similar material, enclosing the source of illumination, whether a candle, oil, gas-jet, or
incandescent wire.”) (selected definition).
503. See, e.g., High Definition Lidar HDL-64E S2, VELODYNE, www.velodynelidar.
com/lidar/products/brochure/HDL-64E%20S2%20datasheet_2010_lowres.pdf (last
visited Dec. 20, 2013) (describing a class 1 laser with 905 nanometer wavelength in 5
nanosecond pulses).
504. See also supra Part V.
505. MO. REV. STAT. § 307.122 (2013).
506. GA. CODE ANN. § 40-8-51(a) (West 2013).
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precluded by federal safety regulations,507 what does it mean for
future brake-by-wire systems?
These examples are probably not fatal to the legal operation of an
automated vehicle that operates safely and stops quickly. But they
will, at some point, be considered by someone—whether a legislator, a
regulator, a police officer, or a judge—who will have to reconcile the
text of these provisions with their presumed intent.
3. Rules of the Road May Complicate Automated Driving
The rules of the road as codified assume human judgment, and the
rules of the road as observed reflect that judgment. These dependen-
cies may complicate the lawful operation of automated vehicles.
Consider speeding. “It is unlawful for a driver of a vehicle to fail to
obey” a posted speed limit,508 and “[n]o person shall drive a vehicle
upon a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable or prudent.”509
These rules are not coextensive: A driver can violate both, one, or
neither.510 Because the first rule is nominally quantitative, determin-
ing ex ante the requirements for compliance is generally straightfor-
ward. In contrast, because the second rule is nominally qualitative,
determining those requirements ex ante may be more difficult.
507. 49 U.S.C. § 30103(b)(1) (2012) (“When a [federal] motor vehicle safety stan-
dard is in effect . . . , a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe or
continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor
vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is identical to the [federal]
standard.”); see also UNIF. VEH. CODE § 12-103 (2000) (“Where the U.S. Department
of Transportation has issued a current Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard applica-
ble to a particular item of vehicle equipment, a standard adopted by the [state’s] de-
partment applicable to the same aspect shall of performance of that item of vehicle
equipment shall be identical to the federal standard.”).
508. CAL. VEH. CODE § 21461 (West 2013).
509. Id. § 22350. This is often called the “basic speed law.” E.g., Wilding v. Norton,
319 P.2d 440, 443 (Cal. App. 1957); cf. also, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 316.183 (2013) (“(1)
No person shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and
prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential hazards
then existing. In every event, speed shall be controlled as may be necessary to avoid
colliding with any person, vehicle, or other conveyance or object on or entering the
highway in compliance with legal requirements and the duty of all persons to use due
care . . . . (4) The driver of every vehicle shall, consistent with the requirements of
subsection (1), drive at an appropriately reduced speed when: (a) Approaching and
crossing an intersection or railway grade crossing; (b) Approaching and going around
a curve; (c) Approaching a hill crest; (d) Traveling upon any narrow or winding road-
way; and (e) Any special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or
by reason of weather or highway conditions. (5) No person shall drive a motor vehicle
at such a slow speed as to impede or block the normal and reasonable movement of
traffic, except when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation or in compliance
with law.”), 316.1925 (“Any person operating a vehicle upon the streets or highways
within the state shall drive the same in a careful and prudent manner, having regard
for the width, grade, curves, corners, traffic, and all other attendant circumstances, so
as not to endanger the life, limb, or property of any person. Failure to drive in such
manner shall constitute careless driving and a violation of this section.”).
510. Traveling above the posted speed limit is not necessarily unreasonable, and
traveling below the posted speed limit is not necessarily reasonable.
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This quantitative/qualitative distinction is not absolute. A driver
might exceed a posted speed limit to comply with another rule or to
prevent a concrete harm; a community may condone or even expect
minor noncompliance; and the state, acting through budgets, policies,
and the discretion of its individual agents, may decline to punish cer-
tain prima facie violations. Conversely, a “reasonable and prudent”
speed for a given vehicle on a given roadway under given environmen-
tal conditions could conceivably be quantified either prescriptively or
descriptively. This is already done on a crude level: Nonstatutory
speed limits, for example, are often set by reference to the speed at or
below which 85 percent of vehicles travel.511
Vehicle codes are replete with other rules that are nominally quali-
tative or absolute. “Reasonable and prudent” may be less demanding
than the “extreme caution” required of commercial drivers in certain
circumstances.512 Slow-moving vehicles “shall [generally] be driven in
the right-hand lane for traffic or as close as practicable to the right-
hand edge or curb,” a prescription that does not mean “as close as
possible.”513 “No person shall drive upon a highway at such a slow
speed as to impede or block the normal and reasonable movement of
traffic unless the reduced speed is necessary for safe operation, be-
cause of a grade, or in compliance with law.”514 And “[t]he driver of a
vehicle approaching a pedestrian within any marked or unmarked
crosswalk shall exercise all due care and shall reduce the speed of the
vehicle or take any other action relating to the operation of the vehi-
cle as necessary to safeguard the safety of the pedestrian.”515
Although these references to reasonableness, prudence, practicabil-
ity, and due care demonstrate that the law accepts risk at a certain
level, they neither specify this level nor prescribe a basis for determin-
ing it. That determination may be highly subjective, innately and im-
perfectly probabilistic, value-laden, and outcome-dependent. Indeed,
perceived risk is different than actual risk: Humans tend to inflate
some dangers and discount others.516 These rules are generally not
considered unconstitutionally vague,517 but this hardly means that
511. See Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways
(MUTCD) § 2B.13 (2009 ed.) (“Guidance: . . . When a speed limit within a speed
zone is posted, it should be within 5 mph of the 85th-percentile speed of free-flowing
traffic.”).
512. Weaver v. Chavez, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 514, 133 Cal.App.4th 1350 (Cal. App. 2005).
513. CAL. VEH. CODE § 21654(a) (West 2013); Waxman v. Jennings, 238 P. 98 (Cal.
App. 1925).
514. CAL. VEH. CODE § 22400 (2013).
515. Id. § 21950.
516. See, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1700, 1763–66 (2003).
517. See, e.g., People v. De Casaus, 309 P.2d 835 (Cal. App. 1957), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 890; Ex parte Daniels, 192 P. 442 (Cal. 1920); Garcia v. State, 498 S.W.2d 936
(Tex. Crim. App. 1973). But see, e.g., State v. Stanko, 974 P.2d 1132 (Mont. 1998).
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they are easy to translate into legally defensible code.518 In other
words, application of these laws to automated vehicles may present
both design challenges and liability concerns.
Another significant design challenge merits mention: In many
states, a person is required to comply with lawful orders or instruc-
tions issued by authorized persons, which may include police officers,
firefighters, and crossing guards.519 These instructions, which might be
issued orally or physically, may even contravene (and supersede) traf-
fic control devices like signals, stop signs, or lane markings.520 Al-
though the failure of a person to follow instructions of which she is
unaware might not be “willful,”521 an automated vehicle may not be
entitled to obliviousness. In this way, as with other rules discussed, an
automated vehicle may be just one part of an essential human-ma-
chine system.522 The next part describes inchoate state efforts to ex-
pressly regulate that system.
D. Several States Expressly Regulate Automated Vehicles
This part summarizes state laws that expressly address the legality
of automated vehicles. Nevada,523 Florida,524 and California525 have
now enacted such laws, and bills are pending in a number of addi-
tional jurisdictions.526 Critically, none of these state laws would pre-
vail in the face of conflicting federal law, including the federal motor
vehicle regulations discussed and, to the extent that it is cognizable as
518. At least those norms are written. Some community norms (such as waving a
bicyclist through a stop sign) may be even more informal.
519. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-2 (West 2013) (“No person shall fail or refuse to
comply with any lawful order or direction of any police officer, firefighter, [author-
ized] police volunteer . . . , or [authorized] school-crossing guard. . ..”); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 257.602 (West 2013) (“A person shall not refuse to comply with a lawful
order or direction of a police officer when that officer, for public interest and safety, is
guiding, directing, controlling, or regulating traffic on the highways of this state.”); 75
PA. CONS. STAT. § 3102 (2013) (“No person shall willfully fail or refuse to comply
with any lawful order or direction of any uniformed police officer, sheriff or constable
or, in an emergency, a railroad or street railway police officer; or any appropriately
attired person, including an agent or employee of the funeral director during a fu-
neral, authorized to direct, control or regulate traffic or an employee who has been
trained in traffic control by a licensed and insured private security company and who
is acting in the scope of employment.”).
520. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-834(B) (West 2013) (“Law-enforcement officers
and uniformed school crossing guards may assume control of traffic otherwise con-
trolled by lights, and in such event, signals by such officers and uniformed crossing
guards shall take precedence over such traffic control devices.”).
521. See supra note 519.
522. See supra Part III.
523. See infra Part VI.D.1.
524. See infra Part VI.D.2.
525. See infra Part VI.D.3.
526. See infra Part VI.D.4.
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federal law, the Geneva Convention. Moreover, these laws do not re-
solve many of the related issues presented in this article.527
4. Nevada Conditions the Legality of These Vehicles
In 2011, Nevada became the first state to enact legislation directed
at automated vehicles. The primary legislation, passed as Assembly
Bill (AB) 511, defines “autonomous vehicle”528 and directs the state’s
Department of Motor Vehicles to “adopt regulations authorizing the
operation of autonomous vehicles on highways within the State of Ne-
vada.”529 These regulations are to include, inter alia, “minimum safety
standards” and a special “driver’s license endorsement” that “must, in
its restrictions or lack thereof, recognize the fact that a person is not
required to actively drive an autonomous vehicle.”530 This language
suggests that a driver’s license with such an endorsement could be
more or less widely available than a normal license.531
Separate legislation, passed as Senate Bill (SB) 140, provides that,
for the purpose of the state’s restrictions on the use of cell phones by
drivers, “a person shall be deemed not to be operating a motor vehicle
if the motor vehicle is driven autonomously through the use of artifi-
cial-intelligence software and the autonomous operation of the motor
vehicle is authorized by law.”532 (Notably, the DMV’s regulation de-
clines to extend this legal conclusion beyond the context of cell
phones.)533
The DMV’s initial regulation took effect in March 2012.534 In that
regulation, the DMV sought to:
provide[ ] more clarification to the stakeholders regarding what is
not considered autonomous. Self parallel parking and other systems
today require some type of human intervention to successfully oper-
ate the vehicle. The autonomous vehicle, per Nevada’s definition,
527. See supra Parts VI.B–C.
528. “‘Autonomous vehicle’ means a motor vehicle that uses artificial intelligence,
sensors and global positioning system coordinates to drive itself without the active
intervention of a human operator.” NEV. REV. STAT. § 482A.030 (2013). “‘Artificial
intelligence’ means the use of computers and related equipment to enable a machine
to duplicate or mimic the behavior of human beings.” Id. § 482A.020. “‘Sensors’ in-
cludes, without limitation, cameras, lasers and radar. Id. § 482A.050. “‘Highway’
means the entire width between the boundary lines of every way dedicated to a public
authority when any part of the way is open to the use of the public for purposes of
vehicular traffic, whether or not the public authority is maintaining the way.” Id.
§ 484A.095.
529. Id. § 482A.100.
530. Id.
531. Cf. id. § 483.270; NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 483.200 (2013).
532. NEV. REV. STAT. § 484B.165, para. 7 (2013).
533. See sources cited infra note 574.
534. Adopted Regulation of the Department of Motor Vehicles LCB File No.
R084-11, NEV. DMV § 2,  www.leg.state.nv.us/register/RegsReviewed/$R084-11_
ADOPTED.pdf (effective Mar. 1, 2012, )
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does not require human intervention to operate the vehicle. There
is a clear distinction between the two systems.535
Accordingly, the DMV:
will interpret the term “autonomous vehicle” to exclude a vehicle
enabled with a safety system or driver assistance system, including,
without limitation, a system to provide electronic blind spot assis-
tance, crash avoidance, emergency braking, parking assistance,
adaptive cruise control, lane keep assistance, lane departure warn-
ings and traffic jam and queuing assistance, unless the vehicle is also
enabled with artificial intelligence and technology that allows the
vehicle to carry out all the mechanical operations of driving without
the active control or continuous monitoring of a natural person.536
Despite this additional clarification, certain potential technologies
could arguably fall on either side of this line.537 Indeed, other states
could conceivably interpret similar language differently.538
The regulation also defines the “operator” and “driver” of an au-
tonomous vehicle as “the person [who] causes the autonomous vehicle
to engage, regardless of whether the person is physically present in the
vehicle while it is engaged.”539 This determination reduces, but does
not eliminate, uncertainty regarding the application of rules of the
road to the automated vehicle’s user.540
535. Informational Statement of Adopted Regulations as Required by Administrative
Procedures Act NRS 233B.066, LCB File No. R084-11, NEV. DMV 3 (Feb. 6, 2012),
www.leg.state.nv.us/register/RegsReviewed/$R084-11_Statement.pdf.
536. Adopted Regulation, supra note 534, § 2.
537. Consider, for example, a vehicle that can drive itself on freeways but not on
city streets or that can operate in certain conditions without the “active control or
continuous monitoring of a natural person” but that nonetheless requires a human to
assume “control” shortly after a takeover request. Cf., e.g., Continental Tests Highly-
automated Driving, CONTINENTAL (Mar. 23, 2012), www.conti-online.com/generator/
www/com/en/continental/pressportal/themes/press_releases/3_automotive_group/
chassis_safety/press_releases/pr_2012_03_23_automated_driving_en,version=2.html
(“More than 6,000 miles of highly-automated driving on public roads in Nevada were
completed and had the aim to show that it becomes possible to develop room for
freedom for the driver which does not serve primary vehicle guidance and therefore
provide the driver a welcome change in certain situations.”); Driver Assistance Sys-
tems, AUDI USA (Jan. 10, 2012), www.audiusanews.com/newsrelease.do;jsessionid=30
3EC9E15BF1151465A9815C2ED2EC38?&id=2757 (“The traffic jam assistant . . . can
relieve the driver at times when driving is not much fun, such as in congested traffic.
At speeds between zero and 60 km/h (37.28 mph), the system helps to steer the car
within certain constraints. It also accelerates and brakes autonomously. The traffic
jam assistant can be used on expressways or in cities, provided that the course of the
road is not too complex.”).
538. See infra Parts VI.D.2, VI.D.3, VI.D.4.
539. Adopted Regulation, supra note 534, §§ 3–4.
540. See supra Part VI.B; see also Sarah Jacobsson Purewal, Nevada Approves Self-
Driving Cars after Google Lobbying Push, PCWORLD, Feb. 17, 2012, available at
www.pcworld.com/article/250179/nevada_approves_self_driving_cars_after_google_
lobbying_push.html (“According to [DMV director Bruce] Breslow, operators of
driverless cars will be allowed to text and drive – but not drink and drive. ‘There is no
exemption for drinking and driving,’ he told the AP.”).
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In understanding the remaining portions of the regulation, it is im-
portant to distinguish between (1) the testing of autonomous vehicles
for research and development and (2) the sale and consumer opera-
tion of these vehicles by state residents. Although both are addressed
in the regulation, testing receives more detailed treatment. As the
DMV explains in its informational statement, “[s]ince the autonomous
technology will not be available to the public immediately, the De-
partment will be implementing the certification of compliance facili-
ties and vehicle registration program requirements directly after
completing the testing phase of this project.”541
The safety requirements specified by the regulation generally apply
to both test vehicles and consumer vehicles.542 Both must have a sepa-
rate data recorder that “capture[s] . . . sensor data for at least 30
seconds before a collision occurs” and stores that data “for 3 years
after the date of the collision,” have a “switch to engage and disen-
gage the autonomous vehicle,” “safely alert the operator to take con-
trol . . . if a technology failure is detected,” and “not adversely affect
any other safety features . . . subject to federal regulation.”543 In addi-
tion, a test vehicle must be “safe to operate.”544 A consumer vehicle
must additionally be “capable of being operated in compliance with
the applicable traffic laws,” “indicate whether [it] may be operated
with or without the physical presence of an operator,” be able to
“safely move out of traffic and come to a stop” as required, have a
visual indicator that it is operating autonomously, and “allow[ ] the
operator,” should the physical presence of one be required, “to take
control of the autonomous vehicle in multiple manners.”545
A person that wishes to test a vehicle must obtain a one-year license
by completing the appropriate DMV form (currently available on-
line),546 affirming that the vehicle meets the relevant safety require-
ments above, showing insurance coverage, proving that its vehicles
“have been driven by the applicant for a combined minimum of not
less than 10,000 miles in autonomous mode” and “in various condi-
tions for a number of miles that demonstrates the safety of
the . . . vehicles in those conditions,” demonstrating the technology for
approval, proposing geographic locations and establishing the capabil-
ity of its vehicles in those conditions, providing a surety bond or
541. Informational Statement, supra note 535, at 6; see also Autonomous Vehicles,
NEV. DMV, www.dmvnv.com/autonomous.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2013) (“Cur-
rently, the DMV is accepting applications for testing only. Autonomous vehicles are
not available to the general public.”).
542. Compare Adopted Regulation, supra note 534, § 8 with § 16.
543. Adopted Regulation, supra note 534, §§ 8, 16.
544. Id. § 8.
545. Id. § 16.
546. See Autonomous Vehicle Testing License, NEV. DMV (Jan. 2012),
www.dmvnv.com/pdfforms/obl326.pdf.
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cash,547 providing other information required by the DMV, and apply-
ing for special license plates.548 The DMV may deny, suspend, revoke,
or not renew a testing license.549
A testing licensee may only test its vehicles in the general areas and
conditions for which it has received approval.550 These currently in-
clude six geographic categories (interstate highways, state highways,
urban environments, complex urban environments,551 residential
roads, and unpaved/unmarked roads) and five environmental types
(night driving, rain, fog, snow/ice, and wind); more detail about these
categories is provided in the application packet available online.552 At
least two trained persons who are licensed in their state of residence
must be physically present in and actively monitoring the vehicle at all
times during highway testing, unless this requirement is waived by the
DMV.553 In addition, the licensee must report all crashes and citations
to the DMV.554
The remaining significant regulatory provisions apply only to con-
sumer vehicles and not to test vehicles. Moreover, the provisions gov-
erning sale apply only to sales within the state,555 and the provisions
governing operation apply only to operation by residents of the
state.556
A “certificate of compliance” is required “[b]efore an autonomous
vehicle may be offered for sale by a licensed vehicle dealer” and
“[b]efore an autonomous vehicle may be registered.”557 As noted, it is
not required for testing.558 It can be issued by a manufacturer of the
autonomous vehicle or by a licensed “autonomous technology certifi-
cation facility”—though, as also noted below, the text is not entirely
clear how this applies to the manufacturer.559 The issuer certifies that
the installed autonomous technology meets the relevant safety stan-
dards and that the owner’s manual “describes any limitations and ca-
pabilities of the autonomous vehicle.”560
An applicant to operate a certification facility must complete the
appropriate DMV form (which is not yet available), “submit such
547. $1 million for up to 5 vehicles, $2 million for 6 to 10 vehicles, and $3 million for
more than 10 vehicles. Adopted Regulation, supra note 534, § 8.
548. Id. §§ 8–11.
549. Id. § 12.
550. Id. § 9.
551. A portion of urban Las Vegas is currently Nevada’s only “complex urban envi-
ronment.” Autonomous Vehicle Testing License, supra note 546.
552. Id.
553. Adopted Regulation, supra note 534, § 10.
554. Id.
555. Id. §§ 4, 16.
556. Id. § 5.
557. Id. §§ 6, 16.
558. Id. § 16.
559. See id. § 6.
560. Id. § 16.
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proof as the [DMV] deems necessary or appropriate to demonstrate
that the applicant possesses the necessary knowledge and expertise to
certify the safety of autonomous vehicles including, without limitation,
whether the autonomous vehicles meet the requirements for the issu-
ance of a certificate of compliance,” provide a surety bond or cash of
$500,000, make its facility available for inspection and, if required,
“demonstrate the manner in which autonomous vehicles will be certi-
fied,” and make financial information available.561 A successful appli-
cant may then issue a certificate of compliance “to a manufacturer of
an autonomous vehicle or to any other person who wishes to obtain
such a certificate for a new or used vehicle with autonomous technol-
ogy.”562 Notably, however, a manufacturer can also issue its own cer-
tificate.563 The DMV may deny, suspend, or revoke a certification
facility license.564
A person who holds a Nevada driver’s license and “wishes to oper-
ate an autonomous vehicle in autonomous mode in [the] State” must
obtain a “G” endorsement on her license.565 Such an endorsement is
not required for testing or for out-of-state drivers.566 The applicant
must complete the appropriate DMV form (which is not yet availa-
ble), “acknowledge that the operator is subject at all times to the traf-
fic laws and other laws,” and “provide such additional information as
the [DMV] deems necessary.”567
To register an autonomous vehicle in Nevada, its owner must sub-
mit, inter alia, a copy of the certificate of compliance and proof of
insurance coverage.568 Upon registration, the DMV “will issue license
plates to the owner of the vehicle indicating that the vehicle is an au-
tonomous vehicle.”569
Nevada subsequently incorporated some of these regulatory re-
quirements into its statutory law.570
5. Florida Recognizes the Legality of These Vehicles
With its enactment of Committee Substitute House Bill (CS/HB)
1207 in 2012, Florida became the second U.S. state to expressly regu-
late autonomous driving.571 The legislation:
561. Id. § 18.
562. Id. § 19.
563. Id. § 6.
564. Id. § 23.
565. Id. §§ 5, 27.
566. See id. §§ 5, 10.
567. Id. § 5.
568. Id. § 6.
569. Id.
570. Nev. S.B. 313 (2013), available at leg.state.nv.us/Session/77th2013/Reports/
history.cfm?ID=759.
571. H.B. 1207 Fla., 2012 Leg. (Fla. 2012), codified in FLA. STAT. chs. 316, 319
(2013).
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• defines “autonomous vehicle” and “autonomous technology”;572
• declares the legislature’s intent to promote autonomous
technology;573
• “finds that the state does not prohibit or specifically regulate the
testing or operation of autonomous technology in motor vehi-
cles on public roads”;574
• states that a “person who possesses a valid driver license may
operate an autonomous vehicle in autonomous mode”;575
• deems the person who “causes the vehicle’s autonomous tech-
nology to engage” to be the operator of that vehicle;576
• specifies certain requirements for autonomous vehicles regis-
tered in the state;577
• specifies certain requirements for testing an autonomous vehicle
in the state;578
• recognizes limitations on the liability of “the original manufac-
turer” of a vehicle for “alleged defects” related to the conver-
sion of that vehicle “by a third party into an autonomous
vehicle”;579 and
• directs the preparation by February 12, 2014 of a report “recom-
mending [any] additional legislative or regulatory action.”
The entire legislation, which is less than three pages long, concisely
details these provisions.
572. Fla. H.B. 1207 §§ 1, 2, codified in FLA. STAT. § 316.003.
573. Fla. H.B. 1207 § 1.
574. Curiously, the legislative analysis of CS/HB 1207 contradicts this finding by
asserting that “[t]he only jurisdiction in the world where it is legal to operate autono-
mous vehicles on public roads is in the state of Nevada, where a law authorizing them
passed in June 2011.” Final Bill Analysis, CS/HB 1207, Summary Analysis, FLA.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2, www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Documents/load-
doc.aspx?FileName=h1207z1.THSS.DOCX&DocumentType=Analysis&BillNumber
=1207&Session=2012 (last visited Dec. 23, 2013).
575. Fla. H.B. 1207 § 3 (2012), codified in FLA. STAT. § 316.85 (2013).
576. Id.
577. The vehicle must “continue to meet federal standards and regulations for a
motor vehicle,” have an “easily accessible” “means to engage and disengage the au-
tonomous technology,” provide a visual indication inside the vehicle that “the vehicle
is operating in autonomous mode,” provide an alert of a “technology failure affecting
the ability of the vehicle to safely operate autonomously,” and “[b]e capable of being
operated in compliance with the applicable traffic and motor vehicle laws of this
state.” Fla. H.B. 1207 § 4 (2012), codified in FLA. STAT. § 319.145. NHTSA regula-
tions “shall supersede” these requirements “when found to be in conflict with” them.
Id.
578. A human operator able “to monitor . . . and intervene” must be present in the
vehicle if tested in traffic, and “the entity performing the testing must submit [a satis-
factory] instrument of insurance, surety bond, or proof of self-insurance . . . in the
amount of $5 million.” Fla. H.B. 1207 § 5 (2012), codified in FLA. STAT. § 319.145
(2013).
579. Fla. H.B. 1207 § 5 (2012), codified in FLA. STAT. § 316.86 (2013). Neither the
legislation nor Florida’s motor vehicle statutes defines the term “original manufac-
turer.” See Fla. H.B. 1207; FLA. STAT. chs. 316–25 (2013).
2014] AUTOMATED VEHICLES ARE PROBABLY LEGAL 507
6. California Also Recognizes the Legality of These Vehicles
With its enactment of Senate Bill (SB) 1298 in 2012, California be-
came the third U.S. state to expressly regulate autonomous driving.580
The legislation:
• declares the legislature’s intent to both promote and ensure the
safety of autonomous vehicles;581
• finds that the state “presently does not prohibit or specifically
regulate the operation of autonomous vehicles”;582
• directs the state Department of Motor Vehicles to adopt rules by
the beginning of 2015;583
• maintains the current legal status until these rules are
adopted;584
• defines “autonomous vehicle” and “autonomous technology”;585
• defines the operator as “the person who is seated in the driver’s
seat, or if there is no person in the driver’s seat, causes the au-
tonomous technology to engage”;586
• specifies certain basic requirements for testing an autonomous
vehicle;587
• specifies certain basic requirements for operating an autono-
mous vehicle;588
• specifies additional procedural steps to gain approval to operate
an autonomous vehicle without a driver inside;589 and
• requires manufacturers of autonomous technologies to disclose
data collection to purchasers.590
California’s Department of Motor Vehicles is currently developing
regulations to implement this statute.591
7. Bills Have Been Introduced in Other States
The District of Columbia592 and the State of Michigan593 have also
enacted laws expressly regulating automated driving, and other states
580. S.B. 1298 (Cal. 2012), codified in CAL. VEH. CODE div. 16.6, § 38750 (West
2013).
581. Cal. S.B. 1298 § 1.
582. Id.








591. See generally California Department of Motor Vehicles, Autonomous Vehicles
in California, www.dmv.ca.gov/vr/autonomous/auto.htm (last visited April 7, 2014).
592. D.C. Law L19-0278 (2013), available at dcclims1.dccouncil.us/lims/legislation.
aspx?LegNo=B19-0931.
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are considering relevant legislation. For the current status of these
bills, see the website cited below.594
E. States May Wish to Clarify the Legal Status of
Automated Driving
The draft bill language that follows begins to address some of the
issues raised in this article. However, a bill that simply adopts this
language would be incomplete and possibly premature. The language
does not directly address vehicle standards, general tort liability, in-
surance, data collection, transportation planning, environmental im-
pact assessment, or other areas relevant to automated vehicles. In
addition, it is subject to revision; a current version is available at the
website provided.595
The main feature of this draft is its distinction between an auto-
mated vehicle’s ordinary and “virtual” drivers.596 The natural person
occupying or otherwise using an automated vehicle is subject to ex-
isting rules of the road unless the manufacturer or insurer of the vehi-
cle has assumed these responsibilities by registering as a virtual driver.
Explanation of the other provisions is provided in the accompanying
footnotes.
1. Background.
1.1. Legislative intent. It is the intent of the Legislature to facili-
tate the development and deployment of automated vehicles
in a way that improves highway safety.597
1.2. Conventional operation. Nothing in this Act is intended or
shall be construed to change existing statutory law as ap-
plied to vehicles neither under nor transitioning from auto-
mated operation.598
593. Mich. Act No. 231 of 2013 (2014), available at www.legislature.mi.gov/docu-
ments/2013-2014/publicact/pdf/2013-PA-0231.pdf. Notably, Michigan’s legislation pro-
vides that “a person shall not operate an automated motor vehicle upon a highway or
street in automatic mode” unless that person is an approved manufacturer operating
the vehicle for research or testing purposes in accordance with specified require-
ments. Id. secs. 663, 665.
594. Gabriel Weiner and Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Driving: Legislative and
Regulatory Action, cyberlaw.stanford.edu/wiki/index.php/Automated_Driving:_Legis-
lative_and_Regulatory_Action (last visited Dec. 23, 2013).
595. Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Driving: State Model Bill, cyberlaw.stan-
ford.edu/wiki/index.php/Automated_Driving:_State_Model_Bill.
596. See infra §§ 3.7–3.9, 5, 7.3.
597. This language provides a legislative basis for courts and administrative agen-
cies to more flexibly interpret existing and new law with respect to automated
vehicles.
598. This provision expressly preserves existing interpretations of driving laws as
applied to conventional vehicles and automated vehicles being operated convention-
ally. The “transitioning” language is necessary to cover cases where automated opera-
tion has ended but no human has resumed real-time input or where a platoon is
dispersing. See infra §§ 3.7–3.9, 7.6. Some new provisions in this draft, however, do
apply to both conventional and automated vehicles. See, e.g., infra §§ 4, 7.8, 7.9.
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1.3. Vehicle owners. Nothing in this Act is intended or shall be
construed to abridge the existing statutory civil liability of
any vehicle owner.599
1.4. Geneva Convention. The Legislature hereby finds that auto-
mated operation of vehicles under the conditions prescribed
herein is consistent with article 8 of the Convention on Road
Traffic because (1) such operation has the potential to signif-
icantly improve highway safety, one of the objects of the
Convention; (2) this State shall make such operation reason-
ably knowable to the foreign visitors contemplated by the
Convention; (3) the Convention implicitly permits indirect
control over vehicles and animals; (4) there shall remain a
licensed driver of each vehicle who shall be able to specify
or accept the parameters of operation; and (5) these param-
eters shall be consistent with the traffic laws of this State.600
2. Agency implementation.
2.1. The Department shall by rule define certain automation
profiles.601
2.2. The Department shall by rule define certain test vehicle
profiles.602
2.3. The Department shall by rule establish requirements for
automation-only licenses.603
2.4. The Department shall by rule establish requirements for vir-
tual licenses.604
2.5. The Department may by rule establish standards for the col-
lection, transmission, retention, disclosure, use, or owner-
ship of data generated by or for motor vehicles.605
2.6. The Department shall make and maintain all other rules
necessary to fully implement this Act, except that the De-
partment may in its sole discretion decide to act through in-
599. This language ensures that state statutes regarding owner liability (for the pur-
pose of, inter alia, insurance, moving and parking violations, and driver negligence)
are not affected by changes to, inter alia, the definition of driver and the rules of the
road. See supra Part VI.A.3; infra §§ 3.7–3.9, 7. For example, even if the vehicle owner
does not directly initiate automated operation, the vehicle’s effective driver would
still be considered a permitted driver for the purpose of vicarious civil liability. How-
ever, this language does not preclude specification of minimum levels of criminal cul-
pability. See infra §§ 7.9–7.10.
600. See supra Part IV.E.4.
601. See infra § 3.5.
602. See infra §§ 3.11–3.12.
603. See infra § 5.
604. Id.
605. This language covers privacy and security of and access to data, including logs
for crashes and other incidents.
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formal adjudication rather than through informal
rulemaking.606
2.7. The Department shall implement this Act in accordance
with (1) all standards enacted by the National Highway Traf-
fic Safety Administration and, to the extent that the Depart-
ment in its sole discretion deems practicable, (2) relevant
guidelines enacted by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, (3) relevant standards adopted by SAE In-
ternational or the International Organization for Standardi-
zation, and (4) relevant regulations adopted by the
Department of Motor Vehicles of the State of California.607
2.8. The Department shall implement this Act in consultation
with [ the State Highway Patrol ] and [ the Department of
Transportation ], but the failure to consult shall not provide
a basis for judicial invalidation of an otherwise lawful rule or
decision.608
2.9. The Department may recommend additional statutory
changes to the Legislature.609
3. Definitions.
3.1. Automated operation means computer direction of a vehi-
cle’s steering, braking, and accelerating without real-time
human input.610
3.2. Automated vehicle means a motor vehicle capable of auto-
mated operation.611
3.3. Automation package means the combination of hardware
and software necessary for automated operation.612
606. This provision gives the Department the authority, but not the obligation, to
enact rules other than those specifically mandated in this section. This is because an
extensive ex ante rulemaking process may be futile, wasteful, or limiting when many
questions of implementation, including the proper treatment of particular technolo-
gies and products, are likely to be highly novel or contextual.
607. This language recognizes (and perhaps invites) federal preemption. See supra
Part V. It also encourages other means of standardization. SAE International has an
autonomous vehicle standards committee (on which I serve). See sources cited supra
note 36. California is the most populous state and may be one of the first to promul-
gate automated vehicle performance standards. See supra Part VI.D.3.
608. Vehicle automation implicates issues and expertise that may lie outside a de-
partment of motor vehicles. The names and organizational relationships of agencies
vary by state.
609. Florida’s autonomous driving statute requires such a report. See supra Part
VI.D.2.
610. See supra Part III. This definition may be broader than those adopted to date.
See supra Part VI.D. However, the Department may define multiple automation
profiles. See supra § 3.5; infra § 6.3.
611. Id. Accordingly, an automated vehicle is not necessarily under automated
operation.
612. The Nevada, Florida, and California laws use the term “autonomous technol-
ogy” to refer to a similar concept. See supra Part VI.D. The concept is particularly
relevant to the conversion of a conventional production vehicle into an automated
vehicle. See infra § 4.2.
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3.4. Automation period means the moment that automated op-
eration begins until the moment that a natural person (1)
provides real-time input other than to mitigate an imminent
risk, (2) turns off the vehicle, or (3) otherwise acts as speci-
fied by rule of the Department.613
3.5. Automation profile means a set of technical characteristics
describing a particular kind of automated operation.614
3.6. Department means the [ Department of Motor Vehicles ].615
3.7. Drive and operate each mean [ as provided in the vehicle
code and case law ], except that the effective driver exclu-
sively drives and operates an automated vehicle during an
automation period.616
3.8. Driver and operator each mean [ as provided in the vehicle
code and case law ], except that the effective driver is the
exclusive driver and operator of an automated vehicle dur-
ing an automation period.617
3.9. Effective driver means:
3.9.1. If automated operation is initiated to mitigate an im-
minent risk, the natural person operating the vehicle
immediately prior to such initiation;618
3.9.2. Else the vehicle’s virtual driver;619
3.9.3. Else the natural person who actually or, by rule of
the Department, presumptively initiates automated
operation;620
613. See infra §§ 3.7–3.9. The transition from automated operation raises difficult
questions regarding responsibility. Even if automated operation has terminated, the
effective driver’s responsibility continues until an ordinary human driver has actually
intervened. This language also balances, no doubt imperfectly, the risk of a human
intervening when inappropriate with the risk of a human failing to intervene when
needed.
614. This refers to the relevant characteristics of the vehicle, human, and environ-
ment, including the level of automation and the domain of operation. See supra Part
III.
615. Agency names and responsibilities vary by state. See also sources cited supra
note 608.
616. See supra § 3.4; text accompanying supra note 596.
617. Id. Depending on the jurisdiction, the modifier “exclusive” may be too restric-
tive. Cf., e.g., sources cited supra note 312.
618. This provision specifies that the ordinary human driver remains responsible if
an emergency intervention system engages automatically because of an impending
crash or because that driver has become incapacitated.
619. This applies only if the vehicle actually has a virtual driver. See infra §§ 3.13,
5.2.
620. If there is no virtual driver, then the person who initiated automated operation
is the effective driver. This is similar to Nevada and Florida law. See supra Parts
VI.D.1–2. The Department may establish a presumption that another person, such as
the vehicle occupant nearest the conventional apparatus, has initiated automated op-
eration. Cf. supra Part VI.D.3 (California driver rule for autonomous vehicles); supra
note 362 (Wisconsin driver presumptions).
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3.9.4. Else the vehicle’s owner;621
3.9.5. Additionally any person who in willful or wanton
disregard for the safety of persons or property
initiates, permits, or tampers with automated
operation.622
3.10. Manufacturer means any person engaged in the business of
constructing or assembling vehicles of a type required to be
registered under [ this title ].623
3.11. Test vehicle means a vehicle registered as a platform for
research, development, or demonstration of automated op-
eration or, by rule of the Department, other safety-critical
vehicle systems.624
3.12. Test vehicle profile means a set of technical characteristics
describing a particular kind of test vehicle operation.625
3.13. Virtual driver means, with respect to an automated vehicle,
any person holding a virtual license covering that vehicle
for the pertinent part of its automation profile.626
4. Vehicle registration.
4.1. When registering or renewing the registration of any motor
vehicle, the Department shall ascertain and record that ve-
hicle’s (1) automation profile and (2) virtual driver, if
any.627
4.2. Any modification to a motor vehicle or its equipment that
alters its automation package shall invalidate its registra-
tion, unless such alteration is (1) required by law, (2) by or
on behalf of the vehicle’s manufacturer, (3) to a test vehicle
621. This applies if no natural person initiates automated operation, which could
conceivably occur with automated taxi dispatch, carsharing fleet management, fully
automated delivery, and other advanced logistics applications.
622. This language potentially broadens the criminal and civil liability of a person
who causes or could cause harm with an automated vehicle but who may not other-
wise be considered a driver.
623. See UNIF. VEH. CODE § 1-152 (2000); infra § 5.2.3. This definition excludes a
person who only manufacturers or installs an automation package.
624. See supra § 2.2.
625. This refers to the relevant characteristics of the vehicle, human, and environ-
ment, including the level of automation and the domain of operation. See supra Part
III.
626. See supra § 3.9; infra § 5.2. This language leaves open the possibility that, for
example, a vehicle may have a virtual driver during automated parking but not during
highway cruising.
627. This provision enables the Department to identify the technical capability of
every vehicle registered in the state. Current vehicle identification numbers (VINs),
for example, do not indicate whether vehicles have any driver assistance systems. See
sources cited supra note 268. The provision also links certain vehicles with virtual
drivers. See infra § 5.2.
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in accordance with its registration, or (4) otherwise permit-
ted by rule of the Department.628
4.3. The Department may decline to register or, with reasona-
ble notice to the owner and the virtual license holder, sus-
pend, revoke, or decline to renew the registration of any
motor vehicle that it determines to be unsafe, improperly
equipped, or otherwise unfit to be operated on a
highway.629
4.4. In making a determination regarding the registration of
any motor vehicle, the Department may by rule or practice
treat as conclusive a decision by the responsible agency of
another state to permit or restrict the registration, sale, op-
eration, or testing of the relevant make, model, kind, or
category of motor vehicle or equipment.630
4.5. The registration of a motor vehicle shall create no pre-




5.1.1. Any natural person of legal driving age who solely
by reason of physical disability is ineligible for a [
regular noncommercial ] driving license shall be eli-
gible for an automation-only license.
5.1.2. Each automation-only license shall specify condi-
tions of operation, including particular automation
profiles to which it is restricted.
5.1.3. Any person who holds a valid automation-only li-
cense may operate an automated vehicle in accor-
dance with those conditions of operation.
628. The vehicle registration process can provide a mechanism for supervising the
safety of automated vehicles, including aftermarket conversions of conventional vehi-
cles. If an automation package is installed, customized, or changed on a vehicle, the
owner of that vehicle must reregister it. Voluntary and involuntary recalls, manufac-
turer upgrades, and changes to certain test vehicles are exempted. In addition, the
Department can promulgate rules that provide flexibility in the application or admin-
istration of this provision.
629. See id. This provision enables the Department to indirectly prohibit (albeit not
prevent) the operation of any vehicle that it determines to be unsafe, provided that
the vehicle is registered in the state. This provision complements the direct prohibi-
tion on such operation, which also applies to out-of-state vehicles. See infra § 7.8.
630. This is intended to facilitate standardization and reduce the workload on the
Department. See also supra § 2.7.
631. This specifies that no court should deem a vehicle to be safe or lawful simply
because it is registered.
632. This draft maintains the requirement that drivers be licensed and therefore
enables certain persons who are currently ineligible for a license to receive a condi-
tional license valid only for automated vehicles with certain characteristics, regardless
of whether such vehicles yet exist. See supra Part VI.D.1. Operation may involve sim-
ply starting a vehicle and initiating automated operation. See supra § 3.9.
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5.2. Virtual license.633
5.2.1. Any person, natural or otherwise, who meets re-
quirements established by the Department shall be
eligible for a virtual license.634
5.2.2. Each virtual license shall cover a specific kind of
automated vehicle for all or part of its automation
profile.635
5.2.3. The Department may require that the holder of a
virtual license be the manufacturer or insurer of the
vehicles covered by that license.636
5.2.4. Any statutory requirements for a driving license
that in the Department’s determination reasonably
pertain only to a natural person shall not apply to
an applicant for a virtual license who is not a natu-
ral person.637
5.2.5. The Department may, with reasonable notice to the
license holder and owner of any covered vehicle,
suspend, revoke, or restrict a virtual license.638
6. Equipment.
6.1. General. [ This title’s ] vehicle and equipment provisions
shall be interpreted to facilitate the development and de-
ployment of automated vehicles in a way that improves
highway safety.639
6.2. Standards. Any vehicle sold, registered, modified for sale,
or operated on any highway in this State shall comply with
(1) all applicable standards enacted by the National High-
way Traffic Safety Administration and (2) all applicable
standards enacted by the Department.640
6.3. [ Automated vehicles. ]641
633. See text accompanying supra note 596.
634. Requirements might address, inter alia, the performance of the automated ve-
hicles and the ability of the applicant or its insurer to pay any judgments entered
against it. See also infra note 636.
635. Again, this language leaves open the possibility that, for example, a vehicle
may have a virtual driver during automated parking but not during highway cruising.
See sources cited supra note 626.
636. This language expressly permits but does not require the Department to re-
strict virtual licenses to entities that are already subject to well-established regulatory
regimes and that have a connection to the vehicles covered. Such a requirement may
also ensure that virtual licenses are not used to limit liability exposure. Cf., e.g.,
Walkovsky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1966).
637. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 399–401.
638. Cf. supra § 4.3.
639. Cf. supra § 1.1.
640. See supra § 4.3; infra § 7.8. This provision also applies to vehicles registered
outside the state.
641. This draft does not address specific substantive safety standards for automated
vehicles.
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7. Rules of the road.
7.1. General. [ This title’s ] rules of the road shall be interpreted
to facilitate the development and deployment of auto-
mated vehicles in a way that improves highway safety.642
7.2. Qualitative standards. No rule shall be interpreted to im-
pose a greater obligation on drivers of automated vehicles
than on drivers of vehicles that are not automated, unless
the Department by rule specifies otherwise.643
7.3. Virtual drivers. Any language in [ this title ] that [ the De-
partment ] by rule determines cannot reasonably refer to a
virtual driver shall instead refer to a different person or to
no person at all, in each case as specified in such rule.644
7.4. Unattended vehicles. A vehicle that is under automated
operation by a virtual driver shall not be deemed unat-
tended unless it is not lawfully registered, poses a risk to
public safety, or unreasonably obstructs other road
users.645
7.5. Abandoned vehicles. A vehicle that is under automated
operation by a virtual driver shall not be deemed aban-
doned unless it is not lawfully registered, poses a risk to
public safety, or unreasonably obstructs other road
users.646
7.6. Following distance. A platoon that consists of at least one
vehicle under automated operation by a virtual driver and
that is otherwise lawful and operating lawfully shall not be
deemed in violation of following-distance requirements.647
7.7. Reckless driving. Any person who in willful or wanton dis-
regard for the safety of persons or property initiates, per-
mits, or tampers with automated operation of a vehicle is
guilty of reckless driving.648
642. Cf. supra § 1.1. This draft also assumes that the state code specifies that violat-
ing a traffic law constitutes a punishable offense. See, e.g., UNIF. VEH. CODE § 11-
102(a) (2000) (“It is unlawful, and unless otherwise declared in this chapter with re-
spect to particular offenses, it is a (misdemeanor) (violation) for any person to do any
act forbidden or fail to perform any act required in this chapter.”). If the state code
does not contain such language, particular offenses corresponding to provisions in this
draft should also be defined.
643. See supra Part VI.C.3.
644. See, e.g., supra Part VI.D.2.
645. See, e.g., supra Part VI.D.2. This exception applies only if the vehicle has a
virtual driver.
646. See, e.g., supra Part VI.D.2. This exception applies only if the vehicle has a
virtual driver.
647. See infra Part VIII. This exception applies only if the vehicle has a virtual
driver.
648. Under this provision, certain persons who are not operating an automated ve-
hicle might nonetheless commit reckless driving. References to other vehicular
crimes, such as vehicular homicide, may also be appropriate. Cf. also supra § 3.9.5.
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7.8. Unsafe vehicles. No person shall operate any vehicle that is
unsafe, improperly equipped, or otherwise unfit to be
operated.649
7.9. Vehicular felonies. No person shall be guilty of any felony
specified in [ this title ] without a culpability at least equal
to that specified or, if none is specified, [ gross neg-
ligence ].650
7.10. Vehicular misdemeanors. No person shall be guilty of any
misdemeanor specified in [ this title ] without a culpability
at least equal to that specified or, if none is specified, [ neg-
ligence ].651
7.11. Due care in vehicles under automated operation. Notwith-
standing other provisions of [ this title ] or of any local or-
dinance, every driver or occupant of a vehicle under
automated operation shall exercise due care as circum-
stances require to avoid injury to any natural person.652
The foregoing draft language might provide at most a starting point
for any jurisdiction’s analysis. Consistency among states—and coordi-
nation with the federal government—may be highly desirable. At the
same time, as this article has documented, state vehicle codes vary in
both form and substance. A legislature may want or need to delegate
more or less discretionary authority to its department of motor vehi-
cles or other responsible agency. And new technologies or business
cases may require or merit revision of certain provisions—or even the
entire approach. For these reasons and others, a current version of this
language is available at the website provided.653 The law of automated
vehicles is necessarily living.
VII. CONCLUSION
Current law probably does not prohibit automated vehicles—but
may nonetheless discourage their introduction or complicate their op-
eration. Key issues include the precise definition of these human-ma-
chine systems, the concept of control under the Geneva Convention,
the potential for future regulation by the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, and the application of myriad state laws con-
cerning drivers and driving behavior. Five near-term recommenda-
649. This language restates a common statutory provision. See supra Part VI.C.1. It
provides a basis to remove unsafe vehicles from a highway, regardless of where or if
they are registered.
650. The application of existing traffic laws to automated vehicle users could pro-
duce certain anomalous results, particularly in the absence of a virtual driver. This
provision establishes a minimum level of culpability for certain offenses, some of
which may be specified in other titles.
651. See sources cited supra note 650.
652. A person who can prevent a foreseeable injury should not fail to do so simply
because she is not the legal driver of her vehicle.
653. Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Driving: State Model Bill, supra note 595.
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tions might provide some initial clarity without placing law too far
ahead of technology.
First, regulators and standards organizations should work to de-
velop common vocabularies and definitions that are meaningful in
both law and engineering and accessible to the public and the media.
Second, the United States should closely monitor efforts to amend
or interpret the Vienna Convention as an example for or caution re-
garding any potential effort to clarify the Geneva Convention.
Third, NHTSA should provide public guidance about the likely
scope and schedule of any initial regulatory action it may take with
respect to automated vehicles.
Fourth, states should closely examine their vehicle codes to deter-
mine how those codes would or should apply to automated vehicles
both with and without an identifiable human operator.
Finally, there may be value in further research on the regulatory
regimes applicable to special motor vehicles, including taxicabs,
trucks, buses, personal transporters (including Segways), golf carts,
and low-speed vehicles.654 These technologies are important as poten-
tial applications for automated vehicles, and these regimes are impor-
tant as potential analogies for the specific regulation of such vehicles.
More generally, the law plays a crucial role in creating, defining,
discussing, and managing many of the risks and opportunities posed
by automated vehicles. Clearly understanding the current legal status
of these vehicles is therefore an important step toward ultimately real-
izing their potential.
654. See, e.g., Bryant Walker Smith, A Legal Perspective on Three Misconceptions
in Vehicle Automation, in ROAD VEHICLE AUTOMATION, Springer Lecture Notes in
Mobility (forthcoming 2014).
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VIII. APPENDIX 1: MANY STATE VEHICLE CODES PROBABLY DO
PROHIBIT AUTOMATED VEHICLE PLATOONS
Vehicle platoons—convoys of tightly spaced and closely coordi-
nated vehicles that use at least some automation655—are probably
consistent with the Geneva Convention and federal motor vehicle
safety standards but probably conflict with following-distance require-
ments in many U.S. states.
The Geneva Convention recognizes that road traffic might move in
groups. If platoons are treated as convoys, the Convention imposes no
hard requirements beyond compliance with domestic law: “Convoys
of vehicles and animals shall have the number of drivers prescribed by
domestic regulations” and “shall, if necessary, be divided into sections
of moderate length, and be sufficiently spaced out for the convenience
of traffic.”656
Platoons likewise do not appear to be uniquely burdened by any
federal motor vehicle safety standard, subject to the same caveats
noted above.657 Federal rules specific to commercial operations, in-
cluding trucks, trucking, and truckers, may be particularly relevant to
platoons but are outside this article’s scope.
Platoons implicate many of the state laws discussed above658 and
raise at least three additional issues.659 The first is straightforward:
Each platoon is likely to be treated as a series of vehicles rather than
as a single vehicle. A “[v]ehicle” is generally “[e]very device in, upon,
or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn
upon a highway, excepting devices used exclusively upon stationary
655. See sources cited supra note 12.
656. Geneva Convention, supra note 52, art. 8. The division and spacing of convoys
is not required in “regions where migration of nomads occurs.” Id. The Convention
would only impede platoons if they are treated as “combination[s] of vehicles pro-
ceeding as a unit.” Such combinations “may be composed of a drawing vehicle and
one or two trailers,” id. annex 6 at IV(a) and must have a driver, id. art. 8. “An
articulated vehicle may draw a trailer, but if such articulated vehicle is used for the
carriage of passengers, the trailer shall have not more than one axle and shall not
carry passengers.” Id. annex 6 at IV(a). “Any Contracting State may, however, indi-
cate that it will only permit that one trailer be drawn by a vehicle and that it will not
permit an articulated vehicle to draw a trailer. It may also indicate that it will not
permit articulated vehicles for the transport of passengers.” Id. annex 6 at IV(b).
657. See supra Part V.
658. See supra Part VI.
659. Other statutes may also be marginally relevant. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 21711 (West 2013) (“No person shall operate a train of vehicles when any vehicle
being towed whips or swerves from side to side or fails to follow substantially in the
path of the towing vehicle.”).
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rails or tracks,”660 and even truck tractors, trailers, and semitrailers
are typically treated as separate vehicles.661
The second issue involves the identity of each vehicle’s driver. Some
states define driver to expressly include a person “who is exercising
control of a vehicle or steering a vehicle being towed by a motor vehi-
cle,”662 but this is not a uniform conclusion.663 Given the expansive
way in which driver and related terms are defined and interpreted,664
the primary occupants of the lead vehicle and the following vehicles
might each qualify as drivers of all or some of the platoon vehicles.665
The third issue is vehicle spacing. Research platoons have featured
vehicle gaps as low as three to four meters (ten to thirteen feet) to
improve fuel efficiency and to limit incursions by other vehicles.666
However, nearly every jurisdiction prohibits drivers from following
too closely,667 and violation of this restriction can constitute negli-
660. UNIF. VEH. CODE § 1-215 (2000); see also, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 670 (West
2013) (“A ‘vehicle’ is a device by which any person or property may be propelled,
moved, or drawn upon a highway, excepting a device moved exclusively by human
power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.”).
661. UNIF. VEH. CODE §§ 1-192, 1-209, 1-213 (2000); see also sources cited supra
note 404.
662. See sources cited supra note 307; see also 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 12 (2013).
663. See supra note 280; cf. also CAL. VEH. CODE § 305 (2013) (“The term ‘driver’
does not include the tillerman or other person who, in an auxiliary capacity, assists the
driver in the steering or operation of any articulated firefighting apparatus.”).
664. See supra Part VI.A.1.
665. Cf. supra Part VI.A.4.
666. See, e.g., Press Release, Safe Road Trains for the Environment, Partners Con-
clude after the SARTRE Project: Platooned Traffic Can Be Integrated with Other
Road Users on Conventional Highways (Sept. 17, 2012), available at www.sartre-pro-
ject.eu/en/press/Documents/SARTRE%20final%20partner%20release.pdf (minimum
of four meters); Sadayuki Tsugawa, Energy ITS: What We Learned and What We
Should Learn, 2012 Road Vehicle Automation Workshop, Transportation Research
Board (July 25, 2012), available at onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/conferences/2012/
Automation/presentations/Tsugawa.pdf (minimum of four meters); Adrian Zlocki,
KONVOI and interactIVe: Truck Platooning and Crash Avoidance, 2012 Road Vehi-
cle Automation Workshop, Transportation Research Board (July 25, 2012), available
at onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/conferences/2012/Automation/presentations/Zlocki.
pdf (minimum of ten meters); Steven E. Shladover, PATH Progress on Truck Platoons
and Bus Steering Guidance, 2012 Road Vehicle Automation Workshop, Transporta-
tion Research Board (July 25, 2012), available at onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/con-
ferences/2012/Automation/presentations/Shladover3.pdf (minimum of three meters).
667. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 32-5A-89 (2013); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 13,
§ 02.090 (2013); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-730 (2013); ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-51-
305 (2013); CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 21703-05 (West 2013); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-1008
(2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-240, 14-240a (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 4123
(2013); D.C. CODE § 18 (2013); D.C. MUN. CODE REGS. tit. 18, § 2201 (2013); GA.
CODE ANN. § 40-6-49 (2013); HAW. REV. STAT. § 291C-50 (2013); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 49-638 (2013); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-710 (2013); IND. CODE §§ 9-21-8-14 to 16
(2013); IOWA CODE §§ 321.307, 321.308 (2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1523 (2013); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:81 (2013); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 29-a, § 2066 (2013); MD. CODE
ANN. TRANSP. § 21-310 (West 2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.643, 257.643(a) (2013);
MINN. STAT. § 169.18 (2013); MISS. CODE ANN. § 63-3-619 (2013); MO. REV. STAT.
§§ 304.017, 304.044 (2013); MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-329 (2013); NEV. REV. STAT.
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gence per se.668 In particular, most states impose some variation of the
requirement that “[t]he driver of a vehicle shall not follow another
vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due re-
gard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic upon and the condi-
tion of the highway.”669 The effect of this general rule depends
entirely on the interpretation of qualitative terms like “reasonable and
prudent.”670
Most states also require certain drivers who are outside business
and residential districts to leave enough space that another vehicle
may “enter and occupy such space without danger.”671 This restriction
typically applies to trucks and to motor vehicles with trailers;672 some
states exclude truck lanes,673 and some define a specific minimum dis-
tance between 150 feet and 500 feet.674 Many states also apply this
§ 484B.127 (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 265:25 (2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-89
(West 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-7-318 (2013); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1129
(Mckinney 2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-152 (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-10-18
(2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.34 (West 2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 11-310
(2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 811.485 (2013); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3310 (2013); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 31-15-12 (2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-1930 (2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§§ 32-26-40 to 42 (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-8-124 (2013); TEX. TRANSP. CODE
ANN. § 545.062 (West 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-711 (West 2013); VT. STAT.
tit. 23, § 1039 (2013); VA. CODE § 46.2-816 (2013); WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.145
(2013); W. VA. CODE § 17C-7-10 (2013); WIS. STAT. § 346.14 (2013); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 31-5-210 (2013); GUAM CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 3320 (2013); NAVAJO NATION
CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 306 (West 2013); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 27, § 5290 (2013); UNIF.
VEH. CODE § 11-310 (2000); see generally J. H. Cooper, Driver’s Failure to Maintain
Proper Distance from Motor Vehicle Ahead, 85 A.L.R.2d 613 (2013).
668. See, e.g., Ratliff v. Duke Power Co., 151 S.E.2d 641 (N.C. 1966); Cooper, supra
note 667.
669. E.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 21703 (West 2013); FLA. STAT. § 316.0895(a) (2013);
625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-710(a) (2013); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1129(a) (McKin-
ney 2013); UNIF. VEH. CODE § 11-310(a); cf. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.062(a)
(West 2013) (“An operator shall, if following another vehicle, maintain an assured
clear distance between the two vehicles so that, considering the speed of the vehicles,
traffic, and the conditions of the highway, the operator can safely stop without collid-
ing with the preceding vehicle or veering into another vehicle, object, or person on or
near the highway.”).
670. See supra Part VI.C.3. Alabama additionally provides that “[e]xcept when
overtaking and passing another vehicle, the driver of a vehicle shall leave a distance of
at least 20 feet for each 10 miles per hour of speed between the vehicle that he or she
is driving and the vehicle that he or she is following.” ALA. CODE § 32-5A-89(a)
(2013).
671. UNIF. VEH. CODE § 11-310(b), (c) (2000).
672. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 21704 (West 2013); FLA. STAT. § 316.0895(2)
(2013); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-710(b) (2013); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1129(b)
(McKinney 2013); TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.062(b) (West 2013). These provi-
sions generally do not prohibit “overtaking and passing” by such vehicles. UNIF. VEH.
CODE § 11-310(b) (2013).
673. FLA. STAT. § 316.0895(4) (2013); IOWA CODE § 321.308 (2013); MINN. STAT.
§ 169.18(b) (2013); MISS. CODE § 63-3-619(2) (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4511.34(A) (West 2013); W. VA. CODE § 17C-7-10(b) (2013) (additionally excluding
military convoys).
674. ALA. CODE § 32-5A-89(b) (2013) (300 feet); ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-51-305(b)
(2013) (200 feet); CAL. VEH. CODE § 21704 (West 2013) (300 feet); FLA. STAT.
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general restriction to motor vehicles “in a caravan or motorcade”
other than a funeral procession,675 with a smaller number defining a
specific minimum distance between 100 and 300 feet.676
Unlike many of the other state law provisions discussed, the intent
rather than merely the wording of many of these provisions is in con-
flict with platoon operations: Caravans may not exclude other vehi-
cles. However, unlike many of the issues discussed, this restriction
could be addressed with a fairly straightforward statutory change: A
legislature might choose to exempt certain vehicles operating on cer-
tain facilities subject to certain conditions.677
§ 316.0895(4) (2013) (300 feet); IOWA CODE § 321.308 (2013) (300 feet); LA. REV.
STAT. § 32:81(B) (2013) (400 feet); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 29-a, § 2066(4) (2013) (150
feet)MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.643 (2013) (500 feet); MO. REV. STAT. § 304.044 (2013)
(300 feet); MINN. STAT. § 169.18(b) (2013) (500 feet); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-89 (West
2013) (100 feet); NEV. REV. STAT. § 484B.127(2) (2013) (500 feet); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 66-7-318(B) (2013) (300 feet); OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 11-310 (2013) (300 feet); TENN.
CODE § 55-8-124(d) (2013) (300 feet); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 346.14 (West 2013) (500
feet); W. VA. CODE § 17C-7-10(b) (2013) (200 feet).
675. UNIF. VEH. CODE § 11-310(c) (2000). Caravan and motorcade are not defined.
676. CAL. VEH. CODE § 21705 (West 2013) (100 feet); OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 11-
310(d) (2013) (200 feet); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-7-318(C) (2013) (300 feet).
677. See, e.g., supra Part VI.E., § 7.6.
